

THE

GENERAL HISTORY

OF

POLYBIUS.

Tranſlated from the GREEK

By Mr. HAMPTON.

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THE

THE GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS.

BOOK the SIXTH.

EXTRACT the FIRST*.

The origin, and natural revolutions of civil government. An analyſis of the government of Rome.

CHAP. I.

* * * WITH regard indeed to thoſe ſtates of Greece, which have been often raiſed to a high degree of ſtrength and power, and again as frequently have ſuf-

* It is altogether uncertain at what time, and by whoſe labour or direction, theſe Extracts, from the ſixth to the ſeventeenth Book, were ſelected from the Hiſtory. Caſaubon indeed judges it to have been the work of Marcus Brutus: upon the authority, as I ſuppoſe, of Plutarch and of Suidas. The firſt of theſe, ſpeaking of the behaviour of Brutus on the day before the battle of Pharſalia, ſays; "that, when dinner was ended in the camp, while others either went to ſleep, or were diſquieting their minds with apprehenſions concerning

fered an intire reverſe of fortune, it would be no hard taſk, either to treat of the

the approaching battle, he employed himſelf in writing till the evening, compoſing an Epitome of Polybius." The words of Suidas are theſe: "Brutus wrote ſome Letters; and an Epitome of the books of Polybius the Hiſtorian." But an Epitome, that is an Abridgment, is a work of a very different kind. The abridger of a Hiſtory preſerves the ſubſtance of it intire; omitting ſuch parts only as ſeem to be ſuperfluous, or of ſmall importance. He relates events in regular order, and in the due courſe of ſucceſſion. He forms a chain, of ſmaller length indeed, but compoſed of intermediate and dependent links. He employs alſo his own ſtile and language: or, if he adopts thoſe of his author, it is commonly with ſome degree of variation which renders them his own. Even in compiling what are called the heads of a Hiſtory, ſome connection and conſiſtency are ſtill required; and ſuch order of the parts, as may carry with it the appearance of an intire body. But in theſe Extracts no ſeries of hiſtory is preſerved. They are all ſingle and ſeparated portions: ſeparated from the body of the work; and not joined even by the ſmalleſt connection one with another. That they remain alſo in the very words in which they were originally written, is evident not only from the language throughout, which is ſo peculiar as to exclude all doubt, but more particularly from a ſingle circumſtance, which in this caſe is certain and deciſive. Almoſt every one of theſe ſelected portions has in the firſt ſentence one of thoſe connecting particles which ſhew that another period had gone before. Theſe particles, which add nothing to the ſenſe, which bear a manifeſt relation to ſome former ſentence, and which, by being retained, ſerve only to render the beginnning of each paſſage imperfect and abrupt, are alone ſufficient to demonſtrate, that the Extracts, as they were ſelected arbitrarily, and with no reference to any certain plan, were copied alſo with the moſt minute exactneſs, and without diminu-

events that have happened among them in paſt times, or to ſpeak with ſome aſſurance

tion or addition. If this then be the work deſigned by Plutarch and by Suidas, it muſt at leaſt be acknowledged that they have ſpoken of it in very improper terms.

But Brutus compoſed abridgements likewiſe of the books of Fannius, and of Cælius Antipater, two Roman hiſtorians: and Cicero mentions each of theſe works under the ſame title of an Epitome. In one of his letters he ſays; "that he had copied his account of a certain fact, which Atticus had controverted with him, from Brutus's Epitome of the books of Fannius; and that, as Atticus had refuted him by demonſtration, he would now refute Atticus by the authority of Brutus and of Fannius." In another letter he deſires, "that Atticus would ſend him Brutus's Epitome of the books of Cælius." And were theſe abridgements alſo barely a tranſcript of ſeparate and unconnected paſſages? It is ſcarcely to be conceived, that Brutus, if he ever had employed himſelf in a labour of this kind for the ſake of his own improvement, would have ſuffered ſuch collections to be publiſhed with his name, and be diſperſed among his friends: or that Cicero particularly ſhould have been diſpoſed to ſee or to conſult a volume of mere extracts, when the intire Hiſtories both of Fannius and Cælius, muſt undoubtedly have had a place in his library.

It ſeems then that the opinion, which aſcribes the choice of theſe Extracts to Brutus, not only is deſtitute of every kind of proof, but wants even the ſupport of probability. Other conjectures might perhaps as eaſily be offered. But nothing is more vain or trifling, than to form conjectures, when the truth itſelf, if it could be known with certainty, would be but of little value. By what perſon ſoever the choice was made, it is manifeſt that it was made with very good judgement; and that the paſſages all were copied with the moſt ſcrupulous fidelity. In this ſtate they now remain: not to be conſidered as a

concerning thoſe that muſt hereafter happen. For it is eaſy to recount tranſactions that are known; and obvious likewiſe, from an attentive view of former accidents, to derive a foreſight of the future. But with regard to the republick of the Romans, as the preſent condition of the government, on account of that variety of parts of which it is compoſed, cannot be explained without great labour; ſo, on the other hand, the want of being ſufficiently acquainted, both with the general inſtitutions, and particular conduct, that have prevailed among this people in former times, renders it not leſs difficult to pronounce concerning their future fortune. It will be neceſſary therefore to employ the cloſeſt pains, in order to obtain a diſtinct and comprehenſive knowledge of the advantages that are peculiar to the conſtitution of this ſtate.

Among thoſe then, who have treated of

Hiſtory; but as genuine and authentick materials for a hiſtory of the times to which they belong. Or rather they are to be regarded as ſo many diſtinct and ſeparate leſſons of political, military, and moral inſtruction. In this view they will be found to be truly valuable: and the queſtion, at what time, or by whom they were ſelected, like moſt other queſtions which are merely critical, is a matter of curioſity rather than of uſe.

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theſe matters in the way of ſcience, the greateſt part have diſtinguiſhed civil government into three ſeveral kinds; Royalty, Ariſtocracy, and Democracy But it may very reaſonably be demanded of theſe writers, whether they ſpeak of theſe as the only kinds, or ſimply as the beſt. In either caſe indeed they muſt be charged with error. For firſt, that kind of government is undoubtedly to be eſteemed the beſt, which is compoſed of all the three now mentioned. The proof of this is evident, from experience and from fact, as well as reaſon. Such, for example, was the ſyſtem, firſt invented by Lycurgus, and eſtabliſhed by him in Sparta. Nor is it true, on the other hand, that theſe are the only kinds. For many are the examples of monarchical and tyrannical governments, which are greatly different from royalty; though they appear indeed to bear ſome kind of reſemblance to it: which gives occaſion to all monarchs, to cover themſelves, as well as they are able, under this diſguiſe, and falſely to aſſume the regal name. There are likewiſe many oligarchical ſtates, which ſeem to approach nearly in their form to ariſtocracies; though theſe are in truth very widely diſtant from them. The ſame obſervation may be made, with reſpect alſo to

democracies. The following illuſtration will ſerve more clearly to explain my meaning.

It is not every government, which is conducted by a ſingle ſovereign, that is immediately to be termed a royalty: but that alone, which was at firſt beſtowed by the conſent of thoſe who are governed; and which is adminiſtered according to right reaſon, rather than by force and terror. In the ſame manner, neither is every ſtate to be called an ariſtocracy, which places the ſupreme direction of affairs in the hands of a few: but that only, in which thoſe who are moſt diſtinguiſhed by their prudence and integrity are appointed by free choice to govern. Nor laſtly is that to be eſteemed a democracy, in which the whole multitude uſurp the liberty of purſuing their own counſels and deſigns without controul. But when we ſee a people, who, from the ancient manners of their country, are accuſtomed to pay due worſhip to the gods, to revere their parents, to ſhew reſpect to the aged, and to obey the laws; when, in the aſſemblies of citizens like theſe, the reſolutions of the greater part are made the rule of government; then we behold the form of a juſt democracy.

There are therefore ſix different kinds of

of government: three, which are in the mouths of all men, and which have now been mentioned; and three more, that are allied to theſe by nature; Monarchy, Oligarchy, and the Government of the multitude. Of all theſe, the firſt in order is monarchy; which is eſtabliſhed by the bare work of nature, without any preparation or deſign. From monarchy ariſes royalty; when art has been applied, to correct the vices of the former. And when royalty has degenerated into it's congenial evil, which is tyranny; the deſtruction of the latter gives birth to ariſtocracy. This again being changed, according to the natural order of things, into oligarchy; the ſubjects, rouſed to vengeance by oppreſſion, reſiſt the injuſtice of their governours, and eſtabliſh a democracy. And in the laſt place, when the people themſelves become haughty and untractable, and reject all law; to democracy ſucceeds, in the courſe of time, the government of the multitude.

That this deduction is agreeable to truth, will be clear to every one, who conſiders with attention the commencement and firſt riſe, as well as the changes, which nature has appropriated to each particular kind of government. And indeed there is no other way, but by obſerving what

was the natural birth of every ſtate, to judge with certainty concerning the progreſs of it towards perfection, and from thence to decline and ruin; and to diſcern, at what time, in what manner, and into what different form it will at laſt be changed. Above all others, the Roman government may beſt be illuſtrated by ſuch a method of inquiry: becauſe this ſtate, both in it's firſt eſtabliſhment, and ſubſequent increaſe, diſplays a cloſe conformity with the ſettled laws, and regular courſe of nature.

I am not ignorant indeed, that Plato, and ſome other philoſophers, have already treated with the greateſt accuracy of the ſeveral forms of government, and their alternate revolutions. But as there are but few, that are able to comprehend the length of their diſcourſes, and the variety of matter which they contain; I ſhall endeavour rather to give a ſummary account of thoſe more obvious principles, which are adapted both to common apprehenſion, and to the purpoſes of civil hiſtory. And in caſe that any obſcurity or defect ſhould be found in the general view, the particular detail, which I ſhall afterwards ſubjoin, will afford ample compenſation, by removing every difficulty.

What then are the commencements, and what the original riſe of political ſocieties? When a deluge, a peſtilential diſeaſe, a famine, or any other ſimilar cauſe, has brought deſtruction upon the human race; as tradition aſſures us it has happened in former times, and as it is probable it will again hereafter happen; and when all arts and inſtitutions are extinguiſhed alſo in the ſame calamity; from the few, that are left alive, another progeny of men ſprings up: who, being conſcious of their natural weakneſs, and attracted, like all other animals, to an union with their own kind, aſſociate themſelves together in a body. At this time therefore, it is manifeſt, that he who is ſuperior both in ſtrength and courage muſt govern and conduct the reſt. For that this is indeed the genuine work of nature, is moſt clearly ſeen in the examples of the ſeveral kinds of animals, which are led by natural inſtinct only, unimproved by reaſon. Such are cocks, bulls, and boars, as well as other kinds: among all which, thoſe that are confeſſedly the firſt in ſtrength are placed at the head of all the herd. Such therefore is the original ſtate of men: when they aſſemble together in a manner not unlike to that of other animals; and are led by thoſe, that are the braveſt

braveſt and moſt powerful. And this ſtate may properly be called a monarchy: in which the authority of thoſe that govern is meaſured by their ſtrength. But afterwards, when in theſe ſocieties a common education and mutual intercourſe have produced new ſentiments and habits, then firſt commences royalty; then firſt ariſe in the human mind the notions of honourable and baſe, of juſt and unjuſt. Theſe ſentiments, and this change of government, are formed in the following manner.

From the union of the two ſexes, to which all are naturally inclined, children are born. When any of theſe therefore, being arrived at perfect age, inſtead of yielding ſuitable returns, of gratitude and of aſſiſtance, to thoſe by whom they have been bred, on the contrary attempt to injure them, either by words or actions; it is manifeſt, that thoſe who behold the wrong, after having alſo ſeen the ſufferings and the anxious care that were ſuſtained by the parents in the nouriſhment and education of theſe children, muſt be greatly offended and diſpleaſed at ſuch proceeding. For man, who among all the various kinds of animals is alone endowed with the faculty of reaſon, cannot, like the reſt, paſs over ſuch actions with indifference:

indifference: but will make reflection on what he ſees; and, comparing likewiſe the future with the preſent, will not fail to expreſs his indignation at this injurious treatment; to which, as he foreſees, he alſo may at ſome time be expoſed. Thus again, when any one, who has been ſuccoured by another in the time of danger, inſtead of ſhewing the like kindneſs to his benefactor, endeavours at any time to deſtroy or hurt him; it is certain, that all men muſt be ſhocked by ſuch ingratitude; through ſympathy with the reſentment of their neighbour; and from an apprehenſion alſo, that the caſe may be their own. And from hence ariſes, in the mind of every man, a certain ſenſe of the nature and force of duty, in which conſiſts both the beginning and the end of juſtice. In the ſame manner likewiſe, the man, who in the defence of others is ſeen to throw himſelf the foremoſt into every danger, and even to ſuſtain the fury of the fierceſt animals, never fails to obtain the loudeſt acclamations of applauſe and veneration from all the multitude; while he, who ſhews a different conduct, is purſued with cenſure and reproach. And thus it is, that the people begin to diſcern the nature of things honourable or baſe, and in what conſiſts the difference between them; and

to

to perceive, that the former, on account of the advantage that attends them, are fit to be admired and imitated, and the latter to be deteſted and avoided. When he therefore, who poſſeſſes the greateſt power, and is placed at the head of all the reſt, is found always to comply with the general ſentiments, in ſupporting fortitude and merit, and in diſtributing to every one impartial juſtice; the people no longer dreading his ſuperior force, but paying a willing obedience to his wiſdom, ſubmit themſelves to his authority, and with one conſent maintain him in his government againſt all invaders, even to extreme old age. And thus the monarch by inſenſible degrees becomes a king; when reaſon takes the rule, in the place of ſtrength and violence. Such are the firſt perceptions among mankind of juſtice and injuſtice, of baſe and honourable; and ſuch the origin and riſe of genuine royalty. For the people not only confirm theſe leaders in the poſſeſſion of the power to which they have been raiſed, but preſerve it to their children likewiſe: being perſuaded, that thoſe, who have received their birth and education from virtuous parents, cannot but reſemble them in manners. And if at any time they are diſpleaſed at the conduct of theſe deſcend-

ants,

ants, they then chooſe other magiſtrates and kings. But having been taught to diſcern by paſt experience the difference between external faculties and the endowments of the mind, they now appoint to the ſupreme command, not thoſe that excell in bodily ſtrength and vigour, but thoſe who are diſtinguiſhed by their wiſdom and ſuperior reaſon.

In ancient times then, thoſe, who had been once judged worthy to be inveſted with the regal dignity, continued, during the remainder of their lives, in the undiſturbed poſſeſſion and exerciſe of government: fortifying all the advantageous poſts; incloſing their towns with walls; and obtaining ſuch an increaſe of territory as was neceſſary for the ſecurity, or the plentiful ſubſiſtance, of their ſubjects. And as they aſſumed no great diſtinction either in their dreſs or table, but lived a life that was conformable in every point to that of the other citizens, they raiſed againſt themſelves no envy, nor afforded any matter of offence. But their deſcendants, having received the ſovereignty in the courſe of hereditary ſucceſſion, and finding, that all things already were obtained that were convenient for defence, and that the abundance of all neceſſaries exceeded the demands of nature, were

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ſoon hurried, by the wantonneſs of eaſe and plenty, into an open gratification of every paſſion. They then began to be perſuaded, that it was neceſſary that kings ſhould be diſtinguiſhed from their ſubjects by more ſplendid habits, and be ſerved with more coſtly and luxurious tables; and purſued alſo with full career the indulgence of their amours, however lawleſs, without admitting any contradiction or controul. The firſt of theſe diſorders ſoon excited envy and offence, and the latter, wrath and unrelenting hatred. And from hence, the royalty being now converted into tyranny, the diſſolution of it was begun, by machinations formed againſt the perſons of the ſovereigns. Theſe conſpiracies were at firſt contrived, not by men of obſcure or low condition, but by thoſe of nobleſt birth, and who were the moſt diſtinguiſhed by their courage and exalted ſpirit: for ſuch are at all times moſt impatient of the inſolence of princes. But the people, being not leſs offended alſo and enraged, having once obtained ſuch leaders, readily joined their forces in the ſame attempt. And thus, the form of royalty and monarchy being utterly deſtroyed, an ariſtocracy grew up, and was eſtabliſhed in it's place.

For

For the people, moved with preſent gratitude towards thoſe who had delivered them from tyranny, reſolved to inveſt them with the government, and ſubmitted themſelves to their guidance and dominion. And theſe, being on their part alſo not leſs ſatisfied with the honour that was beſtowed upon them, regarded the good of the community as the only rule of their adminiſtration; and employed their whole care and pains, to promote the happineſs of individuals, as well as to advance the common intereſts of all. But when again the children of theſe governours were raiſed, in the courſe of ſucceſſion likewiſe, to the ſame authority; unpractiſed, as they had always been, in hardſhip or misfortune; and unexperienced alſo in that equality and liberty, upon which the government was founded; having been nurtured from their birth in the preeminence and honours of their parents; they began, ſome of them to accumulate inordinate wealth by fraud and violence; while others allowing a full indulgence to their paſſions, abandoned themſelves without reſtraint to riot and intemperance, adulteries and rapes. And thus, the ariſtocracy being now changed into an oligarchy, the paſſions of the multitude were once more inflamed; and the

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ſame deſtruction followed, that had before fallen upon the kings, when they had degenerated into tyrants. For no ſooner was there found a ſingle citizen, who, being encouraged by the general diſcontent and hatred that ſuch a conduct had occaſioned, was bold enough, either by words or actions, to attempt any thing againſt the governours, than the people with one conſent were ready to concur in the deſign. And when they had killed or driven into baniſhment their oppreſſors, not daring to eſtabliſh royalty, on account of the miſconduct of the former kings, and being deterred alſo, by the miſchiefs which they ſtill more lately had experienced, from yielding the ſovereignty to any certain number, they were then forced to have recourſe to the ſingle expedient that was left untried, and to place in themſelves alone their confidence of ſafety. And having aſſumed into their own hands the conduct and the truſt of government, they thus framed a democracy upon the ruins of the oligarchy.

During ſome time afterwards, and while any of thoſe remained alive, who had beheld the miſeries that flowed from the former unequal government, the people were all well pleaſed to maintain this popular ſtate; and thought that nothing was more

more valuable than equality and liberty. But after the courſe of one or two ſucceſſions, as new men ſprang up, even theſe enjoyments, being now become familiar to them, began, through long uſe and habit, to be leſſened in their eſteem, and to give place to the deſire of preeminence and power. Above all the reſt, thoſe who had acquired the greateſt wealth, being eager likewiſe to poſſeſs the ſovereign rule, and not able to obtain it by their own ſtrength and virtue, endeavoured to draw the people to their ſide; ſcattering among them with profuſion all their riches, and employing every method of corruption; till by degrees they had taught them to fix their whole attention upon the gifts by which they were ſuſtained, and rendered their avidity ſubſervient to the views of their own wild ambition. And thus the frame of the democracy was diſſolved; and gave place to the rule of violence and force. For when once the people are accuſtomed to be fed without any coſt or labour, and to derive all the means of their ſubſiſtence from the wealth of other citizens; if at this time ſome bold and enterpriſing leader ſhould ariſe, whoſe poverty has ſhut him out from all the honours of the ſtate, then commences the Government of the multitude: who run together in tumultuous aſſemblies, and

are hurried into every kind of violence; aſſaſſinations, baniſhments, and diviſions of lands: till, being reduced at laſt to a ſtate of ſavage anarchy, they once more find a maſter and a monarch, and ſubmit themſelves to arbitrary ſway.

Such is the circle, in which political ſocieties are revolved; and ſuch the natural order, in which the ſeveral kinds of government are varied, till they are at laſt brought back to that original form, from which the progreſs was begun. With the help of being acquainted with theſe principles, though it may not perhaps be eaſy to foretell the exact time of every alteration that may happen in a ſtate, yet, if our ſentiments are free from prejudice and paſſion, we ſhall very rarely be deceived in judging of the degree, either of exaltation or decline, in which it actually ſubſiſts, or in declaring the form, into which it muſt at laſt be changed. With regard eſpecially to the commonwealth of Rome, this view of things cannot fail to lead us into the knowledge both of the original conſtitution, and the gradual progreſs of it towards perfection, as well as of the future revolution alſo that awaits it. For as this government, above all others, received, as we have already obſerved, both it's firſt eſtabliſhment, and ſubſequent increaſe, from the ſettled laws of nature; it

is reaſonable to believe, that it will follow the ſame laws likewiſe, in being changed hereafter into a contrary form. But this will be more diſtinctly ſeen in the following parts of this diſcourſe. I ſhall now give a ſhort account of the frame of government that was eſtabliſhed by Lycurgus. Such a digreſſion will not be foreign to my deſign.

This legiſlator then, having conſidered with himſelf, that, according to the neceſſary and eſtabliſhed courſe of all things, the ſeveral accidents and changes, that have now been mentioned, were inevitable, formed this concluſion: that every ſimple, and ſingle kind of government was inſecure; on account of it's proneneſs to degenerate into that more vicious kind, which was moſt nearly allied to it by nature. For as ruſt is the inbred bane of iron, and worms of wood; and as theſe ſubſtances, even though they ſhould eſcape all external violence, at laſt fall a prey to the evils that are as it were congenial with them; in the ſame manner likewiſe, every ſingle kind of government breeds within itſelf ſome certain vice, which is attached by nature to its very form, and which ſoon cauſes it's deſtruction. Thus royalty degenerates into tyranny; ariſtocracy into oligarchy; and democracy into

ſavage violence. Nor is it poſſible, as we have already ſhewn, but that, in the courſe of time, theſe converſions muſt be thus produced. Lycurgus therefore, foreſeeing this neceſſity, inſtead of adopting either of the ſingle forms of government, collected what was excellent in them all; and ſo joined together the principles that were peculiar to each ſeveral form, that no one of them might be extended beyond proper bounds, and ſlide into the evil to which it was inclined by nature: but that each ſeparate power, being ſtill counteracted by the reſt, might be retained in due poſition, and the whole government be preſerved in equal balance; as a veſſel, when impelled to either ſide by the wind, is kept ſteady by a contrary force. Thus the dread of the people, to whom a certain ſhare was allotted in the government, reſtrained the exceſſes and abuſe of royalty. The people, on the other hand, were maintained in a due ſubmiſſion to the kings, by their apprehenſion of the power of the ſenate. For the members of the ſenate, being all ſelected from the beſt among the citizens, were always ready to ſupport the cauſe of juſtice; and, by throwing their own weight into the ſcale, when either ſide was in danger of being oppreſſed by the other, to give ſuch

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ſtrength to the weakeſt party, as the conſtitution of the ſtate required. By theſe means, the Lacedæmonians preſerved their liberty intire, for a much longer time than any other people. And thus it was that Lycurgus having been taught by reaſon to foreſee a certain train of cauſes and events, was able to give a laſting ſtrength to his eſtabliſhment. The Romans on the other hand, though they arrived indeed at the ſame perfection in the conſtitution of their ſtate, were not led to it by foreſight or by reaſon. But, during the courſe of many conteſts and diſorders in which they were engaged, having been careful always to adopt, upon every change, ſuch improvements as the occaſion itſelf ſuggeſted to them, they at laſt obtained the ſame end likewiſe, as that which Lycurgus had propoſed; and completed the moſt beautiful frame of government, of all that are in our times known.

Let me only add, that a good judge of hiſtory will not form his opinion of a writer from any thing that is omitted by him, but from that which he relates. If indeed any falſehood ſhould be found in the things which he relates, it may be reaſonable to impute the omiſſion of the reſt to ignorance. But if, on the other hand, all that he relates be true, it ought

then to be acknowledged, that his ſilence with regard to ſome particular things is not the effect of ignorance, but of judgment and deſign.

CHAP. II.

THE three kinds of government, of which we have been ſpeaking, were all found united in the commonwealth of Rome. And ſo even was the balance between them all, and ſo regular the adminiſtration that reſulted from their union, that it was no eaſy thing, even for the Romans themſelves, to determine with aſſurance, whether the intire ſtate was to be eſteemed an ariſtocracy, a democracy, or a monarchy. For if they turned their view upon the power of the Conſuls, the government appeared to be purely monarchical and regal. If again the authority of the ſenate was conſidered, it then ſeemed to wear the form of ariſtocracy. And laſtly, if regard was had to the ſhare which the people poſſeſſed in the adminiſtration of affairs, it could then ſcarcely fail to be denominated a popular ſtate. The ſeveral powers, that were appropriated to each of theſe diſtinct branches of the conſtitution at the time of which we

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are ſpeaking, and which, with very little variation, are even ſtill preſerved, are theſe which follow.

The Conſuls, while they remain in Rome, before they lead out the armies into the field, are the maſters of all publick affairs. For all the other magiſtrates, the Tribunes alone excepted, are ſubject to them, and bound to obey their commands. They introduce embaſſadors into the ſenate. They propoſe alſo to the ſenate the ſubjects of debate; and direct all the forms that are obſerved in making the decrees. Nor is it leſs a part of their office likewiſe, to attend to thoſe affairs that are tranſacted by the people: to call together general aſſemblies; to report to them the reſolutions of the ſenate; and to ratify whatever is determined by the greater number. In all the preparations that are made for war, as well as in the whole adminiſtration in the field, they poſſeſs an almoſt abſolute authority. For to them it belongs, to impoſe upon the allies whatever ſervices they judge expedient; to appoint the military tribunes; to enroll the legions, and make the neceſſary levies; and to inflict puniſhments, in the field, upon all that are ſubject to their command. Add to this, that they have the power likewiſe to ex-

pend what whatever ſums they may think convenient from the public treaſure; being attended for that purpoſe by a Quæſtor, who is always ready to receive and execute their orders. When any one therefore directs his view to this part of the conſtitution, it is very reaſonable for him to conclude, that the government is no other than a ſimple royalty. Let me only obſerve, that if in ſome of theſe particular points, or in thoſe that will be hereafter mentioned, any change ſhould be either now remarked, or ſhould happen at ſome future time, ſuch an alteration will not deſtroy the general principles of this diſcourſe.

To the Senate belongs, in the firſt place, the ſole care and management of the publick money. For all the returns that are brought into the treaſury, as well as all the payments that are iſſued from it, are directed by their orders. Nor is it allowed to the Quæſtors to apply any part of the revenue to particular occaſions as they ariſe, without a decree of the ſenate; thoſe ſums alone excepted, which are expended in the ſervice of the Conſuls. And even thoſe more general, as well as greateſt diſburſements, which are employed, at the return of every five years, in building and repairing the publick edifices, are aſ-

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ſigned to the Cenſors for that purpoſe, by the expreſs permiſſion of the ſenate. To the ſenate alſo is referred the cognizance of all the crimes, committed in any part of Italy, that demand a publick examination and inquiry: ſuch as treaſons, conſpiracies, poiſonings, and aſſaſſinations. Add to this, that when any controverſies ariſe, either between private men, or any of the cities of Italy, it is the part of the ſenate to adjuſt all diſputes; to cenſure thoſe that are deſerving of blame; and to yield aſſiſtance to thoſe, who ſtand in need of protection and defence. When any embaſſies are ſent out of Italy; either to reconcile contending ſtates; to offer exhortations and advice; or even, as it ſometimes happens, to impoſe commands; to propoſe conditions of a treaty; or to make a denunciation of war; the care and conduct of all theſe tranſactions is intruſted wholly to the ſenate. When any embaſſadors alſo arrive at Rome, it is the ſenate likewiſe that determines, in what manner they ſhall be received and treated, and what anſwer ſhall be given to their demands. In all theſe things, that have now been mentioned, the people has no ſhare. To thoſe therefore, who come to reſide in Rome during the abſence of the Conſuls, the government appears to be purely

purely ariſtocratical. Many of the Greeks eſpecially, and of the foreign princes, are eaſily led into this perſuaſion: when they perceive that almoſt all the affairs, which they are forced to negociate with the Romans, are determined by the ſenate.

And now it may well be aſked, what part is left to the People in this government: ſince the ſenate, on the one hand, is veſted with the ſovereign power, in the ſeveral inſtances that have been here enumerated, and more eſpecially in all things that concern the management and diſpoſal of the publick treaſure; and ſince the Conſuls, on the other hand, are intruſted with the abſolute direction of the preparations that are made for war, and exerciſe an uncontrouled authority in the field. There is however a part ſtill allotted to the people; and indeed the moſt important part. For firſt, the people are the ſole diſpenſers of rewards and puniſhments; which are the only bands, by which ſtates and kingdoms, and in a word all human ſocieties, are held together. For when the difference between theſe is overlooked, or when they are diſtributed without due diſtinction, nothing but diſorder can enſue. Nor is it poſſible indeed, that government ſhould be maintained, if the wicked ſtand in equal eſtimation with the

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good. The People then, when any offences demand ſuch puniſhment, frequently condemn the citizens to the payment of a fine: thoſe eſpecially, who have been inveſted with the dignities of the ſtate. To the people alone belongs the right to ſentence any one to die. Upon this occaſion, they have a cuſtom which deſerves to be mentioned with applauſe. The perſon accuſed is allowed to withdraw himſelf in open view, and embrace a voluntary baniſhment, if only a ſingle tribe remains, that has not yet given judgment; and is ſuffered to retire in ſafety to Prænesſte, Tibur, Naples, or any other of the confederate cities. The publick magiſtracies are allotted alſo by the people to thoſe who are eſteemed worthy of them: and theſe are the nobleſt rewards that any government can beſtow on virtue. To the people belongs the power of approving or rejecting laws: and, which is ſtill of greater importance, peace and war are likewiſe fixed by their deliberations. When any alliance is concluded, any war ended, or treaty made; to them the conditions are referred, and by them either annulled or ratified. And thus again, from a view of all theſe circumſtances, it might with reaſon be imagined, that the people had engroſſed the largeſt portion of the government,

vernment, and that the ſtate was plainly a democracy.

Such are the parts of the adminiſtration, which are diſtinctly aſſigned to each of the three forms of government, that are united in the commonwealth of Rome. It now remains to be conſidered, in what manner each ſeveral form is enabled to counteract the others, or to co-operate with them.

When the Conſuls, inveſted with the power that has been mentioned, lead the armies into the field, though they ſeem indeed to hold ſuch abſolute authority as is ſufficient for all purpoſes, yet are they in truth ſo dependent both on the ſenate and the people, that without their aſſiſtance they are by no means able to accompliſh any deſign. It is well known that armies demand a continual ſupply of neceſſaries. But neither corn, nor habits, nor even the military ſtipends, can at any time be tranſmitted to the legions unleſs by an expreſs order of the ſenate. Any oppoſition therefore, or delay, on the part of this aſſembly, is ſufficient always to defeat the enterprizes of the Generals. It is the ſenate likewiſe, that either compels the Conſuls to leave their deſigns imperfect, or enables them to complete the projects which they have formed; by

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ſending a ſucceſſor into each of their ſeveral provinces, upon the expiration of the annual term, or by continuing them in the ſame command. The ſenate alſo has the power to aggrandize and amplify the victories that are gained, or on the contrary to depreciate and debaſe them. For that which is called among the Romans a Triumph, in which a ſenſible repreſentation of the actions of the Generals is expoſed in ſolemn proceſſion to the view of all the citizens, can neither be exhibited with due pomp and ſplendour, nor indeed be in any manner celebrated, unleſs the conſent of the ſenate be firſt obtained, together with the ſums that are requiſite for the expence. Nor is it leſs neceſſary on the other hand, that the Conſuls, how far ſoever they may happen to be removed from Rome, ſhould be careful to preſerve the good affections of the people. For the people, as we have already mentioned, annulls, or ratifies, all treaties. But that which is of greateſt moment is, that the Conſuls, at the time of laying down their office, are bound alſo to ſubmit their paſt adminiſtration to the judgement of the people. And thus theſe magiſtrates can at no time think themſelves ſecure, if they neglect to gain the approbation both of the ſenate, and the people.

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In the ſame manner the ſenate alſo, though inveſted with ſo great authority, is bound to yield a certain attention to the people, and to act in concert with them, in all affairs that are of great and general importance. With regard eſpecially to thoſe offences that are committed againſt the ſtate, and which demand a capital puniſhment, no inquiry can be perfected, nor any judgment carried into execution, unleſs the people confirm what the ſenate has before decreed. Nor are the things, which more immediately regard the ſenate itſelf, leſs ſubject to the ſame controul. For if a law ſhould at any time be propoſed, to leſſen the received authority of the ſenators; to detract from their honours and preeminence; or even to deprive them of a part of their poſſeſſions; it belongs wholly to the people to eſtabliſh or reject it. And even ſtill more; the interpoſition of a ſingle Tribune is ſufficient, not only to ſuſpend the deliberations of the ſenate, but to prevent them alſo from holding any meeting or aſſembly. Now the peculiar office of the Tribunes is, to declare thoſe ſentiments that are moſt pleaſing to the people: and principally to promote their intereſts and deſigns. And thus the ſenate, on account of all theſe reaſons, is forced to cultivate

the favour, and gratify the inclinations, of the people.

The people again, on their part, are held in a dependance, on the ſenate, and are obliged to pay a certain deference, both to the particular members, and to the general body. In every part of Italy there are works of various kinds, which are let to farm by the Cenſors; ſuch as the building, or repairing, of the publick edifices, which are almoſt innumerable; the care of rivers, harbours, gardens, mines, and lands; every thing, in a word, that falls beneath the dominion of the Romans. In all theſe things, the people are the undertakers: inſomuch that there are ſcarcely any to be found, that are not in ſome degree involved, either in the contracts, or in the management of the works. For ſome take the farms of the Cenſors at a certain price: others became partners with the firſt. Some again engage themſelves as ſureties for the farmers: and others, in ſupport alſo of theſe ſureties, pledge their own fortunes to the ſtate. Now the ſupreme direction of all theſe affairs is placed wholly in the ſenate. The ſenate has the power to allot a longer time; to lighten the conditions of the agreement, in caſe that any accident has intervened; or even to releaſe the contractors

tractors from their bargain, if the terms ſhould be found impracticable. There are alſo many other circumſtances, in which thoſe that are engaged in any of theſe publick works may be either greatly injured, or greatly benefited, by the ſenate; ſince to this body, as we have already obſerved, all things that belong to theſe tranſactions are conſtantly referred. But there is ſtill another advantage, of much greater moment. For from this order likewiſe judges are ſelected, in almoſt every accuſation of conſiderable weight, whether it be of a publick, or private, nature. The people therefore, being by theſe means held under due ſubjection and reſtraint, and doubtful of obtaining that protection, which they foreſee that they may at ſome time want, are always cautious of exciting any oppoſition to the meaſures of the ſenate. Nor are they, on the other hand, leſs ready to pay obedience to the orders of the Conſuls; through the dread of that ſupreme authority, to which the citizens in general, as well as each particular man, are obnoxious in the field.

Thus, while each of theſe ſeparate parts is enabled either to aſſiſt or obſtruct the reſt, the government, by the apt contexture of them all in the general frame, is

ſo well ſecured againſt every accident, that it ſeems ſcarcely poſſible to invent a more perfect ſyſtem. For when the dread of any common danger, that threatens from abroad, conſtrains all the orders of the ſtate to unite together, and co-operate with joint aſſiſtance; ſuch is the ſtrength of the republick, that as, on the one hand, no meaſures that are neceſſary are neglected, while all men fix their thoughts upon the preſent exigency; ſo neither is it poſſible on the other hand, that their deſigns ſhould at any time be fruſtrated through the want of due celerity, becauſe all in general, as well as every citizen in particular, employ their utmoſt efforts, to carry what has been determined into execution. Thus the government, by the very form and peculiar nature of it's conſtitution, is equally enabled to reſiſt all attacks, and to accompliſh every purpoſe. And when again all apprehenſions of foreign enemies are paſt, and the Romans, being now ſettled in tranquility, and enjoying at their leiſure all the fruits of victory, begin to yield to the ſeduction of eaſe and plenty, and, as it happens uſually in ſuch conjunctures, become haughty and ungovernable; then chiefly we may obſerve, in what manner the ſame conſtitution likewiſe finds in itſelf a remedy

againſt the impending danger. For whenever either of the ſeparate parts of the republic attempts to exceed it's proper limits, excites contention and diſpute, and ſtruggles to obtain a greater ſhare of power, than that which is aſſigned to it by the laws; it is manifeſt, that ſince no one ſingle part, as we have ſhewn in this diſcourſe, is in itſelf ſupreme or abſolute, but that on the contrary the powers which are aſſigned to each are ſtill ſubject to reciprocal controul, the part, which thus aſpires, muſt ſoon be reduced again within it's own juſt bounds, and not be ſuffered to inſult or depreſs the reſt. And thus the ſeveral orders, of which the ſtate is framed, are forced always to maintain their due poſition: being partly counterworked in their deſigns; and partly alſo reſtrained from making any attempt, by the dread of falling under that authority to which they are expoſed.

EXTRACT the SECOND.

The military inſtitutions of the Romans.

CHAP. I.

AS ſoon as the Conſuls are declared, the military Tribunes are next appointed. Of theſe, fourteen are taken from the citizens who have caried arms in five campaigns; and ten more, from thoſe who have completed ten. For every citizen, before he arrives at the age of forty-ſix, is obliged to ſerve either ten years in the cavalry, or ſixteeen in the infantry: thoſe alone excepted, who are placed by the Cenſors below the rate of four hundred drachmæ; and who are all reſerved for the ſervice of the ſea. In the caſe of any preſſing danger, the time of continuing in the infantry is extended to twenty years. No citizen is permitted by the laws to ſue for any magiſtracy, before he has completed the ſervice of ten campaigns.

When the enrolments are to be made, the Counſuls give notice before to the people of a certain day, upon which all the Romans that are of ſufficient age are

required to attend. This is done every year. And when the day arrives, and the men all appear at Rome, and are aſſembled afterwards in the Capitol, the Tribunes of the youngeſt order divide themſelves, as they are appointed either by the Conſuls or the people, into four ſeparate bodies. For this diviſion correſponds with the firſt and general diſtribution of all the forces into four ſeparate legions. Of theſe Tribunes therefore, the four firſt named are aſſigned to the firſt legion; the three next, to the ſecond; the following four, to the third; and the three, laſt appointed to the fourth. Of the Tribunes of the oldeſt order, the two that are firſt named are placed in the firſt legion; the three ſecond, in the ſecond; the two that follow, in the third; and the remaining three, in the fourth. By this diſtribution and diviſion, an equal number of commanders is allotted to each legion. When this is done, the Tribunes of each legion, having taken their ſeats apart, draw out the tribes one by one by lot; and calling to them that upon which the lot firſt falls, they ſelect from it four young men, as nearly equal as is poſſible both in age and ſtature. And when theſe are brought forward from the reſt, the Tribunes of the firſt legion firſt chooſe one; then thoſe of the

ſecond,

ſecond, a ſecond; thoſe of the third, take the third; and thoſe of the fourth, the laſt. After theſe, four more are made to approach. And now, the Tribunes of the ſecond legion firſt make their choice; then thoſe of the reſt in order; and, laſt of all, the Tribunes of the firſt. In the ſame manner again, from the next four that follow, the Tribunes of the third legion chooſe the firſt; and thoſe of the ſecond, the laſt. And thus, by obſerving the ſame method of rotation to the end, it happens that the legions, with reſpect to the men of which they are compoſed, are all alike and equal. The number allotted to each legion is four thouſand and two hundred; and ſometimes five thouſand, when any great and unuſual danger is foreſeen. After theſe had been thus ſelected, it was anciently the cuſtom to chooſe the cavalry; and to add two hundred horſemen to each four thouſand of the infantry. But in the preſent times, the citizens, of whom the cavalry is compoſed, are firſt enrolled; having been before appointed by the Cenſors, according to the rate of their revenue: and three hundred are aſſigned to every legion.

When the enrolments are in this manner finiſhed, the Tribunes, having aſſembled together in ſeparate bodies the ſol-

diers of their reſpective legions, chooſe out a man that ſeems moſt proper for the purpoſe, and make him ſwear in the following words: "that he will be obedient to his commanders, and execute all the orders that he ſhall receive from them, to the utmoſt of his power." The reſt of the ſoldiers of the legion, advancing one by one, ſwear alſo, that they will perform what the firſt has ſworn. About the ſame time likewiſe, the Conſuls ſend notice to the magiſtrates of the allied cities of Italy, from which they deſign to draw any forces, what number of troops are wanted, and at what time and place they are required to join the Roman army. The cities, having raiſed their levies in the ſame manner that has now been mentioned, and adminiſtered to them the ſame oath, ſend them away, attended by a paymaſter and a General.

At Rome the Tribunes, after the ceremony of the oath is finiſhed, command all the legions to return without arms upon a certain day, and then diſmiſs them. And when they are met together again at the appointed time, thoſe that are the youngeſt, and of the loweſt condition, are ſet apart for the light-armed troops. From the next above theſe in age are ſelected the Haſtati: from thoſe that are in full

full ſtrength and vigour, the Principes; and the oldeſt of all that are inrolled are the Triarii. For every legion is compoſed of all theſe different bodies; different in name, in age, and in the manner in which they are armed. This diviſion is ſo adjuſted, that the Triarii amount to ſix hundred men: the Principes are twelve hundred: the Haſtati an equal number: and all the reſt, light-armed. If a legion conſiſt of more than four thouſand men, the ſeveral bodies are increaſed in due proportion; except only, that the number of the Triarii always remains the ſame.

The youngeſt of theſe troops are armed with a ſword, light javelins, and a buckler. The buckler is both ſtrongly made, and of a ſize ſufficient for ſecurity. For it is of a circular form, and has three feet in the diameter. They wear likewiſe upon their heads ſome ſimple ſort of covering; ſuch as the ſkin of a wolf, or ſomething of a ſimilar kind; which ſerves both for their defence, and to point out alſo to the commanders thoſe particular ſoldiers, that are diſtinguiſhed either by their bravery, or their want of courage, in the time of action. The wood of the javelin is of the length of two cubits, and of the thickneſs of a finger. The iron part is

a ſpan in length: and is drawn out to ſuch ſlender fineneſs towards the point, that it never fails to be bent in the very firſt diſcharge, ſo that the enemy cannot throw it back again. Otherwiſe it would be a common javelin.

The next in age, who are called the Haſtati, are ordered to furniſh themſelves with a complete ſuit of armour. This, among the Romans, conſiſts in the firſt place of a ſhield of a convex ſurface; the breadth of which is two feet and a half; and the length four feet, or four feet and a palm in thoſe of the largeſt ſize. It is compoſed of two planks, glued together, and covered firſt with linen, and afterwards with calve-ſkin. The extreme edges of it, both above and below, are guarded with plates of iron: as well to ſecure it againſt the ſtrokes of ſwords, as that it may be reſted alſo upon the ground without receiving any injury. To the ſurface is fitted likewiſe a ſhell of iron; which ſerves to turn aſide the more violent ſtrokes of ſtones, or ſpears, or any other ponderous weapon. After the ſhield, comes the ſword; which is carried upon the right thigh, and is called the Spaniſh ſword. It is formed, not only to puſh with it at the point; but to make a falling ſtroke with either edge, and with ſingular

gular effect; for the blade is remarkably ſtrong and firm. To theſe arms are added two piles or javelins; a helmet made of braſs; and boots for the legs. The piles are of two ſorts; the one large, the other ſlender. Of the former, thoſe that are round have the breadth of a palm in their diameter; and thoſe that are ſquare the breadth of a palm likewiſe in a ſide. The more ſlender, which are carried with the other, reſemble a common javelin of a moderate ſize. In both ſorts, the wooden part is of the length of about three cubits. The iron, which is of the ſame length likewiſe, and turned outwards at the point, in the form of a double hook, is faſtened to the wood with ſo great care and foreſight, being carried upwards to the very middle of it, and transfixed with many cloſe-ſet rivets, that it is ſooner broken in uſe than looſened; though, in the part in which it is joined to the wood, it is not leſs than a finger and a half in thickneſs. Upon the helmet is worn an ornament of three upright feathers, either red or black, of about a cubit in height; which, being fixed upon the very top of the head, and added to their other arms, make the troops ſeem to be of double ſize, and gives them an appearance which is both beautiful and terrible. Beſide theſe

arms,

arms, the ſoldiers in general place alſo upon their breaſts a ſquare plate of braſs, of the meaſure of a ſpan on either ſide, which is called the guard of the heart. But all thoſe, who are rated at more than ten thouſand drachmæ, cover their breaſts with a coat of mail. The Principes, and the Triarii, are armed in the ſame manner likewiſe as the Haſtati; except only that the Triarii carry pikes inſtead of javelins.

From each of theſe ſeveral ſorts of ſoldiers, the youngeſt alone excepted, ten men of diſtinguiſhed merit are firſt ſelected; and after theſe, ten more. Theſe are all called commanders of companies: and he that is firſt choſen has a ſeat in the military Council. After theſe, twenty more are appointed to conduct the rear; and are choſen by the former twenty. The ſoldiers of each different order, the light troops excepted, are then divided into ten ſeparate parts; to each of which are aſſigned four officers, of thoſe who have been thus ſelected; two to lead the van, and two to take the care of the rear. The light-armed troops are diſtributed in juſt proportion among them all. Each ſeparate part is called a company, a band, or an enſign: and the leaders, captains of companies or centurions. Laſt of all, two

of the braveſt and moſt vigorous among the ſoldiers are appointed by the captains to carry the ſtandards in each company. It is not without good reaſon that two captains are aſſigned to every company. For as it always is uncertain, what will be the conduct of an officer, or to what accidents he may be expoſed; and as in the affairs of war there is no room for pretext or excuſe; this method is contrived, that the company may not upon any occaſion be deſtitute of a leader. When the captains therefore both are preſent, he that was firſt choſen leads the right, and the other the left of the company. And when either of them is abſent, he that remains takes the conduct of the whole. In the choice of theſe captains not thoſe that are the boldeſt and moſt enterpriſing are eſteemed the beſt; but thoſe rather, who are ſteady and ſedate; prudent in conduct, and ſkilful in command. Nor is it ſo much required, that they ſhould be at all times eager to begin the combat, and throw themſelves precipitately into action; as that, when they are preſſed, or even conquered by a ſuperior force, they ſhould ſtill maintain their ground, and rather die than deſert their ſtation.

The Cavalry is divided alſo into ten part or troops. In each of theſe, three captains firſt are choſen; who afterwards appoint three other officers to conduct the rear. The firſt of the captains commands the whole troop. The other two hold the rank and office of Decurions: and all of them are called by that name. In the abſence of the firſt captain, the next in order takes the intire command. The manner in which theſe troops are armed is at this time the ſame as that of the Greeks. But anciently it was very different. For firſt, they wore no armour upon their bodies; but were covered, in the time of action, with only an under garment. In this method, they were able indeed to deſcend from their horſes, or leap up again upon them, with greater quickneſs and facility: but, as they were almoſt naked, they were too much expoſed to danger in all cloſe engagements. The ſpears alſo that were in uſe among them in former times were in a double reſpect very unfit for ſervice. Firſt, as they were of a ſlender make, and always trembled in the hand, it not only was extremely difficult to direct them with exactneſs towards the deſtined mark; but very frequently, even before their points had reached the enemy, the greateſt part of them were ſhaken into

pieces

pieces by the bare motion of the horſes. Add to this, that theſe ſpears, not being armed with iron at the loweſt end, were formed to ſtrike only with the point, and, when they were broken by this ſtroke. were afterwards incapable of any farther uſe. Their buckler was made of the hide of an ox, and in form was not unlike to thoſe globular diſhes which are uſed in ſacrifices. But this was alſo of too infirm a texture for defence: and, as it was at firſt not very capable of ſervice, it afterwards became wholly uſeleſs, when the ſubſtance of it had been ſoftened and relaxed by rain. The Romans therefore, having obſerved theſe defects, ſoon changed their weapons for the armour of the Greeks. For the Grecian ſpear, which is firm and ſtable, not only ſerves to make the firſt ſtroke with the point in juſt direction and with ſure effect; but, with the help of the iron at the oppoſite end, may, when turned, be employed againſt the enemy with equal ſteadineſs and force. In the ſame manner alſo the Grecian ſhields, being ſtrong in texture, and capable of being held in a fixed poſition, are alike ſerviceable both for attack and for defence. Theſe advantages were ſoon perceived, and the arms adopted by the cavalry. For the Romans, above all other people,

people, are excellent in admitting foreign cuſtoms that are preferable to their own.

As ſoon as this partition of the troops is finiſhed, and the neceſſary orders given by the Tribunes concerning their arms, they are then commanded to return to their reſpective habitations, till the day arrives, upon which they are bound by oath to aſſemble together in a certain place appointed by the Conſuls. Each of the Conſuls uſually appoints a different place for the aſſembling of his own army. for to each of them are allotted ſeparately two Roman legions, together with an equal part of the allies. No pretence of accident is at any time allowed to thoſe that are enrolled; nor any excuſe admitted, in oppoſition to their oath, to diſcharge them from appearing on the day preſcribed: unleſs ſome auſpices ſhould intervene, or ſome diſaſter happen, which renders their attendance abſolutely impracticable. When they are all met together, the diſtribution of the allies, who are aſſembled alſo with the Romans, is regulated by twelve officers, called Prefects and appointed by the Conſuls, in the following manner. They firſt chooſe out from all the allies a body of the braveſt and moſt ſkilful ſoldiers, both cavalry and infantry, to ſerve near the perſon, and under

under the immediate orders, of the Conſuls. Theſe are called the extraordinary, or ſelected troops. The whole infantry of the allies is uſually the ſame in number with that of the Romans; but the cavalry three times as many. Among theſe, about a third part of the cavalry, and a fifth part of the infantry, are ſet apart as extraordinaries. The reſt are then divided by the Prefects into two equal bodies; one of which is called the right, and the other the left wing. When all things are thus prepared, the Tribunes direct both the Romans and the allies to incamp.

As the method of this incampment is uniform and ſimple, at all times and in every place the ſame, I ſhall here endeavour to to ſet before the reader a clear deſcription of the order that is obſerved in the Roman armies, both in their marches and incampments; and of the manner alſo in which they are drawn up in battle. For no man ſurely, who is not utterly averſe to all great and laudable purſuits, can be unwilling to attend to ſuch inquiries; in which his ſearch will be rewarded with a kind of knowledge not unworthy of the pains.

CHAP.

CHAP. II.

THIS then is the manner in which the Romans form their camp. As ſoon as the ground is choſen for the purpoſe, that part of it which is judged to be the moſt convenient, both for the diſpatch of orders, and for diſcerning every thing that is tranſacted, is firſt marked out for the place of the Conſular tent. In this place, an enſign is planted in the ground, and round it is meaſured a quadrangular figure, every ſide of which is diſtant from the enſign a hundred feet; ſo that the whole contents of it are equal to the ſpace of four acres. On one ſide of this figure, the ſide that appears to be the moſt commodious for water and for forage, the Roman legions are diſpoſed in the following order. In every legion there are ſix Tribunes, as we have already mentioned; and two legions are aſſigned to each of the Conſuls. With each Conſul therefore, twelve Tribunes always are incamped, Their tents are ranged in one right line, which is parallel to that ſide of the quadrangular ſpace that has been choſen, and diſtant from it fifty feet. The ground between is occupied by their horſes, their beaſts

beaſts of burthen, and other baggage. Theſe tents are ſo diſpoſed, that the back of them is turned towards the Conſular ground; while the oppoſite ſide looks down upon the external aſpect of the camp, which we ſhall hereafter therefore call the front. They are ſet at equal diſtances each from the other; and ſo extended, that the line, upon which they ſtand, traverſes the whole breadth of the ſpace that is occupied by the legions.

A hundred feet are then meaſured downwards, from the front of the tents of the Tribunes: and at the extremity of this diſtance a line is drawn, which runs parallel to theſe tents. From this line forwards, the legions are incamped in the following manner. The line being firſt divided into two equal parts, from the point of the diviſion another right line is drawn; on either ſide of which, and at an equal diſtance from it, is placed the cavalry of the two legions; oppoſite the one to the other; and ſeparated from each other by a ſpace of fifty feet. The diſpoſition of the tents, both of the cavalry, and of the infantry, is the ſame. For every company, as well as every troop, occupies a ſquare piece of ground, the front of which is turned towards the open ſpaces, and contains in length a hun-

dred feet. The depth of it is uſually ſo adjuſted as to be equal to the length; except in the incampment of the Triarii, and the allies. When the legions are compoſed of any greater number, both the length and depth of this ground are increaſed in due proportion. The cavalry, being thus placed towards the middle of the tents of the Tribunes, forms a kind of ſtreet, which runs down tranſverſely from the right line before mentioned, and the ſpace that lies before thoſe tents. All the other ſpaces bear alſo the reſemblance of regular ſtreets; the ſides of which are formed by the troops and companies, which are ranged lengthways through the camp.

Behind the cavalry, and in the ſame form likewiſe, are placed the Triarii of both legions: a company being joined cloſe to every troop; but looking a contrary way; and containing in depth only one half of its length. For the Triarii uſually amount to no more than half of the number of the other bodies. But as the depth of the companies is thus diminiſhed, the ground upon which they are ranged is rendered equal in length to that which is occupied by the reſt.

Oppoſite to the Triarii of the two legions, and at the diſtance of fifty feet on either

either ſide, the Principes are incamped; with their faces turned towards the open ſpaces. By this poſition, two more ſtreets are formed; which take their beginning alſo at the ſame right line, or ſpace of a hundred feet that lies before the tents of the Tribunes; and are ended on the oppoſite ſide, which we before called the front of all the camp. Next to the Principes are lodged the Haſtati; being placed cloſe behind the former, but looking alſo a contrary way. As each of the different bodies, of which a legion is compoſed, is divided into ten companies, from hence it happens, that the ſeveral intervals, or ſtreets are all of an equal length, and are alike terminated by that ſide of the camp which is the front; towards which alſo the laſt of all the companies are always turned.

At the diſtance of fifty feet from the Haſtati, and oppoſite alſo to them, is lodged the cavalry of the allies; beginning from the ſame right line; and extended likewiſe, as the other bodies, down to the front of the camp. The whole infantry of the allies, as we have already mentioned, before the extraordinaries are ſelected, is equal to that of the legions: and the cavalry, after a third part has been taken from it to ſerve as extraordinaries, is double in number to the Roman caval-

ry. The depth therefore of the ground, upon which theſe troops are placed, is enlarged in ſuch proportion, that they cover always the ſame ſpace in length with that which is occupied by the Romans. The ſeveral ſtreets, which are five in number, being thus completely formed, the infantry of the allies, to whoſe companies a depth of ground is alſo aſſigned in proportion to their number, is in the ſame manner ranged cloſe behind the cavalry, but looking a contrary way. For their faces are turned towards the intrenchment, and look down upon both ſides of the camp.

In every company, the foremoſt tents on either ſide are occupied by the Centurions. In this diſpoſition both of the infantry and cavalry, the ſixth company and the ſixth troop are ſeparated from the fifth by a diſtance of fifty feet. By this diviſion another ſtreet is formed, which traverſes all the reſt, and paſſes through the middle of the camp, in a line parallel to the tents of the Tribunes. This ſtreet, on account of the poſition of it below five companies is called the Quintan.

The ſpace, that falls behind the tents of the Tribunes, and which lies cloſe on either hand to the Conſular ground, is allotted,

allotted, one ſide of it for the Forum, and the other for the place of the Quæſtor and the military ſtores. Behind the laſt of the tents of the Tribunes on either ſide, and in a line, which, falling upon thoſe tents, forms that kind of figure which is called the Forceps, the extraordinary cavalry is lodged, together with the volunteers that accompany the Conſul: being all of them extended along the two ſides of the camp; with their faces turned towards the place of the Quæſtor on the one ſide, and to the Forum on the other. And as they are in this manner placed near the Conſul in the camp, ſo likewiſe in the marches, and in a word upon all occaſions that ariſe, they are bound to obſerve with particular attention both the Quæſtor and the Conſul; and to be at all times ready to receive their orders. Cloſe behind this cavalry, but with their faces turned towards the intrenchment, the infantry, which is ſelected alſo for the ſame ſervice, is incamped.

Above theſe troops is left an open ſpace, of a hundred feet in breadth, and parallel to the tents of the Tribunes, which paſſes along the Forum, the Conſular ground, and the place of the Quæſtor; and is continued through the whole extent of the camp. On the upper ſide of it is placed

the extraordinary cavalry of the allies; looking down upon the Forum, the place of the Quæſtor, and the Conſular ground. Between the middle of their tents, and oppoſite to the Conſular ground, is left another open ſpace, of the breadth of fifty feet; which divides the former at right angles, and leads towards the hindmoſt part of the camp. Cloſe again behind this cavalry, the extraordinary infantry of the allies is lodged; with their faces turned towards the intrenchment, and to the rear of all the camp. The ground, that remains unoccupied on either ſide, is reſerved for ſtrangers; or for ſuch of the allies as are brought by any temporary occaſion to the army. When the arrangement is thus completed, the intire camp forms the figure of an equilateral ſquare: and with reſpect to the ſeveral parts, the ſeparation of them into ſtreets, together with the order in which all things are diſpoſed, renders the appearance not unlike to a city.

The intrenchment is diſtant from the tents, on every ſide two hundred feet. The ground, that lies between, is ſubſervient to many valuable purpoſes. It renders the entrance of the legions into the camp, as well as their egreſs from it, both eaſy and commodious. For as the ſeveral companies advance into this open

ſpace

ſpace according to the direction of their reſpective ſtreets, they never meet together in the way, nor are expoſed to the danger of being thrown down and trampled upon each by the other. In this place likewiſe the cattle, and all the ſpoil that is taken from the enemy, is kept in ſafety during the night. But the greateſt advantage is, that in the caſe of an attack by night, neither fire, nor ſcarcely any weapon, can reach the troops; and that even thoſe few javelins, that happen to fall among them, are rendered ineffectual by the diſtance, as well as by the tents that cover them on every ſide.

From this detail of the numbers, both of the infantry and cavalry, of which an army is at any time compoſed; whether four thouſand, or five thouſand men, be allotted to each legion; from the deſcription of the depth, and length of the ground upon which the companies are lodged; and from the accouut of the meaſure and reſpective diſtances of the ſtreets and open ſpaces; it will be eaſy to conceive the extent and whole circumference of the camp. When the allies that firſt join the army, or thoſe that are brought by any occaſion to the camp, exceed the uſual number, the ground that lies on one ſide of the Conſular tent, to-

gether with that which was before mentioned, is assigned to the latter; the Forum and the place of the Quæstor being thrown together for this purpose as the necessity requires. And with regard to the former, the numbers that are redundant are disposed in another separate street, behind the Roman legions, on both sides of the camp. When the four legions, and both the Consuls, are assembled together within one intrenchment, in order to understand the manner of their incampment, nothing more is necessary than to conceive two armies, lodged in the form that has been now described, turned one towards the other, and joined together in the part that is assigned to the extraordinaries of either army; who are placed as we have already mentioned, in the rear of all the camp, with their faces turned towards the intrenchment. In this position the camp forms the figure of an oblong square. The ground, upon which it stands, is double in extent to that of the former camp; and the circumference of it larger by one half. Such is the method which is constantly observed, when both Consuls are incamped together within the same intrenchment. And when they form separate camps, the only difference is, that the Forum, the place

of

of the Quæſtor, and the Conſular tents, are placed in the middle, between both the armies.

CHAP. III.

AS ſoon as the encampment is completed, the Tribunes having aſſembled together all the perſons, both free men and ſlaves, that are in the army, adminiſter to every one of them apart the following oath: "That they will not ſteal any thing from the camp; and, even if they find any thing, that they will bring it to the Tribunes." Two companies are then ſelected from the Principes and the Haſtati of each legion; to whoſe care is aſſigned the ground that lies before the tents of the Tribunes. For as the Romans uſually paſs the whole time of day in this open ſpace, they employ great care to keep it continually cleanſed and ſprinkled. Of the remaining eighteen companies, three are allotted to every Tribune. For in every legion there are twenty companies of Principes and Haſtati, as we have already mentioned, and ſix Tribunes. The ſervice, which theſe three companies are obliged to perform in turn for the Tribune to whom they are reſpectively

reſpectively aſſigned, is to fix his tent, to make the ground around it plain and level, and to cover his baggage, if it be neceſſary, with a fence. It is their duty likewiſe to place a double guard near him for his ſecurity. This guard conſiſts of four ſoldiers, two of whom are ſtationed before the tent, and two behind it, near to the horſes. As three companies are thus allotted to every Tribune, and as each company, without including the Triarii and the light-armed troops, who are both exempted from this duty, contains more than an hundred men, this ſervice falling to each company in turn upon every fourth day only, becomes very light and eaſy: and, while it miniſters in all things that are neceſſary to the convenience of the Tribunes, renders their office likewiſe more illuſtrious, and brings reſpect to their authority.

The Triarii are diſcharged from bearing any part in this attendance. But each of their companies is obliged to furniſh every day a guard to the troop of cavalry that lies cloſe behind it. The duty of this guard, among other functions, is principally to obſerve the horſes: that they may not at any time be rendered unfit for ſervice, by being intangled in the bands that hold them; or, by breaking away, and falling

falling in among other horſes, create tumult and diſorder in the camp. One company alone, which is ſelected in turn from the whole body of theſe troops, is ſtationed round the tent of the Conſul; as well to ſecure his perſon againſt all ſurprize, as for the ſake of adding ſplendour alſo to his dignity.

The intrenchment is made by the allies, on thoſe two ſides, near to which their two wings are encamped. The two other ſides are left to the Romans; to each legion, one. Each ſide is divided into certain portions, according to the number of the companies; and a centurion aſſigned, to overlook the work in every portion. The whole ſide is afterwards examined and approved by two of the Tribunes; whoſe office it is to attend to every thing that is done in the camp. For the Tribunes, dividing among themſelves the time of the campaign, and preſiding, two in turn, during two months of the ſix, have the ſupreme direction of every kind of neceſſary work and ſervice, that falls within the time of their command. The ſame duty is performed, in the ſame manner likewiſe, among the allies, by the officers who are called Prefects.

As ſoon as daylight appears, the leaders of the cavalry, and the centurions, attend

all together at the tents of the Tribunes; and the Tribunes at that of the Conſul. The neceſſary orders are then delivered by the Conſul to the Tribunes; by the Tribunes to the centurions and the leaders of the cavalry; and by theſe, as the proper time for each arrives, to the reſt of the army.

The delivery of the ſignal for the night is ſecured in the following manner. Every tenth cohort, both of infantry and cavalry, is lodged at the extreme end of thoſe lines which form the ſeparate ſtreets. From each of theſe a ſoldier is ſelected, who is diſcharged from all the duties of the guard. This ſoldier, every day about the time of the ſetting of the ſun, goes to the tent of the Tribune, and receives from him the ſignal; which is a flat tablet of wood with ſome word inſcribed upon it: and, having returned back again to his own company, he then delivers the tablet with the ſignal, in the preſence of ſome witneſſes, to the leader of the cohort that is lodged next to his own. From him again, it paſſes to the following cohort; and, in the ſame manner, through all the reſt in order, till it arrives at the firſt cohorts, which lie neareſt to the tents of the Tribunes; and from thence it is carried back again to the Tribunes, while it

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is yet day. If all the tablets that were delivered are brought back, the Tribune then perceives that the ſignal has paſſed through all the camp. But if any one be wanting, he immediately examines into the fact; and, having diſcerned by the inſcriptions in what quarter the tablet has been ſtopped, inflicts a ſuitable puniſhment upon thoſe that have been the cauſe of the neglect.

The guards for the night are thus diſpoſed. One intire company is always ſtationed round the Conſular tent. The tents of the Tribunes, and the cavalry, are guarded by ſoldiers taken from each company, in the manner that has before been mentioned. Each ſeparate company appoints a guard likewiſe for itſelf from it's own body. The other guards are diſpoſed as the Conſul directs. But the uſual cuſtom is, to allot three ſoldiers to the Quæſtor; and two to each of the members of the Council. The external ſides of the camp are guarded by the light-armed forces; who are diſtributed every day along the whole intrenchment. From the ſame body, ten men are alſo ſtationed before every gate that leads into the camp.

Among thoſe that are appointed for the watch, one ſoldier from each guard, the

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ſame whoſe duty it is to take the firſt watch, is carried in the evening to the Tribune, by one of the conductors of the rear of every company. The Tribune, having given to all of them ſome ſmall tablets of wood, inſcribed with a certain character, and appropriated to each particular guard, diſmiſſes them to their reſpective ſtations.

The care of making the rounds is intruſted to the cavalry. The captain of the firſt troop in each of the legions is bound to ſend his orders in the morning to one of the conductors of the rear; commanding him to appoint, before the time of dinner, four ſoldiers of the troop to go the rounds; and to ſend notice alſo afterwards, in the evening, to the leader of the ſecond troop, that it is his turn to inſpect the watch on the following day. The leader of the ſecond troop gives notice, in like manner, for the third day; and the ſame method is obſerved through all the reſt. The four ſoldiers, who are thus ſelected from the firſt troop by the conductor of the rear, having determined among themſelves each particular watch by lot, go afterwards to the tent of the Tribune, and receive from thence in writing an account of the ſeveral poſts, and of the number of the guards, which they

they are required to viſit. They then take their ſtation near to the firſt company of the Triarii. For the leader of this company has the care of marking the time of every watch by the ſound of a trumpet. And when the ſignal is made, he, to whoſe inſpection the firſt watch was allotted, taking with him ſome of his friends as witneſſes, goes round to all the poſts that are recited in his orders, and viſits all the guards: not thoſe alone that are ſtationed round the intrenchment, and before the gates, but thoſe alſo that are placed in every ſingle company and in every troop. If he finds the centinels awake, and fixed in their ſeveral ſtations, he receives from them the wooden tablets. But if he diſcovers, that any one is ſleeping, or has left his poſt, he deſires thoſe that are preſent to bear teſtimony to the fact, and then retires. The ſame method is obſerved in all the following watches. The care of ſounding the trumpet, by which notice is given in the ſame moment both to the centinels, and the inſpectors of the watch, is left, as we have ſaid to the captains of the firſt company of the Triarii, who perform this duty alternately, day by day.

As ſoon as morning appears, thoſe, who have made the rounds, carry the tablets

tablets to the Tribune. If they bring the full number back, they are ſuffered to depart without any queſtion. But if the number be leſs than that of the guards, the inſcriptions are immediatly examined, in order to diſcover from what particular guard the tablet has not been returned. When this is known, the centurion is ordered to attend, and to bring with him the ſoldiers that were appointed for that guard; that they may be queſtioned face to face with him who made the rounds. If the fault be in the guard, he that made the rounds appeals at once to the teſtimony of his friends who were preſent. Such evidence always is demanded from him: and in caſe that he is not able to bring this proof, the whole blame reſts upon himſelf. The Council is then aſſembled; the cauſe is judged by the Tribune; and the guilty perſon ſentenced to be baſtonaded. This puniſhment is inflicted in the following manner.

The Tribune, taking a ſtick into his hand, gently touches the criminal; and, immediately afterwards, all the ſoldiers of the legion attack him with ſticks and ſtones; ſo that the greateſt part of thoſe that are thus condemned are deſtroyed immediately in the camp. If any one eſcapes, yet he is not ſaved. For all return into

into his country is ſhut againſt him: nor would any of his friends or kindred ever dare to receive him into their houſes. Thoſe therefore, who have once fallen into this misfortune, are loſt without reſource. The conductor of the rear, and the leader of the troop, if ever they neglect to give the neceſſary notice in due time, the firſt to the inſpectors of the watch, and the ſecond to the leader of the ſucceeding troop, are ſubject alſo to this puniſhment. From the dread of a diſcipline ſo ſevere, and which leaves no place for mercy, every thing that belongs to the guards of the night is performed with the exacteſt diligence and care.

The ſoldiers are ſubject to the controul of the Tribunes, as theſe are to that of the Conſuls. The Tribunes have the power of impoſing fines, and demanding ſureties, and of puniſhing with ſtripes. The ſame authority is exerciſed by the Prefects among the allies.

The puniſhment of the baſtonade is inflicted alſo upon thoſe who ſteal any thing in the camp; thoſe who bear falſe teſtimony; who in their youth abuſe their bodies; and who have been three times convicted of one fault. Theſe offences are puniſhed as crimes. There are others, that are regarded as the effects of cowar-

dice, and diſgraceful to the military character. When a ſoldier for example, with a view of obtaining a reward, makes a report to the Tribunes of ſome brave action which he has not performed. When any one, through fear, deſerts his ſtation; or throws away his arms in the time of an engagement. From hence it happens, that many, through the dread of the allotted puniſhment, when they are attacked by much greater numbers, will even encounter manifeſt deſtruction, rather than deſert that poſt which they have been ordered to maintain. Others again, when they have loſt their ſhield, or ſword, or any other part of their arms in the time of action, throw themſelves precipitately into the very midſt of the enemy; hoping either to recover what they have loſt, or to avoid by death the reproaches of their fellow-ſoldiers, and the diſgrace that is ready to receive them.

If it happens, that many are at one time guilty of the ſame fault, and that whole companies retire before the enemy, and deſert their ſtation; inſtead of puniſhing all of them with death, an expedient is employed which is both uſeful and full of terror. The Tribune, aſſembling together all the ſoldiers of the legion, commands the criminals to be brought forwards:

forwards: and, having ſharply reproached them with their cowardice, he then draws out by lot, either five, or eight, or twenty men, according to the number of thoſe that have offended For the proportion is uſually ſo adjuſted, that every tenth man is reſerved for puniſhment. Thoſe, who are thus ſeparated from the reſt by lot, are baſtonaded without remiſſion in the manner before deſcribed. The others are ſentenced to be fed with barley inſtead of wheat; and are lodged without the intrenchment, expoſed to inſults from the enemy. As the danger therefore, and the dread of death, hangs equally over all the guilty, becauſe no one can foreſee upon whom the lot will fall; and as the ſhame and infamy, of receiving barley only for their ſupport, is extended alſo alike to all; this inſtitution is perfectly well contrived, both for impreſſing preſent terror, and for the prevention of future faults.

The method, by which the young men are animated to brave all danger, is alſo admirable. When an action has paſſed, in which any of the ſoldiers have ſhewn ſignal proofs of courage, the Conſul, aſſembling the troops together, commands thoſe to approach, who have diſtinguiſhed themſelves by any eminent exploit. And having firſt

beſtowed on every one of them apart the commendation that is due to this particular inſtance of their valour, and recounted likewiſe all their former actions that have ever merited applauſe, he then diſtributes among them the following rewards. To him who has wounded an enemy, a javelin. To him who has killed an enemy, and ſtripped him of his armour, if he be a ſoldier in the infantry, a goblet; if in the cavalry, furniture for his horſe: though, in former times, this laſt was preſented only with a javelin. Theſe rewards however are not beſtowed upon the ſoldiers, who in a general battle, or in the attack of a city, wound or ſpoil an enemy; but upon thoſe alone, who in ſeparate ſkirmiſhes, and when any occaſion offers, in which no neceſſity requires them to engage in ſingle conteſt, throw themſelves voluntarily into danger, and with deſign provoke the combat. When a city is taken by ſtorm, thoſe who mount firſt upon the walls are honoured with a golden crown. Thoſe alſo who have ſaved the lives of any of the citizens, or the allies, by covering them from the enemy in the time of battle, receive preſents from the Conſul, and are crowned likewiſe by the perſons themſelves who have been thus preſerved; and who, if

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they refuſe this office, are compelled by the judgement of the Tribunes to perform it. Add to this, that thoſe who are thus ſaved are bound, during the remainder of their lives, to reverence their preſerver as a father, and to render to him all the duties which they would pay to him who gave them birth. Nor are the effects of theſe rewards, in raiſing a ſpirit of emulation and of courage, confined to thoſe alone who are preſent in the army, but extended likewiſe to all the citizens at home. For thoſe who have obtained theſe preſents, beſide the honour which they acquire among their fellow-ſoldiers, and the reputation which immediately attends them in their country, are diſtinguiſhed after their return, by wearing in all ſolemn proceſſions ſuch ornaments as are permitted only to be worn by thoſe who have received them from the Conſuls as the rewards of their valour. They hang up likewiſe in the moſt conſpicuous parts of their houſes the ſpoils which they have taken, as a monument and evidence of their exploits. Since ſuch therefore is the attention and the care, with which the Romans diſtribute rewards and puniſhments in their armies, it is not to be thought ſtrange, that the wars in which they engage are always ended with glory and ſucceſs.

The military ſtipends are thus regulated. The pay of a ſoldier in the infantry is two oboli by the day; and double to the Centurions. The pay of the cavalry is a drachma. The allowance of corn, to each man in the infantry, conſiſts of about two third parts of an Attic buſhel of wheat by the month. In the cavalry, it is ſeven buſhels of barley, and two of wheat. To the infantry of the allies, the ſame quantity is diſtributed as to that of the Romans; but their cavalry receives only one buſhel and a third of wheat, and five of barley. The whole of this allowance is given without reſerve to the allies. But the Roman ſoldiers are obliged to purchaſe their corn and cloths, together with the arms which they occaſionally want, at a certain ſtated price, which is deducted by the Quæſtor from their pay.

In breaking up the camp, the following order is obſerved. When the firſt ſignal is made, the ſoldiers all take down the tents, and collect the baggage. No tent however is at any time either ſet up or taken down, until thoſe of the Conſul and the Tribunes are firſt ſet up, or firſt removed. Upon the ſecond ſignal, the baggage is placed upon the beaſts of burthen; and at the third, the foremoſt of the troops begin their march, and the whole

whole camp is put in motion. In the van are uſually placed the extraordinaries; and after theſe, the right wing of the allies, which is followed by the baggage of both theſe bodies. Next to theſe, marches the firſt of the Roman legions, with its baggage alſo behind it. The ſecond legion follows; having behind it likewiſe both its own baggage, and the baggage of the allies, who are in the rear; for the rear of all the march is cloſed with the left wing of the allies. The cavalry marches ſometimes in the rear of the reſpective bodies, to which it belongs; and ſometimes on the flanks of the beaſts that are loaded with the baggage; keeping them together in due order, and covering them from inſult. When any attack is expected to be made upon the rear, the extraordinaries of the allies, inſtead of leading the van, are poſted in the rear. In all the other parts, the diſpoſition remains the ſame. Of the two legions, and the two wings of the allies, thoſe that are on one day foremoſt in the march, on the following day are placed behind; that, by thus changing their rank alternately, all the troops may obtain the ſame advantage in their turn, of arriving firſt at water and at forage. There is alſo another diſpoſition, which

is uſed when any immediate danger threatens, and the march is made through an open country. At ſuch times, the Haſtati, the Principes, and the Triarii, are ranged in three parallel lines, each behind the other, with the baggage of the Haſtati in the front. Behind the Haſtati is placed the baggage of the Principes, who are followed likewiſe by that of the Triarii; ſo that the baggage, and the ſeveral bodies, are mingled in alternate order. The march being thus diſpoſed, the troops, as ſoon as any attack is made, turning either to the left or to the right, advance forwards from the baggage, towards that ſide upon which the enemy appears. And thus, in a moment of time, and by one ſingle movement, the whole army is formed at once in order of battle; except only that the Haſtati are perhaps obliged to make an evolution; and the beaſts of burthen alſo, with all thoſe that attend upon the baggage, being now thrown into the rear of all the troops, are covered by them from all danger.

At the end of a march, when the army arrives near the place of their incampment, a Tribune and ſome Centurions, who are appointed always for this purpoſe, advance before the reſt. And having

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ſurveyed the whole ground upon which the incampment is to be made, they firſt determine the place of the conſular tent, and on which ſide of it the legions may moſt commodiouſly be lodged. When this is done, they meaſure out the ſpace that is allotted for the Conſul; and then draw a line, for the place of the tents of the Tribunes; and parallel to it another line, below which the legions are to be incamped. In the ſame manner alſo, the ſeveral portions of the ground, which lies on the other ſide of the conſular tent, and which we have already particularly deſcribed, are aſcertained by lines. And as the diſtances are fixed, and well known by uſe, the admeaſurement of the whole is eaſy, and ſoon completed. Four enſigns are then planted in the ground: the firſt in the place in which the tent of the Conſul is to be ſet up; the ſecond, on that ſide of the conſular ground which has been choſen for the front of the camp; the third in the middle of the line that is deſigned for the tents of the Tribunes; and the laſt upon the other parallel line, below which the legions are to be incamped. Theſe enſigns are all of a purple colour; that of the Conſul excepted, which is white. The portions on the other ſide of the conſular ground

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are ſometimes marked by ſimple pikes fixed in the ground, and ſometimes by enſigns of ſome different colour. Laſt of all, the ſeveral ſtreets are drawn out by meaſure, and pikes alſo planted, to denote the limits of each particular ſtreet. The neceſſary effect of this method is, that when the troops, upon their march, approach ſo near as to diſcover the place of their incampment, they are able to diſcern at once all the different parts of the camp; being taught by the enſign of the conſul to point out and diſtinguiſh all the reſt. And as they all occupy the ſame place always in the camp, ſo that each man knows in what particular ſtreet, and in what part alſo of the ſtreet he is going to be lodged, their entrance very much reſembles that of a body of ſoldiers into their own native city. For as theſe, already knowing, both in general and in particular, the quarters of the city in which their habitations ſtand, turn aſide immediately from the gates, and arrive at their ſeveral houſes without miſtake; juſt ſo it happens in the Roman camp. It is to this facility indeed that the Romans chiefly attend upon ſuch occaſions; and, for the ſake of obtaining it, purſue ſo contrary a method to that of the Greeks. For the Greeks, when they incamp,

ncamp, conſider principally the natural ſtrength of the place that is choſen, and accommodate their diſpoſition to it; being partly ſtudious to avoid the labour of throwing up an intrenchment; and partly perſuaded alſo, that fortifications raiſed by art are always leſs ſecure than thoſe that are made by nature. In compliance therefore with what the nature of the ground demands, they not only are obliged to give every kind of figure to their camp, but to vary alſo the poſition of the ſeveral parts, as the place for each is favourable or improper. And from hence it happens, that the ſoldier never knows with certainty, either his own place in the camp, or that of the body to which he belongs. But the Romans willingly ſubmit to the taſk of making an intrenchment, and to other painful works; for the ſake of the advantage that is found, in employing a method which is never changed, and which renders all the parts of the camp familiar to the army.

Such then in general are the inſtitutions of the Romans, which belong to the eſtabliſhment of their armies, and more eſpecially to the manner of their incampment.

EXTRACT the THIRD.

Some peculiar excellencies in the Roman government and manners, illuſtrated by a compariſon of them with them with thoſe of other ſtates.

CHAP. I.

THE ſtates, which almoſt all writers have tranſmitted to us with applauſe, are thoſe of Lacædemon, Mantinea, Crete, and Carthage. To theſe ſome have alſo added the governments of Thebes and Athens. With regard to the firſt, it may be allowed perhaps that they merit ſome diſtinction. But the republicks of Thebes and Athens very little deſerve, in my opinion, to be made the ſubject of any particular diſcourſe: becauſe they neither roſe by natural ſteps to greatneſs; nor remained for any long continuance in a proſperous ſtate; nor ſunk again by a gradual decline. But having owed all their exaltation merely to ſome favourable ſeaſons, and borrowed a kind of tranſient ſplendour from the times, in that very moment which ſaw them flouriſh, and which ſeemed to promiſe a laſting

ing confirmation of their power, they were thrown back again by fortune into a contrary ſtate. Thus the Thebans, having applied to their own advantage the imprudent conduct of the Lacedæmonians, and the hatred in which they were held by their allies, acquired, indeed, through the ability of one or two of their citizens who diſcerned theſe circumſtances, the reputation of ſuperiority among the Greeks. But that the ſucceſs, which they at this time gained, aroſe not from the conſtitution of their government, but from the ſkill of thoſe who governed, the ill fortune that followed cloſe behind rendered clear and inconteſtable. For as the power of Thebes grew up and flouriſhed with the lives of Epaminondas and Pelopidas, and, when they died, was immediately diſſolved; there needs no farther proof, that the ſplendour, which then accrued to the republick, was derived wholly from the virtue of theſe citizens, and not from any excellence in the ſtate. The ſame obſervation may be applied as juſtly to the commonwealth of Athens: which flouriſhed indeed at many other particular ſeaſons; but having been raiſed by the able conduct of Themiſtocles to the greateſt height of glory, within a ſhort time afterwards was ſunk again in weakneſs

and diſgrace. The cauſe of this ſudden change was no other than the irregular conſtitution of the government. For the Athenian ſtate may very aptly be compared to a ſhip, in which there is no perſon that commands. In ſuch a veſſel, when the mariners, either through the dread of enemies, or the impending dangers of a ſtorm, are compelled to act together in concert, and attend to the orders of the pilot, all things that are neceſſary are performed by them with diligence and ſkill. But no ſooner are theſe apprehenſions paſt, than they begin to reject all controul, and engage in mutual conteſts, ſuch as the diverſity of their ſentiments inſpires. And while ſome among them are earneſt for continuing their courſe, and others not leſs urgent with the pilot to caſt anchor; while the firſt unfurl the ſails, and the latter interpoſe with violence, and command them to be furled; this ſpirit of contention and ſeditious obſtinacy not only affords a ſhameful ſpectacle to thoſe that behold it at a diſtance, but renders the ſafety likewiſe of all who are embarked in the veſſel ſo precarious, that very frequently, when they have eſcaped the dangers of the greateſt ſeas and moſt dreadful tempeſts, they are at laſt wrecked even in the harbour, and

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when they have juſt gained the land. In the ſame manner the Athenian ſtate, after having been conducted, by the virtue of the governours and the people, through all the difficulties of the moſt threatening ſeaſons, has often unaccountably been overſet, in times of perfect ſafety and tranquility. There is no need therefore to ſay more concerning this republick, or that of Thebes; in both of which the multitude diſpoſes all things, as the impulſe of their own peculiar paſſions prompts them: the people in the one, being naturally precipitate and eager above the reſt of men; and in the other, trained up to habits of force and violence.

Let us paſs on then to the government of Crete; and conſider, upon what grounds it is, that the moſt ſenſible of the ancient writers, ſuch as Ephorus, Xenophon, Calliſthenes, and Plato, have ventured to affirm; firſt, that the frame of this republick very much reſembles, or rather is the ſame with that of Sparta; and ſecondly, that the conſtitution itſelf is ſuch as deſerves to be applauded. In my judgement, their opinion with reſpect to both theſe points is very diſtant from the truth. Whether it be or not, the following obſervations may enable us to determine. And firſt, concerning the little reſemblance

blance that is to be found betwen theſe two ſtates.

There are three things mentioned by theſe writers, as diſtinguiſhing the Spartan government. The firſt is the equality of poſſeſſions in land; of which no one is permitted to obtain a greater portion than another: the whole lands, that belong to the community, being divided in equal ſhares among all the citizens. The ſecond is the neglect of wealth, that prevails among this people. That even the uſe of money is unknown among them: and that, by conſequence, the very root of that contention, which ſprings from the poſſeſſion of leſs and more, is utterly deſtroyed. In the laſt place, as they affirm, the kings of Lacedæmon enjoy a perpetual and hereditary ſovereignty; and the ſenators, with whoſe participation, and by whoſe advice, the intire adminiſtration of affairs is regulated, hold their dignity during life. Now in all theſe points the government of Crete is contrary to that of Sparta. For the Cretans are permitted, by their laws, to poſſeſs, without any bounds, as large a property in land as they are able to obtain. The eſtimation alſo of money is ſo great among them, that it is not only neceſſary, but even highly honourable to acquire it. And indeed

deed the desire of amassing wealth, and the habit of increasing it, are so deeply implanted in the very manners of this people, that they alone of all mankind think nothing sordid or dishonourable that is joined with gain. Lastly, in this island, all the publick offices are renewed every year; and are constituted in a manner purely democratical. I have often therefore been led to wonder, that states, which differ so essentially, should be thus joined together by these writers, as if they were of a similar kind and nature. But it is not only to be imputed to them, that they have barely overlooked this difference. For when they have employed great pains to shew, that Lycurgus alone, of all mankind, discerned the means that were most proper to give stability to government; that, as every state can only be maintained by bravery in war, and union among the citizens, this legislator, when he took away from his republick the desire of riches, removed also with it all civil tumult and dissension, and that the Lacedæmonians, being thus freed from these domestick evils, lived together in perfect concord, and preserved such order in their government, as was not to be found in any of the states of Greece; when they have discoursed, I say, at large, on all these

circumſtances, and ſeen alſo on the other hand, that the natural luſt of wealth, which prevails among the Cretans, gives birth continually both to private conteſts, and to publick diſſenſions and diviſions; produces murthers and inteſtine wars; yet ſtill, as if a difference ſo acknowledged were of ſmall importance, they boldly venture to affirm, that there is a cloſe reſemblance between the two republicks. And indeed Ephorus, when he treats of either of them, employs indiſcriminately the ſame expreſſions, the proper names alone excepted; ſo that, unleſs we attend to theſe, it is not poſſible to diſtinguiſh, which of the two is deſigned by his diſcourſe. Such then is the difference between the government of Crete and that of Sparta. I ſhall now endeavour to ſhew, that the firſt is neither worthy of applauſe, nor imitation.

There two things, which are eſſential parts in every government, and according to which the principles and conſtitution of the ſtate itſelf, will be found to deſerve either praiſe or cenſure. Theſe are, the manners and the laws. The manners and the laws that are moſt worthy to be approved, are thoſe which form the lives of individuals to ſanctity and moderation, and the general temper of the whole community to mild-

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neſs and to juſtice: and thoſe which produce contrary effects are fit to be rejected. When we perceive therefore, that the laws and manners of a ſtate are ſuch as tend to promote the exerciſe of honeſty and virtue, as it is very reaſonable for us to conclude, that the ſtate itſelf is virtuous, and the members of it free from all reproach; ſo, on the other hand, when an immoderate deſire of gain governs the life of every private citizen, and the public tranſactions of the ſtate are contrary to juſtice, we may ſafely venture to declare, that the laws of this community are bad, the manners of the people corrupt and vicious, and the whole government contemptible. Now if we conſider the character and conduct of the Cretans, it is certain, that ſcarcely an example can be found of any nation, in which the private manners of the citizens are more replete with artifice and fraud, or where the publick enterprizes are more unjuſt. As this republick therefore neither bears any reſemblance to that of Sparta, nor deſerves in any manner to be approved or imitated, we ſhall here reject it, as unworthy of our notice in that compariſon which we propoſe.

Nor is it reaſonable to expect, that we ſhould allow any place in this inquiry to the commonwealth of Plato; how much

ſoever it may have been celebrated by ſome philoſophers. For as in the conteſts between artiſts, or combatants, in the publick games, no perſons are admitted, who have not firſt been trained in proper diſcipline, and prepared by exerciſe; ſo neither can this republick hope to be received into any competition concerning excellence, till it has firſt ſhewn its ſtrength in ſome real action. To compare it, ſuch as it has hitherto remained, with the republicks of Sparta, Rome, and Carthage, would be no leſs abſurd, than to compare a ſtatue with a breathing and living man. For though the beauty of the work might deſerve perhaps the higheſt commendation, yet the compariſon of an inanimate form with an animated being would very juſtly appear defective and incongruous to every eye. Leaving therefore this republick and that of Crete, let us return again to the government of Sparta.

When I conſider the laws that were invented by Lycurgus, as tending to promote union among the citizens, to ſecure the Laconian territory from all danger, and to mantain his people in the undiſturbed enjoyment of their liberty, they appear to have been ſo wiſely framed, and adapted with ſuch true foreſight to all theſe purpoſes, that I am almoſt tempted

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to regard them, rather as the work of ſome divinity, than the effort of any human mind. In eſtabliſhing an equality of poſſeſſions, and in reſtraining all the citizens to the conſtant uſe of one ſimple and common diet, he choſe the means that were moſt effectual, to render the Lacedæmonians moderate in their deſires, and to baniſh all contention from the ſtate. By accuſtoming them to painful labours, and dangerous exerciſes, he formed them to be brave and daring. And where temperance and fortitude meet together, in any man, or in any community of men, it is ſcarcely poſſible that thoſe, who are habituated to the practice of theſe virtues, ſhould ever be diſturbed by inteſtine evils, or be ſubdued by external force. Lycurgus therefore, having thus raiſed the frame of his republick upon theſe two priciples, ſecured all Laconia againſt the dread of any hoſtile attempts, and eſtabliſhed the liberty of Sparta upon ſuch ſtrong foundations, that it ſubſiſted during many ages. But it appears to me that this Legiſlator, both in the frame of his particular laws, and in the general conſtitution of the government, wholly overlooked one great precaution: the precaution that was neceſſary to reſtrain his people from invading the territory of their neighbours, from aſpir-

ing to an extended ſovereignty, or raiſing themſelves in any manner to be the arbiters of all affairs. As the particular members of the ſtate were accuſtomed by his inſtitutions to live in the ſimpleſt and moſt frugal manner, and to remain ſatisfied with their own poſſeſſions, it was alſo no leſs requiſite, either to infuſe into the whole community the ſame willing ſpirit of contentedneſs and moderation, or to force them through neceſſity to adopt it. But Lycurgus, while he freed his citizens from jealouſy and envious competition in their private manners, and in the adminiſtration of their own particular government, at the ſame time allowed full ſcope to their ambitious projects againſt the reſt of Greece, and ſuffered them to become moſt eager and aſpiring, in the purſuit both of wealth and power. For who is ignorant, that the Lacedæmonians, the firſt almoſt of all the Greeks, were led by the deſire of gain to invade the territory of their neighbours, and declared war againſt the Meſſenians, with deſign to reduce them into ſlavery? Who has not heard, that, when they had inveſted Meſſene with their forces, they perſiſted in the attempt with ſo great obſtinacy, that they bound themſelves by an oath, never to raiſe the ſiege till the city ſhould be taken?

taken? Nor is it leſs notorious to all mankind, that, with a view of eſtabliſhing their own dominion over the Grecian ſtates, they ſubmitted to obey the orders even of a people whom they had conquered. For after having bravely maintained the cauſe of the common liberty of all the Greeks, and ſubdued the Perſians who brought an army to invade it; after having defeated, and forced them to return; they baſely yielded to them many cities, by the peace that was concluded by Antalcidas; that they might obtain in return the treaſure that was neceſſary, for acquiring to themſelves the ſovereignty of Greece. Upon this occaſion it was that they firſt perceived in what part their government was defective. For as long as they confined their views of conqueſt to the neighbouring ſtates, and to the limits of Peloponneſus, they were able to draw from Laconia itſelf ſuch ſupplies as were ſufficient for the accompliſhment of their deſigns: as all things that were neceſſary were collected within their reach; and as the diſtance was commodious for their return back again to their country, and for tranſporting all their ſtores. But when they attempted to maintain fleets upon the ſea, and to ſend their armies beyond the bounds of Peloponneſus; it very ſoon

was ſeen, that neither their iron money, nor the exchange of their own natural commodities, that was permitted by Lycurgus, was capable of ſupplying all their wants: but that money of a common currency, and ſtores drawn from foreign countries, were neceſſary to ſupport ſuch enterprizes. They were forced therefore to ſupplicate aſſiſtance from the court of Perſia; to impoſe a tribute upon the iſlands; and to exact contributions from all the Greeks: being fully aſſured, that while they adhered to the inſtitutions of Lycurgus, they could never hope to obtain the ſupreme command in Greece, nor be able even in any manner to contend for ſuperiority with other ſtates. But to what purpoſe is this digreſſion? It is to ſhew by the evidence of facts, that the laws of Lycurgus were perfectly well contrived, for maintaining his people in the undiſturbed poſſeſſion of their own proper territory, and for preſerving their liberty inviolable: and that, where men propoſe to themſelves theſe advantages as the ſole objects of political inſtitutions, it muſt be acknowledged, that there neither is, nor ever was any ſyſtem or frame of government, more eligible than that of Sparta. But if a people on the other hand ſhould deſire to enlarge their views, and eſteem it

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more great and glorious to hold many in ſubjection, to extend their empire over various countries, and to draw the ſubmiſſion of all mankind towards them; it muſt then alſo be confeſſed, that the Lacedæmonian conſtitution is defective; and that the Roman government is framed with greater ſtrength, for the accompliſhment of ſuch deſigns. The truth of this remark is manifeſt from that which happened in the two republicks. For the Lacedæmonians no ſooner endeavoured to obtain the ſovereignty of Greece, than they brought their own liberty into danger. But the Romans, having once ſubdued to their dominion all the parts of Italy, reduced, within a ſhort time afterwards, the whole world beneath their yoke: being greatly aſſiſted in the execution of this vaſt attempt, by the plenty of all neceſſary ſtores, and the facility with which they were continually ſupplied.

CHAP. II.

THE government of Carthage ſeems alſo to have been originally well contrived, with regard to thoſe general forms that have been mentioned. For there were kings in this government; together with

with a ſenate, which was veſted with ariſtocratical authority. The people likewiſe enjoy the exerciſe of certain powers that were appropriated to them. In a word, the intire frame of the republick very much reſembled thoſe of Rome and Sparta. But at the time of the war of Annibal, the Carthaginian conſtitution was worſe in its condition than the Roman. For as nature has aſſigned to every body, every government, and every action, three ſucceſſive periods; the firſt, of growth; the ſecond, of perfection; and that which follows, of decay; and as the period of perfection is the time in which they ſeverally diſplay their greateſt ſtrength; from hence aroſe the difference that was then found between the two republicks. For the government of Carthage having reached the higheſt point of vigour and perfection much ſooner than that of Rome, had now declined from it in the ſame proportion: whereas the Romans at this very time, had juſt raiſed their conſtitution to the moſt flouriſhing and perfect ſtate. The effect of this difference was, that among the Carthaginians the people poſſeſſed the greateſt ſway in all deliberations, but the ſenate among the Romans. And as, in the one republick, all meaſures were determined by the

multitude; and, in the other, by the moſt eminent citizens; of ſo great force was this advantage in the conduct of affairs, that the Romans, though brought by repeated loſſes into the greateſt danger, became, through the wiſdom of their counſels, ſuperior to the Carthaginians in the war.

If we deſcend to a more particular compariſon, ſhall find, that, with reſpect to military ſcience for example, the Carthaginians, in the management and conduct of a naval war, are more ſkilful than the Romans. For the Carthaginians have derived this knowledge from their anceſtors through a long courſe of ages; and are more exerciſed in maritime affairs than any other people. But the Romans, on the other hand, are far ſuperior in all things that belong to the eſtabliſhment and diſcipline of armies. For this diſcipline, which is regarded by them as the chief and conſtant object of their care, is utterly neglected by the Carthaginians; except only that they beſtow ſome little attention upon their cavalry. The reaſon of this difference is, that the Carthaginians employ foreign mercenaries; and that on the contrary the Roman armies are compoſed of citizens, and of the people of the country. Now in this reſpect, the

the government of Rome is greatly preferable to that of Carthage. For while the Carthaginians intruſt the preſervation of their liberty to the care of venal troops; the Romans place all their confidence in their own bravery, and in the aſſiſtance of their allies. From hence it happens, that the Romans, though at firſt defeated, are always able to renew the war; and that the Carthaginian armies never are repaired without great difficulty. Add to this, that the Romans, fighting for their country and their children, never ſuffer their ardour to be ſlackened; but perſiſt with the ſame ſteady ſpirit, till they become ſuperior to their enemies. From hence it happens likewiſe, that even in actions upon the ſea, the Romans, though inferior to the Carthaginians, as we have already obſerved, in naval knowledge and experience, very frequently obtain ſucceſs, through the mere bravery of their forces. For though in all ſuch conteſts a ſkill in maritime affairs muſt be allowed to be of the greateſt uſe; yet, on the other hand, the valour of the troops that are engaged is often no leſs effectual to draw the victory to their ſide.

Now the people of Italy are by nature ſuperior to the Carthaginians and the Africans, both in bodily ſtrength, and in

courage. Add to this, that they have among them certain inſtitutions, by which the young men are greatly animated to perform acts of bravery. It will be ſufficient to mention one of theſe, as a proof of the attention that is ſhewn by the Roman government, to infuſe ſuch a ſpirit into the citizens, as ſhall lead them to encounter every kind of danger, for the ſake of obtaining reputation in their country. When any illuſtrious perſon dies, he is carried in proceſſion, with the reſt of the funeral pomp, to the Roſtra in the Forum: ſometimes placed conſpicuous in an upright poſture; and ſometimes, though leſs frequently, reclined. And while the people are all ſtanding round, his ſon, if he has left one of ſufficient age, and who is then at Rome, or, if otherwiſe, ſome perſon of his kindred, aſcends the Roſtra, and extols the virtues of the deceaſed, and the great deeds that were performed by him in his life. By this diſcourſe, which recalls his paſt actions to remembrance, and places them in open view before all the multitude, not thoſe alone who were ſharers in his victories, but even the reſt who bore no part in his exploits, are moved to ſuch ſympathy of ſorrow, that the accident ſeems rather to be a publick misfortune, than a private

private loſs. He is then buried with the uſual rites; and afterwards an image, which both in features and complexion expreſſes an exact reſemblance of his face, is ſet up in the moſt conſpicuous part of the houſe, incloſed in a ſhrine of wood. Upon ſolemn feſtivals, theſe images are uncovered, and adorned with the greateſt care. And when any other perſon of the ſame family dies, they are carried alſo in the funeral proceſſion, with a body added to the buſt, that the repreſentation may be juſt even with regard to ſize. They are dreſſed likewiſe in the habits, that belong to the ranks, which they ſeverally filled when they were alive. If they were Conſuls or Prætors, in a gown bordered with purple: if Cenſors, in a purple robe: and if they triumphed, or obtained any ſimilar honour, in a veſt embroidered with gold. Thus apparelled, they are drawn along in chariots preceded by the rods and axes, and other enſigns of their former dignity. And when they arrive at the Forum, they are all ſeated upon chairs of ivory; and there exhibit the nobleſt object that can be offered to a youthful mind, warmed with the love of virtue and of glory. For who can behold without emotion the forms of ſo many illuſtrious men, thus living, as it were, and breathing

ing together in his preſence? Or what ſpectacle can be conceived more great and ſtriking? The perſon alſo that is appointed to harangue, when he has exhauſt-all the praiſes of the deceaſed, turns his diſcourſe to the reſt, whoſe images are before him; and, beginning with the moſt ancient of them, recounts the fortunes and the exploits of every one in turn. By this method which renews continually the remembrance of men celebrated for their virtue, the fame of every great and noble action becomes immortal; and the glory of thoſe, by whoſe ſervices their country has been benefited, is rendered familiar to the people, and delivered down to future times. But the chief advantage is, that by the hope of obtaining this honourable fame, which is reſerved for virtue, the young men are animated to ſuſtain all danger, in the cauſe of the common ſafety. For from hence it has happened, that many among the Romans have voluntarily engaged in ſingle combat, in order to decide the fortune of an intire war. Many alſo have devoted themſelves to inevitable death: ſome of them in battle, to ſave the lives of other citizens; and ſome in time of peace, to reſcue the whole ſtate from deſtruction. Others again, who have been inveſted with the higheſt dignities, have,

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in defiance of all law and cuſtom, condemned their own ſons to die: ſhewing greater regard to the advantage of their country, than to the bonds of nature, and the cloſeſt ties of kindred. Very frequent are the examples of this kind, that are recorded in the Roman ſtory. I ſhall here mention one, as a ſignal inſtance, and proof of the truth of all that I have affirmed. Horatius ſurnamed Cocles, being engaged in combat with two enemies, at the fartheſt extremity of the bridge that led into Rome acroſs the Tiber, and perceiving that many others were advancing faſt to their aſſiſtance, was apprehenſive that they would force their way together into the city. Turning himſelf therefore to his companions that were behind him, he called to them aloud, that they ſhould immediately retire and break the bridge. While they were employed in this work, Horatius, though covered over with wounds, ſtill maintained his poſt, and ſtopped the progreſs of the enemies; who were ſtruck with his firmneſs and intrepid courage, even more than with the ſtrength of his reſiſtance. And when the bridge was broken, and the city ſecured from inſult, he threw himſelf into the river with his armour, and there loſt his life as he had deſigned: having preferred the

the ſafety of his country, and the future fame that was ſure to follow ſuch an action, to his own preſent exiſtence, and to the time that remained for him to live. Such is the ſpirit, and ſuch the emulation of atchieving glorious actions, which the Roman inſtitution sare fitted to infuſe into the minds of youth.

In all things that regard the acquiſition of wealth, the manners alſo and the cuſtoms of the Romans are greatly preferable to thoſe of the Carthaginians. Among the latter, nothing is reputed infamous, that is joined with gain. But among the former, nothing is held more baſe than to be corrupted by gifts, or to covet an increaſe of wealth by means that are unjuſt. For as much as they eſteem the poſſeſſion of honeſt riches to be fair and honourable, ſo much, on the other hand, all thoſe that are amaſſed by unlawful arts, are viewed by them with horror and reproach. The truth of this fact is clearly ſeen in the following inſtance. Among the Carthaginians, money is openly employed to obtain the dignities of the ſtate: but all ſuch proceeding is a capital crime in Rome. As the rewards therefore that are propoſed to virtue in the two republicks are ſo different, it cannot but happen, that the attention of the citizens to form their

minds to virtuous actions muſt be alſo different.

But among all the uſeful inſtitutions, that demonſtrate the ſuperior excellence of the Roman government, the moſt conſiderable perhaps is the opinion which the people are taught to hold concerning the Gods: and that, which other men regard as an object of diſgrace, appears in my judgement to be the very thing by which this republick chiefly is ſuſtained. I mean, ſuperſtition: which is impreſſed with all its terrors; and influences both the private actions of the citizens, and the publick adminiſtration alſo of the ſtate, in a degree that can ſcarcely be exceeded. This may appear aſtoniſhing to many. To me it is evident, that this contrivance was at firſt adopted for the ſake of the multitude. For if it were poſſible that a ſtate could be compoſed of wiſe men only, there would be no need perhaps of any ſuch invention. But as the people univerſally are fickle and inconſtant, filled with irregular deſires, precipitate in their paſſions, and prone to violence; there is no way left to reſtrain them, but by the dread of things unſeen, and by the pageantry of terrifying fiction. The ancients therefore acted not abſurdly, nor without good reaſon, when they inculcated

culcated the notions concerning the Gods, and the belief of infernal puniſhments; but much more thoſe of the preſent age are to be charged with raſhneſs and abſurdity, in endeavouring to extirpate theſe opinions. For, not to mention other effects that flow from ſuch an inſtitution; if, among the Greeks for example, a ſingle talent only be intruſted to thoſe who have the management of any of the publick money; though they give ten written ſureties, with as many ſeals, and twice as many witneſſes, they are unable to diſcharge the truſt repoſed in them with integrity. But the Romans, on the other hand, who in the courſe of their magiſtracies, and in embaſſies, diſburſe the greateſt ſums, are prevailed on by the ſingle obligation of an oath, to perform their duty with inviolable honeſty. And as, in other ſtates, a man is rarely to be found, whoſe hands are pure from publick robbery; ſo, among the Romans, it is no leſs rare, to diſcover one that is tainted with this crime.

But all things are ſubject to decay and change. This is a truth ſo evident, and ſo demonſtrated by the perpetual and the neceſſary courſe of nature, that it needs no other proof. Now there are two ways by which every kind of government is deſ-

troyed: either by ſome accident that happens from without; or ſome evil that ariſes within itſelf. What the firſt will be, it is not always eaſy to foreſee: but the latter is certain and determinate. We have already ſhewn, what are the original, and what the ſecondary, forms of government; and in what manner alſo they are reciprocally converted each into the other. Whoever therefore is able to connect the beginning with the end in this inquiry, will be able alſo to declare with ſome aſſurance, what will be the future fortune of the Roman government. At leaſt in my judgement nothing is more eaſy. For when a ſtate, after having paſſed with ſafety through many and great dangers, arrives at the higheſt degree of power, and poſſeſſes an intire and undiſputed ſovereignty; it is manifeſt, that the long continuance of proſperity muſt give birth to coſtly and luxurious manners, and that the minds of men will be heated with ambitious conteſts, and become too eager and aſpiring in the purſuit of dignities. And as theſe evils are continually increaſed, the deſire of power and rule, and the imagined ignominy of remaining in a ſubject ſtate, will firſt begin to work the ruin of the republick: arrogance and luxury will afterwards advance it: and in

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the end, the change will be completed by the people: when the avarice of ſome is found to injure and oppreſs them; and the ambition of others ſwells their vanity, and poiſons them with flattering hopes. For then, being inflamed with rage, and following only the dictates of their paſſions, they no longer will ſubmit to any controul; or be contented with an equal ſhare of the adminiſtration, in conjunction with their rulers; but will draw to themſelves the intire ſovereignty, and ſupreme direction of all affairs. When this is done, the government will aſſume indeed the faireſt of all names, that of a free and popular ſtate; but will in truth be the greateſt of all evils, the Government of the multitude.

As we have thus ſufficiently explained the conſtitution and the growth of the Roman government; have marked the cauſes of that greatneſs in which it now ſubſiſts; and ſhewn by compariſon, in what view it may be judged inferior, and in what ſuperior, to other ſtates; we ſhall here cloſe this diſcourſe. But as every ſkilful artiſt offers ſome piece of work to publick view, as a proof of his abilities; in the ſame manner we alſo, taking ſome part of hiſtory, that is connected with the times from which we were led into

this digreſſion, and making a ſhort recital of one ſingle action, ſhall endeavour to demonſtrate by fact as well as words what was the ſtrength, and how great the vigour, which at that time were diſplayed by this republick.

When Annibal, after the battle of Cannæ, had taken priſoners eight thouſand of the Romans, who were left to guard the camp; he permitted them to ſend a deputation to Rome, to treat of their ranſom and redemption. Ten perſons, the moſt illuſtrious that were among them, were appointed for this purpoſe: and the General, having firſt commanded them to ſwear, that they would return to him again, ſuffered them to depart. But one of the number, as ſoon as they had paſſed the intrenchment, having ſaid that he had forgotten ſomething, went back into the camp, took what he had left, and then continued his journey with the reſt; perſuading himſelf, that by this return he had diſcharged his promiſe, and ſatisfied the obligation of the oath. When they arrived at Rome, they earneſtly intreated the ſenate not to envy them the ſafety that was offered; but to ſuffer them to be reſtored again to their ſeveral families, at the price of three minæ, for each priſoner, which was the ſum

ſum that Annibal demanded: that they were not unworthy of this favour: that they neither had through cowardice deſerted their poſt in battle; nor done any thing that had brought diſhonour upon the Roman name; but that, having been left to guard the camp, they had been thrown by unavoidable neceſſity, after the deſtruction of all the reſt of the army, into the power of the enemy. The Romans were at this time weakened by repeated loſſes; were deſerted by almoſt every one of their allies; and ſeemed even to expect, that Rome itſelf would inſtantly be attacked; yet, when they had heard the deputies, they neither were deterred by adverſe fortune from attending to what was fit and right, nor neglected any of thoſe meaſures that were neceſſary to the publick ſafety. But perceiving, that the deſign of Annibal, in this proceeding, was both to acquire a large ſupply of money, and at the ſame time to check the ardour of his enemies in battle, by opening to their view the means of ſafety even though they ſhould be conquered, they were ſo far from yielding to this requeſt, that they ſhewed no regard either to the diſtreſſed condition of their fellow-citizens, or to the ſervices that might be expected from the priſoners:

but reſolved to diſappoint the hopes, and fruſtrate the intentions of this General, by rejecting all terms of ranſom. They made a law alſo, by which it was declared, that the ſoldiers that were left muſt either conquer, or muſt die: and that no other hope of ſafety was reſerved for them, in caſe that they were conquered. After this determination, they diſmiſſed the nine deputies, who on account of their oath were willing to return; and taking the other, who had endeavoured to elude by ſophiſtry what he had ſworn, they ſent him back bound to the enemy: ſo that Annibal was much leſs filled with joy, from having vanquiſhed the Romans in the field, than he was ſtruck with terror and aſtoniſhment, at the firmneſs and the magnanimity that appeared in their deliberations.

THE

THE GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS.

BOOK the SEVENTH.

EXTRACT the FIRST.

Leontium in Sicily deſcribed.

THE city Leontium, conſidered in its general poſition, is turned towards the north. Through the middle of it runs a level valley, which contains the publick buildings allotted to the adminiſtration of government and of juſtice; and in a word, the whole that is called the Forum. The two ſides of the valley are incloſed by two hills, which are rough and broken along the whole extent. But the ſummit of theſe hills, above the brows, is flat and plain, and is covered with temples and with houſes. There are two gates

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to the city. One of them is in the ſouthern extremity of the valley, and conducts to Syracuſe. The other is on the oppoſite ſide, and leads to thoſe lands ſo famed for their fertility, and which are called the Leontine fields. Below the hill that ſtands on the weſtern ſide of the valley, flows the river Liſſus: and on the ſame ſide likewiſe there is a row of houſes, built under the very precipice, and in a line parallel to the river. Between theſe houſes and the river lies the road which has been mentioned.

EXTRACT the SECOND.

The treaty that was concluded between Annibal, General of the Carthaginians, and Xenophanes, embaſſadour from Philip.

THE ſolemn treaty, which Annibal the General, Mago, Myrcan, Barmocar, and all the ſenators of Carthage that were with him, and all the Carthaginians that are in the army with him, have concluded with Xenophanes, the ſon of Cleomachus, the embaſſadour deputed by king Philip, the ſon of Demetrius, in his own name, and in the name of the Macedonians and their allies.

In the preſence of Jupiter, Juno, and Apollo; in the preſence of the Deity of the Carthaginians, and of Hercules and Iolaus; in the preſence of Mars, Triton, and Neptune; in the preſence of all the Gods who are with us in the camp, and of the ſun, the moon, and the earth; in the preſence of the rivers, the lakes, and the waters; in the preſence of all the Gods who preſide over the ſtate of Carthage; in the preſence of all the Gods who preſide over the Macedonian empire, and the reſt of Greece; in the preſence of

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all the Gods, who direct the affairs of war, and who are present at this treaty; Annibal the General, and all the senators of Carthage that are with him, and all the Carthaginians that are in the army with him, have said.

With the consent of you and of us, this treaty of amity and concord shall connect us together, as friends, as kindred, and as brothers, upon the following conditions.

King Philip and the Macedonians, together with the rest of the Greeks that are in alliance with them, shall protect the lords of Carthage; Annibal the General, and those that are with him; the governours in every place in which the laws of Carthage are observed; the people of Utica, and all the cities and nations that are subject to the Carthaginian sway, together with their armies and their allies; the cities likewise, and all the people with whom we are allied, in Italy, in Gaul, and in Liguria; and all those that shall hereafter enter into an alliance with us in those countries. The Carthaginians, on the other hand, the people of Utica, and all other cities and states that are subject to the Carthaginians, with their allies and armies; the cities also and all the people of Italy, of Gaul, and of Liguria,

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that are at this time in alliance with us; and all others likewiſe that ſhall hereafter be received into our alliance in any of thoſe parts of Italy; ſhall protect and defend king Philip and the Macedonians, together with the reſt of the Greeks that are in alliance with them. We will not engage in any ill deſigns, or employ any kind of treachery, the one againſt the other. But with all alacrity and willingneſs, without any deceit or fraud, you, the Macedonians, ſhall declare yourſelves the enemies of thoſe that are enemies of the Carthaginians; thoſe kings alone excepted, and thoſe ports and cities, with which you are connected by any treaty. And we alſo, on the other hand, will be the enemies of thoſe that are enemies of king Philip; thoſe kings and cities, and nations alone excepted, to which we are already bound by treaty. You ſhall be partners alſo with us in the war, in which we are now engaged againſt the Romans; till the Gods give to you and to us a happy termination of it. You ſhall ſupply us with the aſſiſtance that is requiſite, and in the manner that ſhall be ſtipulated between us. And if the gods, refuſing ſucceſs to our endeavours in the war againſt the Romans and their allies, ſhould diſpoſe us to enter into treaty with them;

them; we ſhall inſiſt, that you alſo be included in the treaty, and that the peace be made upon theſe expreſſed conditions: that the Romans ſhall at no time make war againſt you: that they ſhall not remain maſters of the Corcyreans, nor of the people of Apollonia, Epidamnus, Pharos, and Dimalus; nor of the Parthinians, and the Atintanians: and that they ſhall reſtore alſo to Demetrius of Pharos all the perſons of his kindred, who are now detained in publick cuſtody at Rome. If the Romans ſhall afterwards make war either againſt you or us, we will mutually ſend ſuch aſſiſtance as ſhall be requiſite to either party. The ſame thing alſo will we perform, if any other power ſhall declare war againſt us; thoſe kings and cities, and ſtates alone excepted, with which we are allied by treaty. If at any time it ſhould be judged expedient to add to the preſent treaty, or to detract from it, it ſhall be done with mutual conſent.

EXTRACT the THIRD.

Demetrius of Pharos adviſes Philip to place a garriſon in Ithome. The different ſentiments of Aratus.

WHEN the entrails of the victims that have been ſacrificed were brought, as the cuſtom was, to Philip, he took them in his hands, and, inclining to one ſide, and ſhewing them to Aratus, aſked him, what he thought was ſignified by them: that he ſhould relinquiſh the citadel, or that he ſhould keep poſſeſſion of it? In the very inſtant, Demetrius ſeized the occaſion to reply. "If you have the ſoul of a diviner in you, "ſaid he, you will relinquiſh it without "delay. But if you have the ſpirit of a "king who underſtands affairs, you will "keep poſſeſſion of it: that you may not, "if the preſent opportunity be loſt, wiſh "in vain hereafter to obtain another. For "it is only by holding both the horns, "that you can hope to keep the bull in "ſubjection to you." By the horns he deſigned to ſignify the two fortreſſes of Ithome and Acrocorinthus; and Peloponneſus by the bull. But Philip, turning to Aratus, ſaid, "And is this alſo your "advice?" And when the other heſitated,

he preſſed him to declare his ſentiments. Aratus then, after a ſhort ſilence, made this reply. "If you can retain poſſeſſion "of this citadel, without breaking that "faith by which you are bound to the "Meſſenians, keep it. But if, by leaving "a garriſon in this place, you relinquiſh "that which ſtands in the ſtead of all "citadels and garriſons, that which Antigonus tranſmitted to you, and which "has hitherto preſerved your allies; I "mean, good faith; conſider whether it "will not now be better to draw away "your forces from Ithome, and, leaving "there your faith, ſecure to yourſelf by "that garriſon alone the fidelity of the Meſſenians, and of all the reſt of the allies." Philip, if he had followed his own natural inclination, would have been ready enough to have violated his faith; as we may judge from the ſubſequent actions of his life. But as he had been ſharply reproved not long before by the younger Aratus, for having ordered ſome citizens to be put to death; and as the elder Aratus at this time addreſſed him with great authority as well as freedom; and beſought him not to diſregard the advice that he had offered; he was prevailed on to deſiſt; and taking Aratus by the hand, "Let us return then, ſaid he, by "the way by which we came."

EXTRACT the FOURTH.

Antiochus renders himſelf maſter of Sardes, by the contrivance of Lagoras of Crete.

ROUND the city of Sardes, ſharp ſkirmiſhes paſſed continually; and little battles both by night and by day, without any intermiſſion. For every method of ſurprize, and every art both of attack and of defence, were practiſed by both parties. To enter into a particular deſcription of all that was tranſacted, would be both uſeleſs, and altogether tedious. But when the ſiege had now continued to the ſecond year, it was at laſt ended by the contrivance of Lagoras, a Cretan. This man, who had gained a long experience in the affairs of war, had remarked that the ſtrongeſt places very frequently become the eaſieſt prey, through the too great ſecurity of the inhabitants: who repoſe ſuch confidence either on the natural ſtrength of their cities, or on the works by which they are covered, that they are altogether remiſs and negligent in guarding them. He knew likewiſe, that places are often taken by aſſault in the very parts that are the ſtrongeſt, and

againſt which it was moſt improbable that an enemy would make any attempt. Agreeably to theſe ſentiments, having now conſidered that the ſtrength of Sardes was ſuch, that all men had deſpaired of being able to take it by aſſault, and hoped only that it might be at laſt ſubdued by famine; he was the more encouraged by this very reaſon to make the attempt; and turned his thoughts on every ſide, in order to find ſome fair occaſion of rendering himſelf maſter of the place. And having remarked that the wall which connected the citadel with the city was not guarded, he conceived the hope that in that very part he ſhould be able to accompliſh his deſign. That this part was deſtitute of guards, he thus diſcovered. The wall was built upon a very lofty rock; and at the bottom of the precipice was a hollow valley, into which the carcaſes of the horſes and beaſts of burthen were thrown, that died within the city. In this valley large flocks of vultures, and other birds of prey, were continually aſſembled. And as the birds, when they were ſatiated with food, conſtantly repoſed themſelves upon the top of the precipice, and upon the wall, Lagoras concluded from this circumſtance that the wall was certainly not guarded, but

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was at almoſt all times deſtitute of people. When he had formed this conjecture, he went himſelf by night, and carefully examined in what part he might make his approaches, and fix the ladders. And having found, on the ſide of one of the rocks, a place that was proper for the purpoſe, he then communicated his project to the king. Antiochus conceived great hopes, and intreated him to accompliſh the deſign. Lagoras on his part promiſed to employ his utmoſt power; but deſired that Theodotus the Ætolian, and Dionyſius, the captain of the guards, each of whom poſſeſſed all the ſtrength and courage which an enterprize of this kind required, might be aſſociated with him in the undertaking, and commanded to aſſiſt in the execution of it. To this the king immediately conſented; and theſe three together, having regulated their plan in ſecret, waited for a night, in the latter part of which there would be no moon. When ſuch a night was come, on the evening before the day in which the attempt was to be made, they choſe from the whole army fifteen men, the moſt diſtinguiſhed by their ſtrength and courage, to carry the ladders, and to ſhare with themſelves the danger of mounting the walls. After theſe, they

took thirty more, who were directed to lie in ambuſcade at a certain diſtance; and, when the firſt ſhould have ſcaled the walls, and deſcended to the gate that was near, to advance from their concealment, and to cut through the bars and hinges of the gate from without, while the reſt broke the locks and the bolts on the inſide. Behind theſe followed another body of two thouſand men; who were ordered to enter the city with the reſt, and to take poſſeſſion of the circus of the theatre, which commanded both the citadel and the city. And that no ſuſpicion of the truth might ariſe from making theſe detachments, a report was ſpread, that a body of Ætolians deſigned to throw themſelves through the valley before mentioned into the city; and that, as notice had been received of their deſign, theſe forces were prepared to oppoſe their entrance.

When all things were now ready, as ſoon as the moon had withdrawn her light, Lagoras and the reſt approached the precipices with their ladders, and concealed themſelves under the brow of the rock that hung over the valley. When day appeared, and the guards on this ſide had retired; while the king, according to his cuſtom, ſent one part of his troops to their reſpective poſts, and drew out the

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reſt in order of battle in the Hippodrome, the attempt remained for ſome time unnoticed. But no ſooner were two ladders raiſed, upon one of which Dionyſius firſt mounted, and Lagoras upon the other, than a great commotion and diſorder was ſpread through all the camp. For though neither the garriſon in the city, nor Achæus himſelf, who was in the citadel, diſcerned the men that were attempting to ſcale the walls, becauſe they were covered by the brow of the rock; thoſe that were in the camp very clearly ſaw they whole of this bold and dangerous action. And while ſome were ſtruck with admiration at an attempt that appeared incredible; and others foreſaw, but were doubtful of the conſequence; they ſtood fixed in ſuſpence, and, with an anxiety mingled with joy, expected the event. The king, perceiving this commotion, and being willing to draw aſide the attention both of his own troops and of the beſieged from what was done, led out the army, and advanced towards the gate that was on the oppoſite ſide of the city, and was called the gate of Perſis. Achæus, perceiving from the citadel this motion of the enemy, ſo different from any which they had before been uſed to make, was thrown into great perplexity,

and knew not what was their deſign. He ſent ſome forces however towards the gate. But as the road by which they deſcended from the citadel was narrow, and full of precipices, they arrived too late. Aribazus alſo, who commanded in the city, and who ſuſpected nothing of the real truth, led the garriſon to the ſame gate likewiſe, which Antiochus threatened to attack. And having ſtationed one part of his forces on the walls, he ordered the reſt to advance through the gate, to ſtop the enemy as they approached, and to engage them in battle. In the mean time Lagoras, Dionyſius, and Theodotus, having gained the ſummit of the rock, and deſcended from thence to the gate that was below, diſperſed thoſe that they met, and began to break the gate. The thirty alſo on the outſide at the ſame time advanced, and aſſiſted in breaking it. And when the gate was in this manner ſoon forced open, the two thouſand men, that had ſtood ready for that purpoſe, entered and took poſſeſſion of the circus. As ſoon as this was perceived, the forces, that had been ſtationed upon the walls, and thoſe that were ſent through the gate of Perſis by Aribazus, returned back again in haſte, to attack thoſe that had entered the city. But,

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as the gate was opened for their return, ſome of the troops of Antiochus entered together with them: and having thus made themſelves maſters of this gate likewiſe, they then ran to break the reſt of the gates that were near. Aribazus and all the garriſon, after a ſhort engagement with thoſe that were already within the city, fled haſtily into the citadel. Theodotus and Lagoras, remaining ſtill in their firſt ſtation, with great prudence attended to all that paſſed. The reſt of the army, entering now on every ſide, were ſoon maſters of the place. And while one part killed all thoſe that they met, others ſet fire to the houſes, or diſperſed themſelves in ſearch of plunder, till the whole city was pillaged and deſtroyed. In this manner Antiochus became maſter of Sardes.

THE GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS.

BOOK the EIGHTH.

EXTRACT the FIRST.

Men who truſt themſelves to others are to be cenſured or excuſed, according to different circumſtances. Examples of both caſes.

WHEN accidents of this kind happen, it would be dangerous to decide in general, that thoſe who are betrayed into ſuch misfortunes deſerve to be blamed; or, on the contrary, that they deſerve to be excuſed. For it frequently is ſeen, that, when men have employed all the caution that reaſon could ſuggeſt, they ſtill fall into the power of thoſe who ſcruple not to violate the eſtabliſhed laws of mankind.

mankind. But if we attend, on the other hand, to the particular times and circumſtances of ſuch events, it is certain, that by theſe we may be enabled to judge without reſerve; and to declare ſome Generals, among thoſe who have been thus deceived, to be worthy of cenſure, and others to be free from blame. The following examples will ſhew the truth of this remark.

Archidamus, one of the kings of Lacedæmon, ſuſpecting the ambition of Cleomenes, fled from Sparta. But being afterwards prevailed on to return, and put himſelf into the power of his enemy, he loſt both his kingdom and his life, and left not the leaſt excuſe for his imprudence to future times. For while the condition of things remained the ſame, and the ambition of Cleomenes had even acquired new ſtrength, how was it poſſible that he ſhould avoid this fate, if he threw himſelf again into the hands of thoſe, from whom he had eſcaped by flight, and with the greateſt difficulty? Pelopidas alſo of Thebes, who was well acquainted with the wicked diſpoſition of the tyrant Alexander, and who knew likewiſe that every tyrant conſiders thoſe who defend the cauſe of liberty as his greateſt enemies, when he not only had prevailed

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on Epaminondas to take arms in ſupport of the democratical government of Thebes, and of all Greece, but had himſelf led an army into Theſſaly, in order to ſubvert the monarchy of Alexander, ventured to go on a ſecond embaſſy to this very tyrant. By this imprudence, having moſt abſurdly repoſed a confidence in thoſe whom he had the greateſt reaſon to diſtruſt, he brought great loſs upon his country, and deſtroyed the reputation alſo which he had before acquired. A like misfortune happened to the Roman Conſul, Cnæus Cornelius; who, in oppoſition to all reaſon, delivered himſelf to the enemy, in the time of the war of Sicily. Many other examples alſo might be found of the ſame imprudence. And from theſe it may fairly be concluded, that whoever, without due conſideration and inquiry, throw themſelves into the power of their enemies, are very greatly to be blamed.

On the other hand, when men have before employed every neceſſary kind of caution, they cannot be thought to deſerve any cenſure. Never to place a confidence in any one, is abſolutely impracticable. It is ſufficient, if we take ſome proper pledges for our ſecurity, and act afterwards as reaſon ſhall require. The beſt pledges of ſafety, upon ſuch occaſions,

ſions, are oaths; wives and children given as hoſtages; and, above all, the former life of the perſons whom we are inclined to truſt. If theſe are employed to betray and ruin us, the reproach muſt fall upon the authors of the treachery, and not upon thoſe who are deceived. The firſt ſtep therefore ſhould be, to gain aſſurances of ſuch a kind, that thoſe with whom we treat may be compelled by them to obſerve their faith. But, as theſe are not always to be obtained, the next courſe is to take every meaſure with ſuch prudence, that, if we fall afterwards into misfortunes, it may not be imputed to us as a fault. Many examples of this ſort might be drawn from former ages. But there is none more illuſtrious than that which is found in the very times of which we are writing, the example of Achæus. For this prince, after he had employed the moſt perfect foreſight that human wiſdom could ſuggeſt, and neglected no precaution that was neceſſary for his ſafety, fell into the power of his enemies. But ſo far was he from incurring any blame, that, on the contrary, his misfortune was pitied and excuſed; while the authors of it were condemned to bear the curſes, and the deteſtation of mankind.

EXTRACT the SECOND.

Reflections on the greatneſs of the deſigns of Rome and Carthage, and the perſevering obſtinacy of the two Republicks. The advantages of General Hiſtory.

IT will by no means be foreign to my firſt deſign, or to the general intention of this work, to deſire the reader to pauſe a while, and to conſider the greatneſs of the actions of the Carthaginians and the Romans, and the ſtubborn conſtancy with which they ſeverally perſiſted in their enterprizes. For is it not aſtoniſhing, that, when they were engaged in ſo great a war in Italy, and in another not leſs important alſo in Spain, when the proſpect of ſucceſs in theſe two wars was to both equally uncertain, and the preſent danger alike terrible to both, as if theſe were not ſufficient, they at this very time ſhould maintain another, both in Sardinia and in Italy, and not only ſhould extend their views at once to all theſe wars, but ſhould be able alſo to complete the preparations, and furniſh the ſupplies that were neceſſary to all? But our admiration muſt

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ſtill increaſe, if we take a view of things in a more particular detail. The Romans had in Italy two complete armies, under the command of the two Conſuls. In Spain they had two more: one upon land, at the head of which was Cnæus Cornelius; and another upon the ſea, commanded by Publius. On the ſide of the Carthaginians likewiſe, the armies were the ſame. Beſide theſe, the Romans had alſo a fleet, that was ſtationed on the coaſts of Greece, to obſerve the motions of king Philip. At the ſame time Appius, with a hundred quinqueremes, and Marcus Claudius at the head of a land army, ſupported the war in Sicily; while Amilcar did the ſame on the ſide of the Carthaginians.

From theſe facts very clearly will appear the truth of that which we have often taken occaſion to affirm in the former parts of this work: that it is not poſſible to obtain an entire view and knowledge of the whole of things from particular hiſtories. For how can the bare reading of what paſſed in Sicily only, or in Spain, be ſufficient to inſtruct us, either in the greatneſs of the things that were tranſacted, or more eſpecially, in what manner, and through what kind of government, that moſt aſtoniſhing event

was perfected, which has happened in the preſent age, and of which there is no example in former times; that all the known parts of the earth have been reduced beneath the power of a ſingle ſtate. In what manner Syracuſe was taken by the Romans, and by what meaſures they gained poſſeſſion of Spain, may be known perhaps in ſome degree from particular hiſtories. But general hiſtory alone can ſhew, by what ſteps they arrived at the ſovereignty of the whole; what circumſtances counteracted them in their purſuit of that great deſign; and what again, at certain times, co-operated with them. There is therefore no other way by which we may be enabled to diſcern, either the greatneſs of the tranſactions themſelves, or the force of the Roman government. For when we read that the Romans attempted the conqueſt of Sicily only or of Spain, and maintained vaſt armies both upon land and ſea; ſuch projects, conſidered ſingly in themſelves, contain nothing very great or wonderful. But when it is ſeen, that not theſe enterprizes only, but many others likewiſe, were at the ſame time formed and executed by the ſame republick; and that this very people, even while they carried into execution theſe deſigns, were involved in various difficulties,

ties, and ſuſtained many dreadful battles, in their own proper country; it is then only that theſe tranſactions will appear in their juſt light; that our admiration will indeed be raiſed; and that we ſhall obtain a full conception of all that we deſire to know. Let this then ſerve to ſhew the miſtake of thoſe, who think that ſeparate and particular relations will inſtruct them in the knowledge of general and univerſal hiſtory,

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EXTRACT the THIRD.

The ſiege of Syracuſe. The Romans are forced to deſiſt from their attempt, by the wonderful inventions of Archimedes.

THE Conſul Appius, having taken upon himſelf the command of the land forces, and ſtationed the army round the Scythian porticoe, from whence the wall was continued along the ſhore even to the mole of the harbour, reſolved to make his approaches on that ſide. As the number of his artificers was very great, he prepared in five days only a ſufficient quantity of blinds and darts, with every thing beſides that was proper for the ſiege: and was perſuaded, that by this celerity he ſhould be able to attack the enemy, before they had made the neceſſary preparations for their defence. He had not at this time made due reflection upon the great ſkill of Archimedes; nor conſidered, that the mind of a ſingle man is on ſome occaſions far ſuperior to the force of many hands. But this truth was ſoon diſcovered to him by the event. For as Syracuſe was in itſelf a place of

very great ſtrength; the wall that ſurrounded it being built upon lofty hills, whoſe tops hanging over the plain, rendered all approach from without, except in certain parts, extremely difficult; ſo within the city likewiſe, and againſt all attempts that might be made on the ſide of the ſea, ſo great a quantity of inſtruments of defence had been contrived by the perſon juſt now mentioned, that the beſieged were at no time idle; but were ready, upon every new attack, to meet the motions, and repel the efforts of the enemy. Appius, however, advancing with his blinds and ladders, endeavoured to approach that part of the wall which was joined to the Hexapylum, on the eaſtern ſide of the city. At the ſame time Marcellus directed his courſe towards Achradina, with a fleet of ſixty quinqueremes, all filled with ſoldiers, who were armed with bows, ſlings, and javelins, in order to drive the enemy from the walls. There were alſo eight other quinqueremes, from one ſide of which the benches of the rowers had been removed; from the right ſide of ſome, and from the left of others. Theſe veſſels, being joined two and two together, on the ſides from which the benches had been taken, were rowed by the oars on the op-

poſite ſide, and carried to the walls certain machines called Sackbuts, the conſtruction and uſe of which may be thus deſcribed.

A ladder is made, which has four feet in breadth, and ſuch a length as may make it equal, when raiſed, to the height of the walls. On either ſide of it is a high breaſt-work, in the form of a baluſtrade. This ladder is laid at length upon the ſides in which the two veſſels are joined, but extending far beyond the prows; and at the top of the maſts of the veſſels are fixed pullies and ropes. At the proper time, the ropes are faſtened to the top of the machine. And while ſome, ſtanding on the ſtern of the veſſels, draw the ladder upwards by the pullies, others, on the prow, at the ſame time aſſiſt in raiſing it with bars and levers. The veſſels being then rowed near to the ſhore, endeavours are uſed to fix the machine againſt the walls. At the top of the ladder is a little ſtage, guarded on three ſides with blinds, and containing four men upon it, who engage with thoſe upon the walls that endeavour to obſtruct the fixing of the machine. And when it is fixed, theſe men, being now raiſed above the top of the wall, throw down the blinds on either ſide, and advance to attack the bat-

tlements and towers. The reſt at the ſame time aſcend the ladder, without any fear that it ſhould fail; becauſe it is ſtrongly faſtened with ropes to the two veſſels. The name of Sackbut is beſtowed not improperly upon this machine. For when it is raiſed, the appearance of the ladder and the veſſels, joined thus together, very much reſembles the figure of that inſtrument.

In this manner then, when all things now were ready, the Romans deſigned to attack the towers. But Archimedes had prepared machines that were fitted to every diſtance. And while the veſſels were yet far removed from the walls, employing catapults and baliſtæ, that were of the largeſt ſize, and worked by the ſtrongeſt ſprings, he wounded the enemy with his darts and ſtones, and threw them into great diſorder. When the darts paſſed beyond them, he then uſed other machines, of a ſmaller ſize, and ſtill proportioned to the diſtance. By theſe means the Romans were ſo effectually repulſed, that it was not poſſible for them to approach. Marcellus therefore, perplexed with this reſiſtance, was forced to advance ſilently with his veſſels in the night. But when they came ſo near to the land as to be within the reach of darts, they were

expoſed

expoſed to new danger from another invention, which Archimedes had contrived. He had cauſed openings to be made in many parts of the wall, equal in height to the ſtature of a man, and to the palm of a hand in breadth. And having planted on the inſide archers, and little ſcorpions, he diſcharged a multitude of arrows through the openings, and diſabled the ſoldiers that were on board. In this manner, whether the Romans were at a great diſtance, or whether they were near, he not only rendered uſeleſs all their efforts, but deſtroyed alſo many of their men. When they attempted alſo to raiſe the ſackbuts, certain machines which he had raiſed along the whole wall on the inſide, and which were before concealed from view, ſuddenly appeared above the walls, and ſtretched their long beaks far beyond the battlements. Some of theſe machines carried maſſes of lead, and ſtones not leſs than ten talents in weight. And when the veſſels with the ſackbuts came near, the beaks, being firſt turned by ropes and pullies to the proper point, let fall their ſtones; which broke not only the ſackbuts, but the veſſels likewiſe, and threw all thoſe that were on board into the greateſt danger. In the ſame manner alſo the reſt of the machines, as often as the enemy

the enemy approached under the cover of their blinds, and had ſecured themſelves by that precaution againſt the darts that were diſcharged through the openings of the wall, let fall upon them ſtones of ſo large a ſize, that all the combatants upon the prow were forced to retire from their ſtation.

He invented likewiſe a hand of iron, hanging by a chain from the beak of a machine, which was uſed in the following manner. The perſon, who like a pilot guided the beak, having let fall the hand, and catched hold of the prow of any veſſel, drew down the oppoſite end of the machine that was on the inſide of the walls. And when the veſſel was thus raiſed erect upon its ſtern, the machine itſelf was held immoveable; but, the chain being ſuddenly looſened from the beak by the means of pullies, ſome of the veſſels were thrown upon their ſides; others turned with the bottom upwards; and the greateſt part, as the prows were plunged from a conſiderable height into the ſea, were filled with water, and all that were on board thrown into tumult and diſorder.

Marcellus was in no ſmall degree embarraſſed, when he found himſelf encountered in every attempt by ſuch reſiſtance.

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He perceived that all his efforts were defeated with loſs; and were even derided by the enemy. But, amidſt all the anxiety that he ſuffered, he could not help jeſting upon the inventions of Archimedes. This man, ſaid he, employs our ſhips as buckets to draw water: and boxing about our ſackbuts, as if they were unworthy to be aſſociated with him, drives them from his company with diſgrace. Such was the ſucceſs of the ſiege on the ſide of the ſea.

Appius alſo on his part, having met with the ſame obſtacles in his approaches, was in like manner forced to abandon his deſign. For while he was yet at a conſiderable diſtance, great numbers of his army were deſtroyed by the baliſtæ and the catapults. So wonderful was the quantity of ſtones and darts, and ſo aſtoniſhing the force with which they were thrown. The machines indeed were worthy of Hiero, who had furniſhed the expence; and of Archimedes who deſigned them, and by whoſe directions they were made. If the troops advanced nearer to the city, they either were ſtopped in their approach by the arrows that were diſcharged through the openings in the walls; or, if they attempted to force their way under the cover of their bucklers,

were deſtroyed by ſtones and beams that were let fall upon their heads. Great miſchief alſo was occaſioned by thoſe hands of iron that have been mentioned; which lifted men with their armour into the air, and daſhed them againſt the ground. Appius therefore was at laſt conſtrained to return back again to his camp. And when he had held a conſultation with the tribunes, it was with one conſent determined by them, that every other method ſhould be tried to obtain poſſeſſion of Syracuſe, but that they would no more attempt to take it by aſſault. Nor did they afterwards depart from this reſolution. For though they remained eight months before the city, and during that time invented various ſtratagems, and carried into execution many bold deſigns, they never had the courage to attack the place in the regular forms. So wonderful, and of ſuch importance upon ſome occaſions is the power of a ſingle man, and the force of ſcience properly employed. With ſo great armies both by land and ſea, the Romans could ſcarcely have failed to take the city, if one old man had been removed. But while he is preſent, they dare not even to make the attempt; in the manner at leaſt which Archimedes was able to oppoſe. Being

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perſuaded therefore, that, as the city was crouded with inhabitants, it might at laſt moſt eaſily be reduced by famine, they reſolved to have recourſe to this as their only hope; and to intercept by their fleet the proviſions that ſhould be brought by ſea, while the army cut off all approach on the ſide of the land. And that the time employed in the ſiege, might not paſs wholly without action, but be attended with advantage in ſome other place, the Conſuls divided the army. And while Appius, with two parts of the forces, inveſted the city; Marcellus with the reſt, advancing through the country, waſted the lands of the Sicilians who had joined the Carthaginians in the war.

EXTRACT the FOURTH.

The death of Aratus who was poiſoned by the order of Philip.

THOUGH Philip attempted to waſte the territory of the Meſſenians, who were now his enemies, the miſchief which he occaſioned to them was very inconſiderable. But the ſame prince found better ſucceſs in carrying into execution the impious deſigns which he had contrived againſt the neareſt of his friends. For not long afterwards Aratus was poiſoned by his orders, with the aſſiſtance of Taurion who preſided over the affairs of Peloponneſus. This infamous action was not for ſome time diſcovered to the world. For the poiſon was not of that kind which procures immediate death; but was one of thoſe which weaken the habit of the body, and deſtroy life by ſlow degrees. Aratus himſelf was very ſenſible of the injury that he had received: and the manner in which the thing was made known was this. The old man, who had kept it ſecret from every one one beſides, could not reſtrain himſelf

himſelf from letting fall ſome words in the preſence of a favourite ſervant whoſe name was Cephalo. For when this domeſtic, who attended him with great fidelity during the courſe of his illneſs, had one day deſired his maſter to remark, that ſome of the ſpittle that hung upon the wall was mingled with blood: "Such, Ce-" phalo, ſaid Aratus, is the reward of the " friendſhip which I have had for Philip." So great and excellent a thing is moderation: which diſpoſed the ſufferer, and not the author of the injury, to feel the greateſt ſhame; when he found that all the glorious actions which he had ſhared with Philip, in order to promote the ſervice of that prince, had been at laſt ſo baſely recompenſed.

Such was the end of this magiſtrate; who received after his death, not from his own country alone, but from the whole republic of the Achæans, all the honours that were due to a man, who had ſo often held the adminiſtration of their government, and performed ſuch ſignal ſervices for the ſtate. For they decreed ſacrifices to him, with the other honours that belong to heroes; and, in a word, omitting nothing that could ſerve to render his name immortal.

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If the dead therefore retain any ſenſe, it is probable that Aratus muſt now contemplate with a pleaſing ſatisfaction not only the gratitude of the Achæans, but all the difficulties alſo and the dangers which himſelf encountered in his life.

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EXTRACT the FIFTH.

The manner in which Philip took the citadel of Liſſus, and the city.

PHILIP had for a long time before revolved in his mind the deſign of rendering himſelf maſter of the city of Liſſus and the citadel. Beginning his march therefore with the army, and having after two days paſſed the defiles, he incamped upon the banks of the river Ardaxanus, at no great diſtance from the city. But when he ſaw that the whole circuit of the city, both on the ſide of the land, and on that alſo towards the ſea, was ſtrongly fortified both by nature and by art; and that the citadel, which ſtood near, was of ſo great height and ſtrength that it was ſcarcely poſſible that it ever ſhould be taken by aſſault; he laid aſide all hopes of being able to reduce the laſt, but judged the conqueſt of the city to be not abſolutely impracticable. Between Liſſus, and the foot of the mountain upon which the citadel was built, there was an open ſpace, which ſeemed very proper for his intended attack

tack upon the city. The king therefore, after ſome ſlight ſkirmiſhing with the enemy upon this ground, contrived the following ſtratagem. Having allowed the army to repoſe themſelves during one whole day, and encouraged them as the occaſion required, he ſent away in the night the greateſt and moſt ſerviceable part of the light-armed troops, with orders that they ſhould conceal themſelves in certain vallies covered with wood, which were on the ſide of the country, at a little diſtance from the open ſpace that has been mentioned. On the following day, taking with him the Peltaſtæ, and the remaining part of the light-armed forces, and beginning his march on the ſide towards the ſea, he advanced round the city to the ground upon which he before had ſkirmiſhed, as if his intention had been to make an attack from thence upon the place. The city was filled with people, who had thrown themſelves into it from all the neighbouring parts of Illyria, upon the firſt arrival of Philip in the country. But the citadel, becauſe it ſeemed ſufficiently ſecured by its own natural ſtrength, was defended by a very ſmall garriſon. As ſoon then as the Macedonians approached, the enemy, confident in their numbers as well as in the advantage

vantage of the ground, came out in crouds againſt them from the city. Philip, having ſtationed the Peltaſtæ in the plain, commanded the light-armed forces to advance towards the heights, and to engage with vigour. At firſt the conteſt was on both ſides equal. But after ſome time, theſe troops being preſſed by numbers, and diſordered by the difficulties of the ground, were forced to turn their backs, and retired towards the heavy forces. The beſieged purſue with eagerneſs, and attack the heavy forces in the plain. At the ſame time, the troops that were in the citadel, perceiving that Philip drew away his army in ſmall diviſions, and that ſome of the cohorts alone ſuſtained the fight, while others ſeemed to retreat, were perſuaded that he was preparing altogether to leave the field. Leaving therefore their poſt by ſtealth, as if the ſituation of the place was alone ſufficient to defend it, they deſcended in ſmall bodies, and through private roads, into the plain, expecting to obtain ſome ſhare in the plunder of thoſe that fled. In this moment, the troops that had been placed in ambuſcade in the vallies advanced unperceived, and attacked the enemy with vigour. At the ſame time likewiſe, the heavy forces returned back again

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to the charge. The Illyrians were ſoon thrown into diſorder. Thoſe that had advanced from Liſſus fled back again by different ways, and ſaved themſelves within the city. But the garriſon of the citadel was intercepted by the forces that had riſen from the ambuſcade. Thus the event happened which was the leaſt expected: and Philip gained poſſeſſion of the citadel without any danger. On the following day, after many violent and terrible attacks, the city alſo was taken by the Macedonians. This ſudden and unexpected conqueſt ſtruck ſo great terror into all the neighbouring parts, that almoſt all the cities of Illyria ſubmitted themſelves voluntarily to the king. For when he had taken two places of ſuch uncommon ſtrength by aſſault, it ſemed that there would be now no fortreſs able to withſtand his efforts, nor any hope of ſafety for thoſe that ſhould reſiſt his arms.

EXTRACT the SIXTH.

Achæus, who was beſieged in the citadel of Sardes, by Antiochus, is delivered into the power of his enemies by the treachery of Bolis.

THERE was a man whoſe name was Bolis, a Cretan by birth, who had long lived in the court of Ptolemy, and held a military command. He had the reputation of poſſeſſing, together with a good underſtanding, a moſt enterpriſing courage; and was ſuppoſed to be inferior to none in the experience which he had gained in the affairs of war. Soſibius, having endeavoured in many conferences to obtain the confidence of this man, and to render him devoted to his intereſts, at laſt diſcloſed to him, that he could not at this time perform any ſervice more acceptable to the king, than by contriving ſome method to ſave Achæus. Bolis, when he had heard him, ſaid that he would conſider what he had propoſed, and then retired. And when he had examined the thing by himſelf, after two or three days he returned, and told Soſibius that he would

undertake the buſineſs: that he had paſſed ſome time in Sardes, and was well acquainted with the place: and that Cambylus, who commanded a body of Cretans in the army of Antiochus, was not only his fellow-citizen, but his kinſman alſo, and his friend. Now Cambylus was ſtationed in one of the advanced poſts that were behind the citadel of Sardes. For the ground on that ſide not being fortified with works, was defended only by a line of Cretans. Soſibius received this account with joy; and was perſuaded either that Achæus was not to be reſcued from his preſent danger, or that Bolis alone could ſave him. And as the latter ſhewed on his part alſo the greateſt eagerneſs, the affair was ſoon determined. Some money was immediately furniſhed by Soſibius, that nothing might be wanting that was neceſſary to the deſign. He gave him an aſſurance likewiſe of much larger ſums, if the attempt ſhould be attended with ſucceſs. And, by exaggerating alſo in the ampleſt manner the rewards that might be expected both from Ptolemy and from Achæus, he raiſed the hopes of Bolis to the greateſt height.

The Cretan, impatient to begin the work, furniſhed himſelf with the proper inſtruments of credit, and ſailed away immediately

mediately to Rhodes, to find Nicomachus; whoſe affection for Achæus, and his fidelity towards him, were like thoſe of a father towards a ſon. From thence he went to Epheſus, and joined Melancomas. For theſe were the perſons whom Achæus had long employed, to tranſact his affairs abroad, both with Ptolemy, and all other ſtates. Bolis therefore, arriving firſt at Rhodes, and afterwards at Epheſus, communicated to theſe men the whole deſign. And finding them ready to lend all the aſſiſtance that he deſired, he then ſent Arianus, one of his own officers, to Cambylus, with orders to acquaint him, that Bolis had been ſent from Alexandria to raiſe ſome foreign mercenaries; but that having ſome buſineſs of great importance to communicate to Cambylus, he deſired that this General would appoint a certain place and time, in which they might meet together, without the knowledge of any other perſon. Arianus ſoon diſcharged his commiſſion, and was ſent back again by Cambylus; who conſented to all that was propoſed, and fixed the hour and the place in which he would meet Bolis in the night.

In the mean time Bolis, who was a true Cretan, verſatile in his nature, carefully examined the thing in all its cir-

cumſtances, and conſidered it on every ſide. At laſt however he joined Cambylus at the appointed place, and delivered a letter to him. Upon this letter, they immediately held a conſultation that was worthy of two Cretans. For the object of their deliberation neither was the ſafety of the unhappy prince, nor the fidelity which they owed to thoſe who had employed them; but their own ſecurity alone, and their own advantage. With theſe baſe views, it was not long before they concurred in the ſame opinion: that they would firſt divide between themſelves the ten talents that had been given by Soſibius, and afterwards diſcloſe the whole matter to Antiochus: and that, when they had obtained ſome preſent money from the king, togther with an aſſurance alſo of ſuch future rewards as might be ſuitable to ſo great a ſervice, they would engage, with his aſſiſtance to deliver Achæus into his hands. When they had thus determined, Cambylus took upon himſelf the part of communicating the buſineſs to Antiochus. Bolis on the other hand engaged, that after ſome days he would ſend Arianus to Achæus, with letters from Nicomachus and Melancomas. But he left it to the care of Cambylus to take ſuch meaſures, that

that this officer might enter the citadel, and return back again with ſafety. At the ſame time it was concerted, that, if Achæus ſhould fall into the ſnare, and ſend back an anſwer to the letters, Bolis ſhould then join Cambylus, and aſſiſt in the execution of the deſign.

When they had in this manner regulated all their plan, they ſeparated; and each prepared himſelf to perform the part which he had undertaken. Cambylus took the firſt occaſion that was offered, and diſcloſed the project to the king. Antiochus, ſurpriſed by an aſſurance ſo unexpected and ſo pleaſing, was agitated by different paſſions. In one moment, tranſported with joy, he promiſed every thing that was required of him. In the next, being diffident of the ſucceſs, he demanded an account of every part and circumſtance of the deſign, and of the meaſures that were taken for carrying it into execution. At laſt, giving full credit to the whole, and being perſuaded that the thing had happened by the ſpecial favour of the gods, he preſſed Cambylus with repeated earneſtneſs to accompliſh what he had begun. At the ſame time Bolis addreſſed himſelf in ſuch a manner to Nicomachus and Melancomas, that they entertained not the leaſt

ſuſpicion with reſpect to his ſincerity. They gave letters therefore to Arianus, to be delivered to Achæus; and adviſed this prince to place an entire confidence in Bolis and Cambylus. The letters were written in a certain cypher, which they had always uſed: and were ſo compoſed, that, if they had fallen into any other hands, the contents would have remained unknown.

Arianus having introduced himſelf into the citadel with the aſſiſtance of Cambylus, delivered the letters to Achæus; and, as he had been employed in the affair from the beginning, gave alſo a diſtinct and accurate account of all that had been done. Being cloſely examined concerning various matters, reſpecting Bolis and Soſibius, Nicomachus and Melancomas, and moſt eſpecially Cambylus, he anſwered every queſtion without any heſitation, and with an air of the moſt genuine truth. And this he was the better enabled to do, becauſe he was a ſtranger to the ſecret conſultations that had paſſed between Bolis and Cambylus. Achæus being ſatisfied with his anſwers, but chiefly becauſe he gave credit to what was written by Nicomachus and Melancomas, ſent back Arianus with an anſwer to the letters. And when the ſame thing had been many

times repeated, he at laſt reſolved to embrace the meaſure which his friends adviſed: the rather indeed, becauſe he had now no other hopes of ſafety. He deſired therefore, that Bolis and Arianus might be ſent to him, in a night in which there would be no moon; and ſaid that he would deliver himſelf into their hands. His intention was, firſt to remove himſelf from the preſent danger; and, immediately after his eſcape, to take the route of Syria. For he had reaſon to be perſuaded, that his ſudden and unexpected appearance among the Syrians, while Antiochus ſtill remained before the citadel of Sardes, would occaſion ſome commotion in the country; and be received with the greateſt joy by the people of Antiochia, Cœle-Syria, and Phænice. Animated by theſe flattering hopes, he now expected with impatience the time in which Bolis ſhould arrive.

As ſoon as Melancomas had received theſe letters, he urged Bolis to depart; having firſt recommended the buſineſs to him again in the moſt preſſing words, and given him an aſſurance of great rewards, if the deſign ſhould be attended with ſucceſs. Bolis, having diſpatched Arianus to Cambylus with notice of his coming, met the latter in the night at an

appointed place. They paſſed a whole day together, in adjuſting all the parts of their deſign; and then entered the camp by night. The manner in which they regulated their plan was this. If Achæus ſhould leave the citadel alone, or with only one companion, together with Bolis and Arianus, it was certain that no reſiſtance could be expected from him; and that it would be an eaſy thing for thoſe to whom he had entruſted himſelf to ſeize his perſon, But in caſe that he ſhould be attended with a greater number, it would then be a matter of ſome difficulty: eſpecially becauſe the intention was, to take him alive if it was poſſible, in order the more to gratify Antiochus. Upon this account it was determined, that, in bringing Achæus from the citadel, Arianus ſhould go the firſt, as being acquainted with the track by which he had often paſſed and returned: and that Bolis ſhould follow behind the reſt; that, as ſoon as they ſhould arrive at a certain place, where Cambylus had engaged to conceal ſome men in ambuſcade, he might then ſeize Achæus, and hold him faſt; leſt, in the tumult and the darkneſs of the night, he ſhould either ſave himſelf by flight into the adjoining woods, or throw himſelf in deſpair from the top of

ſome precipice, and not fall alive, as they had deſigned, into the power of his enemies.

When all things were thus concerted, Cambylus, unattended by any perſon, conducted Bolis in the ſame night to Antiochus, who alſo was alone. The king received him with great marks of favour; confirmed the promiſes which he had made; and earneſtly intreated both of them to carry the project into execution without delay. They then returned back again to their own part of the camp: and when the morning approached, Bolis and Arianus went towards the citadel, and entered it before it was yet day.

Achæus received Bolis with eager tranſports of affection; and aſked many queſtions concerning every circumſtance and part of the deſign. And as he judged, both from his appearance and diſcourſe, that he was equal to the weight of ſuch an enterprize, he was filled with joy, from the proſpect of ſo near a ſafety. But this joy again was mingled with no ſmall anxiety and doubt, when he looked forwards to the greatneſs of the conſequences. In this uncertainty, as he had joined to an excellent underſtanding a long experience alſo in affairs, he reſolved not to repoſe an intire confidence in the integrity of Bolis. He told

told him therefore, that it was not poſſible for him at this time to follow him; but that he would ſend with him three or four of his friends: and, when theſe ſhould have joined Melancomas, he would then be ready himſelf to leave the citadel. Thus Achæus did all that was poſſible to be done: but conſidered not that he was practiſing the arts of a Cretan againſt a Cretan. For Bolis had attentively examined every circumſtance that could ariſe in the courſe of ſuch an undertaking.

When the night was come in which Achæus had promiſed to ſend out his friends, he ordered Bolis and Arianus to wait at the gate of the citadel, till they ſhould be joined by thoſe whom he had appointed to go with them. And being now ready to depart, he firſt communicated the deſign to his wife Laodice; who was ſo ſtruck with the ſurprize, that ſhe loſt her ſenſes. Achæus, having employed ſome time in ſoothing and calming her diſorder, and encouraged her to expect a happy ſucceſs, choſe four of his friends, and, cloathing them in plain habits, himſelf alſo taking a ſimple and vulgar dreſs, and appearing to be a perſon of mean condition, ſet forwards on his way towards the gate. He had ordered

dered likewiſe, that one alone of theſe attendants, ſhould anſwer all the queſtions that ſhould be aſked by Arianus, as well as aſk of him whatever might be neceſſary; and ſhould ſay that the others were barbarians. When they had joined the traitors, Arianus went the firſt, as being acquainted with the way: and Bolis, as it had been concerted, followed behind the reſt, but not without great perplexity and doubt. For though, as a Cretan, he was ready enough, upon any ill occaſion, to penetrate through the artifice of others, yet, in the darkneſs of the night, he neither knew which of the perſons was Achæus, nor whether he was indeed among them. But, as the path was rough and difficult, and many parts of the deſcent very ſlippery and full of danger; the pains which the reſt employed, ſometimes to ſupport Achæus in ſuch places, and ſometimes to wait his coming, not being able altogether to abſtain from that attention which they had been uſed to pay to their prince, ſoon diſcovered to the artful Cretan the perſon whom he deſired to know. When they came therefore to the place appointed by Cambylus, the ſignal being given by a whiſtle, thoſe that were in ambuſcade ſuddenly ſeized the four attendants, while

Bolis

Bolis himſelf graſped Achæus, whoſe hands were wrapped within his garment, and held him faſt; being apprehenſive, that, perceiving what had happened, he would otherwiſe deſtroy himſelf with his ſword, which he had brought with him. The reſt ſoon ſurrounded him on every ſide; and, making themſelves maſters of his perſon, conducted him, together with his friends, immediately to Antiochus.

The king had long been in ſuſpence, and impatiently expected the event. Having diſmiſſed his company, he remained alone in his tent without going to reſt, attended by two or three guards. When he ſaw Cambylus enter, and place Achæus bound upon the ground, his aſtoniſhment took from him the power of ſpeech, ſo that he remained for a long time ſilent. At laſt he melted into tears: being ſtruck, as I ſuppoſe, with ſeeing in this ſignal inſtance, how difficult it is to guard againſt the prepoſterous accidents of fortune. For this Achæus, who was the ſon of Andromachus, the brother of Laodice the wife of Seleucus; who himſelf had married Laodice the daughter of king Mithridates; who was ſovereign of all the country on this ſide of mount Taurus; who in this very moment was thought, both by his own troops and by thoſe of his enemies,

to be ſecure in a fortreſs of the greateſt ſtrength; this very Achæus is now ſeated bound upon the ground, and thrown into the power of his greateſt enemies; while every perſon is ignorant of the tranſaction, except thoſe alone who had accompliſhed it. On the morrow, when the courtiers, as the cuſtom was, came to the royal tent at break of day, and beheld Achæus; they were no leſs aſtoniſhed than the king had been, and could ſcarcely give credit to what they ſaw. The council was then aſſembled; and, after long deliberation concerning the puniſhment that ſhould be inflicted upon the unhappy prince, it was at laſt determined, that his hands and feet ſhould be firſt cut off, and afterwards his head: that the latter ſhould be ſewed up in the ſkin of an aſs; and the body be fixed upon a croſs. When this ſentence was executed, the whole army was ſo ſtrongly agitated by ſurprize and terror, that Laodice, who alone knew that her huſband was gone, conjectured what had happened to him, when ſhe beheld from the citadel the great commotion and diſorder that was ſpread through all the camp. Soon afterwards, a herald being ſent to inform her of the death of Achæus, and to command her to relinquiſh all affairs, and retire from the citadel; the

the garriſon at firſt anſwered only with loud lamentations and extravagant cries: not ſo much on account of the affection which they had born towards Achæus, as becauſe the event itſelf was moſt unexpected and aſtoniſhing. When their grief had ceaſed, they found themſelves involved in great perplexity. For Antiochus preſſed the citadel cloſely without any intermiſſion: being perſuaded that, as Achæus was now removed, the garriſon itſelf would moſt probably furniſh ſome occaſion, by which he might become maſter of the place. And this indeed ſoon happened. The ſoldiers fell into ſedition, and formed two parties; one of which joined themſelves to Ariobazus, while the other adhered to Laodice. And as each of theſe factions diſtruſted the other, they in a ſhort time ſurrendered both themſelves and the citadel to Antiochus.

In this manner died Achæus; vanquiſhed by the treachery of thoſe whom he had truſted, after he had employed every kind of caution that reaſon could ſuggeſt. His fate may afford two uſeful leſſons to poſterity. The firſt, that we ought not too eaſily to place a confidence in any perſon: and the other, that we never ſhould be much elated by proſperous fortune; but remember that, as men, we are ſubject to the power of every accident.

EXTRACT the SEVENTH.

Annibal takes Tarentum by ſurprize, and with the aſſiſtance of ſome of the citizens.

THE young men at firſt left the city in the night, as if they deſigned to make an excurſion in ſearch of booty. But when they approached near to the Carthaginian camp, the reſt having concealed themſelves in an adjoining wood, Philemenus only and Nico advanced cloſe to the intrenchment. Being taken by the guards, and neither declaring who they were, nor from whence they came, but only that they had ſomething to communicate to the General, they were ſoon brought to Annibal; and when they ſaw him, they deſired that they might have ſome diſcourſe with him alone. To this requeſt he readily conſented. And when they were alone with him, having firſt endeavoured to excuſe their own conduct and that of their fellow-citizens, they then entered into a long and various accuſation of the Romans; that the deſign which they had formed, to deſert their party, might appear to have been ſuggeſted to them by

juſt reaſons. Annibal received what they had ſaid with great marks of favour; applauded their reſolution; and then diſmiſſed them; commanding them after a ſhort time to return, and diſcourſe with him again upon the buſineſs; and that, for the preſent, as ſoon as they had gained a little diſtance from the camp, they ſhould boldly drive away the cattle that were within their reach, and the men that were with them: that he would give ſuch orders, that they might do it without any danger. His intention was, both to gain time for himſelf to examine more cloſely what had been propoſed; and to induce the Tarentines alſo to believe, that the young men had left the city with no other deſign than to obtain ſome booty. The young men followed theſe directions. And as Annibal on the one hand was greatly pleaſed, that an occaſion had at laſt been offered to him of becoming maſter of the city; ſo Nico alſo and Philemenus were encouraged to perſiſt in their deſign with double ardour: not only becauſe they had opened a way to converſe with Annibal in full ſecurity, and had found him ready to embrace what they propoſed; but becauſe the quantity of the booty likewiſe which they carried back ſecured them againſt all ſuſpicion

picion on the part of their own citizens. For ſuch was the abundance, that it ſerved both for ſacrifices and for feaſts. The Tarentines therefore not only entertained not any ſuſpicion: but many of them were deſirous alſo of bearing a part in theſe excurſions.

Not long afterwards they again went out of the city, and, having obſerved the ſame caution as before, concluded with Annibal a ſolemn treaty upon theſe conditions: that he ſhould leave the Tarentines in the full enjoyment of their liberty, and neither ſhould exact any tribute from them, nor impoſe upon them any law; and that, as ſoon as the city ſhould be taken, the Carthaginians ſhould be allowed to pillage the houſes that were occupied by the Romans. They received from him a ſignal likewiſe, by which they might obtain admiſſion from the guards, as often as they ſhould come to the camp. From this time therefore, they had frequent opportunities to ſee and converſe with Annibal: ſometimes leaving the city as if they were going in ſearch of booty, and ſometimes under the pretence of hunting.

When the meaſures were thus prepared, that were neceſſary to accompliſh the intended project, the reſt of the conſpirators,

while they waited for the proper time o action, adviſed Philemenus to be aſſiduous in his hunting. For this young man had through all his life been ſo devoted to the diverſions of the field, that the general opinion of him was, that he had almoſt no other paſſion. It was concerted therefore, that he ſhould endeavour to gain the favour both of Caius Livius who commanded in the city, and of the guards alſo that were ſtationed at a certain gate, which was below the gate called Temenis, by preſenting to them from time to time ſome part of the game which he ſhould take.

Philemenus, having taken upon himſelf this part of the deſign, brought back continually ſome game to the city; either ſuch as himſelf had taken, or what had been prepared for him by Annibal; and gave one part to the commander, and another part to the guards, that they might be ready to open to him the wicket of the gate. For he both left the city and returned, moſt uſually in the night: on pretence indeed of danger from the enemy; but in reality, becauſe this ſeaſon was moſt ſuitable to the deſign. When the guards then had been ſo long accuſtomed to this practice, that, as ſoon as Philemenus appeared and gave the

ſignal by a whiſtle, they were ready without any delay to open the gate; the conſpirators, having received notice that the Roman governor deſigned on a certain day to give a feaſt to a large company in the Muſæum which was near to the citadel, reſolved, in concert with Annibal, to chooſe that day for carrying their project into execution. This General, who for ſome time before had feigned himſelf to be ſick, that his long continuance in one place might not ſeem ſtrange to the Romans, pretending now that his ſickneſs was worſe, and remained with the army at the diſtance of three days journey from Tarentum. But when the appointed time was come, he ſelected from all the cavalry and infantry about ten thouſand of the moſt active and braveſt ſoldiers, and, commanding them to take proviſions for four days, began his march with the greateſt haſte juſt before the break of day: having ordered a body of eighty Numidian Horſe to advance at the diſtance of thirty ſtadia before the reſt; that the main body might not be diſcerned by any; but that all thoſe whom they ſhould meet might either be taken priſoners by them, or, flying into the city, diſcover only that the Numidians were making incurſions in the

country. And when they were now distant from the city about a hundred and twenty ſtadia, he commanded the troops to reſt and to take their ſupper upon the banks of a river, where ſome precipices covered them from open view. He then called together the officers; and, not communicating to them the deſign, exhorted them only to acquit themſelves like men of courage, and to be aſſured that their bravery never would receive more ample rewards. In the next place he commanded them to keep the order of the march with the greateſt ſtrictneſs; and to puniſh every ſoldier with ſeverity that ſhould leave his rank. And laſtly, that they ſhould carefully attend to all his orders, and do nothing except what ſhould be commanded. With theſe orders, he diſmiſſed them; and, as ſoon as the evening approached, again began his march, deſigning to arrive at the foot of the walls about the time of midnight. He took Philemenus with him as a guide; and had prepared a wild boar, which was to be uſed in the execution of the deſign.

Livius had aſſembled his friends together in the Muſæum on that day, agreeably to the notice which the conſpirators had before received. About the time of ſun-ſet, when the feaſt was at the height,

ſome

ſome meſſengers arrived with the news, that the Numidians were making incurſions in the country. The governour, not apprehending any thing beſides, and being diverted indeed by this very account from any ſuſpicion of the truth, gave orders to ſome officers, that, as ſoon as the day ſhould appear, they ſhould take one half of the cavalry, and endeavour to ſtop the ravages of the enemy.

When night was now come, Nico, Tragiſcus, and all the reſt that were engaged in the deſign, having collected themſelves together in the city, expected the return of Livius; which, as the feaſt had been celebrated in the day, ſoon happened. The reſt of the young men then remained together in their place at a certain diſtance. But ſome of them advanced forwards to meet the company; and, aſſuming a diſſolute and ſportive air, began to mimick the geſtures of thoſe that were returning from the banquet. And when they had joined the governour, whoſe ſenſes were greatly diſordered by the wine, they gave a free ſcope to their mirth. They laughed with him; received, and retorted his jeſts; and, turning back with him, conducted him in that manner to his houſe; where with a mind diſſolved in joy, and free from every anxious

and diſquieting thought, he ſoon ſunk into that deep ſleep, which drinking in the day is ſo ready to procure. Nico and Tragiſcus then returned back again to their companions: and, dividing themſelves into three bodies, took poſſeſſion of the avenues that led towards the Forum; that from thence they might be able to obſerve whatever ſhould happen either within or without the city. There were ſome alſo that were ſtationed near the houſe of the governour. For they well knew, that, if any ſuſpicion ſhould ariſe of their deſign, it would be firſt conveyed to Livius; and that every meaſure that could be taken to prevent the execution, muſt begin from him. But when the ſeveral companies of the evening had at laſt retired, and all the tumult of the city ceaſed; when the inhabitants were faſt in ſleep, and the night far advanced; the young men, finding that nothing had yet appeared to obſtruct their hopes, again united themſelves in one body, and prepared to begin their work.

The meaſures which they had concerted with the Carthaginians were theſe. That Annibal, having approached the city on the eaſtern ſide, and directing his march towards the gate called Temenis, ſhould kindle a fire upon a certain tomb, which

which by ſome was called the tomb of Hyacinthus, and by others of Apollo Hyacinthus: that Tragiſcus, on the other hand, as ſoon as he ſhould perceive this fire, ſhould anſwer by another within the city: and that Annibal, having then extinguiſhed the fire which he had made, ſhould advance ſlowly towards the gate. Agreeably to this plan, the young men, having traverſed the ſtreets of the city, came to the place of the tombs. For the eaſtern ſide of Tarentum is filled with ſepulchres of the dead; who, in obedience to an ancient oracle, are all buried, even to the preſent age, within the gates. The words of the oracle are ſaid to have been theſe. "That the fortune of Tarentum would be happier and more proſperous, in proportion to the numbers that ſhould inhabit it." The Tarentines therefore, in order to obtain a full accompliſhment of the prediction, from that time kept their dead alſo within the city. The young men then, arriving at this place, ſtood near the tomb of Pythionicus, and waited for the event. Annibal ſoon approached, and made the ſignal that had been concerted. Nico and Tragiſcus, filled with confidence, immediately anſwered by another fire. And when that of Annibal was again extinguiſhed, they

then ran with the greateſt haſte towards the gate, that they might be able to kill the guards, before the Carthaginians ſhould arrive. For it had been concerted, that the troops ſhould advance leiſurely, and with a deliberate pace. The whole thing ſucceeded as they deſired. The guards were taken by ſurprize: and while one part of the conſpirators were employed in killing them, the reſt broke the bars; and, the gate being ſoon ſet open, Annibal alſo arrived in the very moment that was requiſite: having conducted his march with ſo great prudence, that no diſcovery had been made of it in the city. Making his entry therefore without any tumult or reſiſtance, as he had at firſt deſigned; and being perſuaded that the chief part of the work was already finiſhed, he advanced boldly from the lower ſide of the city through the ſtreet that led to the Forum: leaving only a body of two thouſand of his cavalry without the gate; that they might be ready either to intercept any enemy that ſhould appear from without, or to ſerve in the caſe of any of thoſe ſudden accidents, which frequently ariſe in the courſe of ſuch enterprizes. When he came near to the Forum, he ordered the troops to halt, and waited for the arrival of Philemenus; not without ſome

ſollicitude,

ſollicitude with reſpect to this part of the deſign. For when himſelf, after he had made the ſignal of the fire, began his march towards the gate called Temenis, he at the ſame time ſent Philemenus, with a wild boar, and a thouſand Africans, to another gate that was near: being deſirous to employ more means than one, and not to truſt the ſucceſs of the project to any ſingle meaſure.

After ſome time, Philemenus approached the walls, and made the accuſtomed ſignal by a whiſtle. The guard immediately deſcended to the gate. Philemenus called to him to open without delay; and ſaid that they carried a heavy load, having brought with them a wild boar. The guard, being pleaſed with what he heard, and hoping to receive, as at other times, ſome ſhare of the fortunate chace, haſtily opened the wicket of the gate. Philemenus then entered carrying the foremoſt part of the barrow; and with him another, who appeared to be a peaſant, and wore the dreſs of a ſhepherd. Two others alſo followed, and ſupported the burthen behind. When the four had entered, they firſt killed the guard; who, not ſuſpecting any harm, was employed in viewing and in handling the boar. At the ſame time thirty Afri-

cans, who had advanced before the reſt, paſſed leiſurely through the wicket, and without any interruption. And while one part began to break the bars of the gate, others killed the reſt of the guards. The The ſignal being then made, the whole body of the Africans that were without entered through the gate, and directed their march towards the Forum, as they had been before commanded.

When Annibal ſaw theſe troops approach, being overjoyed to find that the deſign had thus far been attended with ſucceſs, he made haſte to carry into execution what remained. Having divided the Gauls, who were in number about two thouſand, into three ſeparate bodies, he placed at the head of each two of the young men who had joined in the conſpiracy, together with two Carthaginian officers; and commanded them to take poſſeſſion of the moſt commodious avenues that led into the Forum. He ordered the young men to ſave from ſlaughter all the citizens that they ſhould meet; and to proclaim aloud, that the Tarentines ſhould remain in their place, and be aſſured of ſafety. But he commanded the Carthaginian and Gallic officers to kill every Roman that ſhould fall in their way. Immediately theſe bodies ſeparated; and

and marched by different ways to execute theſe orders.

As it now began to be known that the enemy had entered, the whole city was filled with clamour and confuſion. Livius, being informed of what had happened, and finding himſelf ſo much inebriated as to be incapable of acting, immediately with his domeſticks left his houſe; and having ordered the wicket of the gate that led to the harbour to be opened to him, went on board one of the veſſels that were at anchor there, and ſailed round to the citadel. About the ſame time Philemenus, having prepared ſome Roman trumpets, and ſome perſons who had learned to blow them, ordered them to be ſounded near the theatre. The Romans, in obedience to a ſignal to which they had been accuſtomed, immediately took arms; and running towards the Forum, afforded the occaſion which their enemies deſired. For as they ſpread themſelves through the ſtreets without any order, they fell, ſome of them among the Carthaginians, and ſome among the Gauls, and were deſtroyed by them in very great numbers.

The day began now to appear, and the Tarentines, who had remained quiet in their houſes, were not able to underſtand the truth of what had happened. For, as

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on the one hand they heard only the Roman trumpets, and ſaw no attempt made to plunder or inſult the city, they were ready to perſuade themſelves, that the Romans themſelves had occaſioned the diſorder. But when they perceived on the other hand, that many of the Roman ſoldiers were killed in the ſtreets; and that the Gauls were buſy in ſpoiling them, they then began to ſuſpect, that the Carthaginians had found means to enter the city. But when it was now clear day, and the Romans had retired into the citadel, in which there was a garriſon; Annibal, having drawn up all his forces in order of battle in the Forum, ordered proclamation to be made, that the Tarentines ſhould all meet together in the Forum likewiſe without arms. At the ſame time the young men who had joined in the conſpiracy ran through the city, crying liberty, and exhorting the citizens not to fear, but to conſider the Carthaginians as their deliverers and friends. When they heard theſe words, as many of the citizens as remained firm in the in the intereſts of the Romans fled alſo into the citadel. The reſt obeyed the order, and came to the Forum without arms. As ſoon as they were aſſembled, Annibal harangued them in a diſcourſe

that

that was full of favour. And when the Tarentines on their part, having obtained ſo unexpected a deliverance, received all that he ſaid with loud and general applauſe, he then diſmiſſed them; commanding that each of them ſhould inſcribe the word TARENTINE upon the door of his houſe; and forbidding them, under pain of death, to make the ſame inſcription upon any houſe that belonged to a Roman. Having afterwards divided into ſeveral bands the troops that were moſt proper for this ſervice, he ſent them away to pillage all the houſes upon which they ſhould ſee no inſcription: and kept the reſt of his forces drawn up in order; that they might be ready to ſupport the firſt. The Carthaginians, having collected together in this pillage great quantities of plunder of every kind, and obtained a booty that fully anſwered all their expectations, remained under their arms during that whole night.

On the following day, Annibal, after he had held a conſultation with the Tarentines, reſolved to ſeparate the city from the citadel by a wall; that the inhabitants might have nothing to dread from the ſallies of the Roman garriſon. He began therefore with firſt throwing up an intrenchment parallel to the wall and the

ditch

ditch of the city. But as he well knew, that the enemy would employ all their power to obſtruct him in this deſign; and judging likewiſe, that nothing was more neceſſary with reſpect to the future time, than that he ſhould ſtrike a terror into the Romans, and inſpire the Tarentines with confidence; he held in readineſs ſome of the braveſt of his forces. As ſoon as the work was begun, the Romans ſallied out, and began the attack with great impetuoſity and courage. At firſt Annibal only ſkirmiſhed, in order to provoke ſtill more the ardour of the enemy. But when a ſufficient number of them had advanced beyond the ditch, he then gave the ſignal to his troops, and fell with fury upon the Romans. The fight was for ſome time ſharp and obſtinate; and ſuch as might be expected upon a narrow ground, and in a place that was incloſed with walls. But the Romans, being cloſely preſſed, were at laſt forced to fly. Many of them had fallen in the action: but the greateſt part, flying in diſorder, were puſhed into the ditch, and periſhed there. After this ſucceſs, Annibal continued the work of the intrenchment in full ſecurity; and was pleaſed to find that the event had fully anſwered all his expectations. For as the Romans were now

forced

forced to remain quiet behind their walls, and began to fear that the citadel, as well as themſelves, would be expoſed to danger; the Tarentines, on the other hand, were ſo filled with confidence, that they were perſuaded, that, without any aſſiſtance from the Carthaginians, they ſhould be able to defend themſelves againſt the Romans. When this work was finiſhed, at a little diſtance from the intrenchment, and on the ſide towards the city, he ordered a ditch to be made, parallel to the intrenchment and to the wall of the citadel; and, on the ſide of the ditch which was next to the city, a rampart; which was covered alſo on the top with a paliſade, and was itſelf almoſt as ſecure as a wall. At a moderate diſtance from this rampart, in a line with it, and on the ſide alſo that was next to the city, he ordered a wall likewiſe to be built, from the place called Sotira to the ſtreet that was named the Lower Street. With ſuch fortifications, the Tarentines wanted not the preſence of an army, to ſecure them againſt the inſults of the enemy. Annibal therefore, leaving only a ſufficient garriſon, with a neceſſary guard of cavalry, went and incamped at the diſtance of forty ſtadia from the city; upon the banks of a river which is ſometimes called Galeſus, but

moſt

moſt commonly Eurotas, from the river of the ſame name which flows near to the city of Sparta. For there are many appellations of this kind, both in the city and through the whole territory of Tarentum, which the Tarentines, who are allowed to have ſprung from the Spartan ſtock, brought with them from the country from which they migrated.

By the great zeal and diligence of the Tarentines, who were aſſiſted alſo by the Carthaginians in the work, the building of the wall was in a ſhort time finiſhed. Annibal then reſolved to attempt to take the citadel. But when the neceſſary preparations were completed, the Romans, having received ſome ſuccours by the ſea from Metapontum, in ſome degree reſumed their courage; and, making a ſally in the night, deſtroyed all the machines and works. The Carthaginians therefore were forced to abandon that deſign. But as the wall was now finiſhed, Annibal aſſembled the Tarentines together, and told them, that the thing of greateſt importance in the preſent circumſtances was, that they ſhould render themſelves maſters of the ſea: that, as the citadel commanded the entrance of the harbour, their veſſels, not being able to ſail out of the port, were altogether uſeleſs; that the

Romans,

Romans, on the other hand, would receive all neceſſaries by the ſea in full ſecurity: and that, as long as the enemy ſhould be poſſeſſed of this advantage, the liberty of the city muſt ſtill be expoſed to danger. But if the Romans, he ſaid, could be but once excluded from the means of receiving any ſupplies by the ſea, they would immediately have recourſe to a voluntary ſubmiſſion, and ſurrender the citadel. The Tarentines aſſented to this diſcourſe; but were not able to conceive by what way the thing now mentioned could be accompliſhed; unleſs perhaps by the arrival of a Carthaginian fleet. But this was not to be expected at the preſent time. They knew not therefore, nor were they able to conjecture, to what this diſcourſe of Annibal could lead. And when he farther told them, that it was manifeſtly in their own power, by themſelves alone, and without any aſſiſtance from the Carthaginians, to become maſters of the ſea, they were ſtill more ſurpriſed, and unable to comprehend his meaning.

But this General, having remarked that the ſtreet that was on the inſide of the wall, and which led from the harbour to the exterior ſea, might eaſily be accommodated to the purpoſe, had con-

ceived the deſign of tranſporting the veſſels over this ground from the port to the ſouthern ſide of the city. As ſoon then as he diſcloſed this project, the Tarentines not only acknowledged that the thing was practicable, but expreſſed alſo the higheſt admiration, and were perſuaded that nothing was too difficult for the ſagacity and courage of this great commander. Immediately therefore they prepared ſome carriages with wheels; and applied themſelves with ſuch alacrity, and in ſo great numbers, to the execution of this deſign, that the work was accompliſhed almoſt as ſoon as it was propoſed. The Tarentines then, when they had thus drawn their veſſels over the land into the open ſea, and cut off all ſupplies from the Romans, inveſted the citadel without any danger. Annibal, having left a ſufficient garriſon in the city, began his march back again with the army; and, arriving on the third day in his firſt camp, continued there during the remainder of the winter.

THE

THE GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS.

BOOK the NINTH.

EXTRACT the FIRST.

Different kinds of History. The most useful is that which relates publick actions.

THESE then are the most remarkable transactions, that were included in the Olympiad before mentioned, and in the course of four years complete; which, as we have said, is to be considered as the proper term of an Olympiad. These transactions we shall endeavour to describe in the two following books.

I am not ignorant indeed, that the manner in which I write this history has something in it unpleasing: and that the uniformity of the composition must render

it ſuitable to the taſte and judgement of only one ſort of readers. For all other hiſtorians, or at leaſt the greateſt part of them, employ together all the ſeveral branches of hiſtory, and by the means of that variety attract many different perſons to the reading of their works. Thus thoſe, for example, who ſeek only a preſent ſatisfaction, are gratified with an account of the origin and deſcent of families. Others again, more curious and inquiſitive, have a pleaſure in tracing the ſettlement of colonies, the foundation of cities, and the migrations of people, as they are found in the work of Ephorus: and the attention of the political reader is fixed by the recital of the publick actions of nations, cities, and kingdoms. With regard therefore to myſelf, as I have confined my labours ſimply to theſe actions, and excluded every other ſubject from my work, this hiſtory, as I have ſaid is properly adapted only to one ſort of men, and has nothing in it that can allure the minds of the greateſt part of readers. The reaſons that induced me to chooſe this branch of hiſtory alone, and to reject the reſt, have been ſhewn at large in other parts of this work. It may not however be improper, for the ſake of impreſſing them again more ſtrongly upon

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the memory, to give a ſhort recapitulation of them in this place.

As theſe genealogies then, with all the fabulous ſtories that attend them, as the eſtabliſhments of colonies, the relations of people one to another, and the foundations of cities, have already been recounted by many writers, and in a very copious manner: the neceſſary conſequence muſt be, that whoever at this time reſumes theſe ſubjects, either muſt appropriate to himſelf the labours of another, which of all actions is the baſeſt; or, not claiming them as his own, muſt appear to be engaged in a very uſeleſs undertaking; ſince, by his own acknowledgement, he is only buſied in compiling an account of thoſe very matters, which have already been ſufficiently explained, and tranſmitted to poſterity by former writers. For this reaſon therefore, as well as for many others, I have rejected all ſuch ſubjects. With regard to actions, there are two reaſons likewiſe, that determined me to adopt them as the only ſubject of my work. Firſt, as actions happen in a continually new ſucceſſion, the relation of them alſo muſt be always new; nor is there any need, in compoſing a recital of late events, to go back to others that have already been recounted. In

the next place, this kind of hiſtory, as it has been in all times the moſt inſtructive, is ſuch moſt eminently in the preſent age. For ſo great is the perfection to which all arts and ſciences have been raiſed, that thoſe who are acquainted with them may now examine every thing that happens by ſome certain rule. Upon theſe accounts then, I have confined myſelf, as I have ſaid, to the recital of actions only: and I am perſuaded, that thoſe who ſhall read my work with due attention, will be ready to bear the ſtrongeſt teſtimony to the truth of theſe reflections.

EXTRACT the SECOND

Annibal, having in vain endeavoured to force the Romans to raiſe the ſiege of Capua, advances with the ſame deſign towards Rome, but is diſappointed in his expectation. A compariſon of Annibal with Epaminondas; and of the Lacedæmonians with the Romans.

ANNIBAL, having extended his army in a circle round the whole camp of Appius, at firſt endeavoured by light ſkirmiſhing to draw him out to an engagement. And when no anſwer was returned to this invitation, he then inveſted the camp as in a regular ſiege. The cavalry, advancing together in troops, threw their javelins with loud cries into the very camp: while the infantry, ranged alſo in juſt cohorts, attempted to tear away the palliſade of the intrenchment. The Romans however were not moved from their purpoſe even by theſe attacks: but oppoſed their light forces only to thoſe who came near to the intrenchment; while the heavy armed troops, drawn up in cohorts, and covering them

from the javelins that were thrown, remained quite in their ranks. Annibal therefore, being grieved to find, that he neither could throw himſelf into the city of Capua, nor draw the Romans to an engagement, was at laſt forced to have recourſe to other counſels, and to conſider with himſelf what meaſures were moſt proper to be taken.

The ſtate indeed in which things now appeared, might well fill the Carthaginians with perplexity, ſince it cannot but occaſion ſome embarraſſment even to thoſe who read only a relation of it. For is it not almoſt incredible, that the Romans, who had been ſo often defeated by the Carginians that they dared not to engage them again in ſet battle, ſhould yet refuſe to retire, or to leave the field? Is it not aſtoniſhing, that thoſe very troops, who in former times had never left the ſides of the hills, ſhould now deſcend into the plains, and lay ſiege to the nobleſt city, in the moſt conſpicuous part of Italy; while their camp alſo was ſurrounded by thoſe very enemies, whom they had feared to look deliberately in the face? The Carthaginians on the other hand, who had gained victory after victory without any intermiſſion, were at this very time perplexed with no leſs difficulty

difficulty than the vanquiſhed. In my judgement however, the conduct both of the one and of the other was founded ſimply upon this opinion which was common to them both; that the cavalry of Annibal was the only cauſe, to which the Carthaginians owed all their victories, and the Romans their defeats. Upon this account it was, that the latter, immediately after every action, had been accuſtomed to lead their armies along the ſides of the hills, in ſight indeed of the enemy, but in places where the cavalry was not able to act againſt them. And with reſpect particularly to all that now paſſed in the neighbourhood of Capua, the ſame perſuaſion very clearly explains the motives that determined either army. For the Romans, while they refuſed to draw out their forces to a battle, through dread of the cavalry of the enemy, at the ſame time remained with confidence in the poſt which they had taken: as being well aſſured, that this very cavalry, which had occaſioned their defeat in every ſet engagement, was not able to make any impreſſion upon their camp. The Carthaginians again conſidered, and with no leſs reaſon, that it would not be poſſible for them to keep their cavalry long together in a body. For the forage had been purpoſely

purpoſely deſtroyed by the Romans through all the country. Nor was it poſſible to bring from any great diſtance thoſe ſupplies of hay and of barley, which ſo large a number of horſes and beaſts of burthen would require. And if, on the other hand, they ſhould diſmiſs their cavalry, and remain afterwards in their camp; they never could attack, without manifeſt hazard, an enemy who was ſtrongly intrenched, and againſt whom every engagement, not ſupported by their cavalry, muſt be attended with very doubtful ſucceſs. They were apprehenſive likewiſe, that ſome new forces might arrive; and, incamping cloſe behind them, might involve them in the greateſt difficulties by intercepting their ſupplies. Annibal therefore, having concluded from theſe reaſons, that it was not poſſibe to draw the Romans from the ſiege by open force, reſolved to attempt it in a different way.

He conſidered with himſelf, that, if he could make a ſecret march, and appear ſuddenly in the neighbourhood of Rome, either ſome advantage might perhaps be gained againſt the city, before the inhabitants ſhould be recovered from the conſternation into which ſo unexpected an event would throw them; or, on the other hand, that Appius would be forced

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to raiſe the ſiege of Capua, and haſten to the aſſiſtance of his country; or ſending away one part at leaſt of his army for that purpoſe, would afford the opportunity of an eaſy victory, both againſt the forces that ſhould be ſo ſeparated from the reſt, and thoſe alſo that would be left behind. Having formed then this deſign, he engaged an African to paſs as a deſerter into the Roman camp, and from thence into the city, with letters which he had taken care to ſecure. For he had reaſon to fear, that the inhabitants, as ſoon as they ſhould perceive that he was gone, would deſpair of receiving any farther ſuccour, and ſurrender themſelves to the Romans. He contrived therefore, that theſe letters ſhould be delivered to them on the very day following his departure: that, being acquainted with his purpoſe, they might be encouraged ſtill to ſuſtain the ſiege.

At Rome, when the news arrived of what paſſed in the neighbourhood of Capua; and that Annibal had incamped cloſe to the Roman army, and even inveſted them in their camp; the minds of all men were raiſed in ſuſpenſe, and were filled with anxiety and dread. For it ſeemed that the very moment that would decide the war was now approaching. The citizens therefore,

therefore in general, and every one particularly, were occupied with no other care, than to complete the preparations for that ſide, and to ſend all the neceſſary ſuccours.

The people of Capua, when they had received the letters from the hands of the African, and were informed of the deſign of Annibal, reſolved to wait the event, and ſuſtain the ſiege. In the mean time this General, on the fifth day after he had firſt incamped, having ordered the troops to take their ſupper, and leaving his fires lighted, decamped in the evening with ſo great ſecrecy, that the enemy knew not that he was gone. With continual and forced marches, he paſſed through the territory of the Samnites; taking care always to ſend ſome troops before, to examine the country, and to occupy the proper poſts. And while the attention of the Romans was wholly fixed on the affairs of Capua, and the condition of the ſiege, he paſſed the river Anio before he was diſcovered, and, advancing ſtill nearer towards Rome, fixed his camp at the diſtance of no more than forty ſtadia from the city. The firſt news of this approach filled all Rome with terror and confuſion. For, beſide that the event was ſudden, it was moſt diſtant likewiſe

likewiſe from every expectation; becauſe Annibal never had approached ſo near before. Add to this, that an opinion alſo immediately prevailed, that he would not even now have ventured to approach, unleſs the legions that were employed in the ſiege of Capua had been firſt defeated. The men therefore made haſte to mount the walls, and to take all the advantageous poſts, that were without the city: while the women went round to the temples, offering ſupplications to the Gods, and ſweeping the pavements of the holy ſhrines with their hair. For ſuch is the cuſtom of this people, whenever their country is threatened with any great and unuſual danger.

Annibal then, having incamped in the place that has been mentioned, had reſolved to make an attempt againſt the city on the following day; when an accident, as fortunate as unexpected, occaſioned the ſafety of Rome. The Conſuls, Cneus Fulvius and Publius Sulpicius, who had before enrolled one legion, had ordered the ſoldiers to attend at Rome with their arms upon this very day, to take the military oath. At this very time likewiſe, they were employed in ſelecting and enrolling men for another legion. Thus a great body of troops was aſſembled

bled as it were ſpontaneouſly in the moment that was requiſite. The Conſuls, placing themſelves with confidence at their head, went and encamped without the city; and by this meaſure gave an effectual check to the ardour of the Carthaginians. For Annibal had at firſt advanced, and was not without hopes that he ſhould be able to take the city by ſtorm. But when he ſaw that the Romans were drawn up in battle againſt him; and being informed alſo of the true ſtate of things by a priſoner that was taken, he deſiſted from the attempt: and leading his army through the country, ſet fire to the houſes, and plundered all that was within his reach. The booty that was gained even in the firſt excurſions was ſuch as exceeded all account: being drawn from a country, into which it never had been expected that an enemy would at any time come.

The Conſuls however were now ſo filled with confidence, that they had the boldneſs to encamp at the diſtance of ten ſtadia only from the Carthaginian army. But Annibal, having conſidered that his troops were loaded with an immenſe booty; that he had failed in his attempt againſt the city; and, above all, that the time was now elapſed, in which he had

ſuppoſed

ſuppoſed that Appius, informed of the danger with which Rome was threatened, would either raiſe the ſiege of Capua, or, leaving there a ſmall part only of his forces, would haſten with the reſt to defend his country; and that in either caſe he ſhould meet him on his way with ſome advantage; reſolved to begin his march back again, and decamped early in the morning. But Publius, having before broken the bridges that were upon the river, ſo that the Carthaginians were obliged to ford the ſtream, preſſed cloſely upon the rear of the army in their paſſage, and threw them into no ſmall diſorder. The numbers indeed of the Carthaginian cavalry, and the readineſs of the Numidians in aſſiſting every part that was attacked, prevented the action from being in any manner general. The Romans however recovered again a great part of the plunder; and, having taken priſoners alſo about three hundred men, they then returned back to their camp. And being afterwards perſuaded, that fear alone had determined Annibal to make ſo precipitate a retreat, they followed cloſely after him, leading their army along the ſides of the hills.

The Carthaginian General, keeping in view his firſt deſign, for ſome time continued

tinued his march with the greateſt haſte. But, after five days, being informed that Appius had not left the ſiege, he halted, till the Romans who were following him were come near: and then falling ſuddenly upon their camp in the night, he killed great numbers of them, and forced the reſt to fly out of the camp. And when the morning was come, perceiving that they had retreated to a ſtrong eminence that was near, he reſolved not to attack them in that poſt: but continued his route through Daunia and the Brutian diſtrict, appeared ſo unexpectedly in the neighbourhood of Rhegium, that he had almoſt made himſelf maſter of the city. For all that were found in the country upon his approach fell into his hands; and among them many of the inhabitants of Rhegium.

Is there any one now that can withhold his admiration, or refuſe the teſtimony that is due to the emulation and the courage, that were ſo ſignally diſplayed upon this occaſion both by the Carthaginians and the Romans? The conduct of Epaminondas, in an action not unlike to that which we have now deſcribed, has received the applauſe of all mankind. This general, arriving at Tegea with his allies, perceived that the Lacedæmonians

had drawn together all their forces, as well as thoſe of their allies, to Mantinea, with deſign to offer battle to the Theban army. Having ordered his troops therefore to take their ſupper, at an early hour, he led them out in the beginning of the night, under the pretence of occupying certain poſts, that were moſt proper for the approaching battle. But when this perſuaſion was ſpread through all the army, he directed his march ſtrait to Sparta, and arrived moſt unexpectedly about the third hour of the night. Finding the place deſtitute of all defence, he penetrated as far as to the Forum, and made himſelf maſter of all the parts of the city that were on the ſide of the river. But this fortune ſoon was changed. For Ageſilaus having been informed of what had happened, by a deſerter who had gone in the night to Mantinea, immediately began his march, and arrived at Sparta with all his forces, in the very moment when the city was taken. Epaminondas therefore, being thus forced to abandon his deſign, ordered his troops to take their repaſt upon the banks of the Eurotas; and, having allowed alſo ſome time for reſt, he reſolved to march back again in haſte by the ſame way by

which he had arrived: being perſuaded, that, as whole the Lacedæmonian army had come in haſte to protect their country, Mantinea in its turn was now left without defence. And this indeed was the truth. He therefore encouraged his troops; and continuing his march all night with the greateſt haſte, arrived about the middle of the day in the neighbourhood of Mantinea, which had no force ſufficient to make reſiſtance. But it happened that the Athenians, who were deſirous to bear a part in the intended action againſt the Thebans, arrived at this very time, with deſign to join the Lacedæmonian army. And when the advanced guard of the Thebans had juſt reached the temple of Neptune, which ſtood at the diſtance of ſeven ſtadia only from Mantinea; in the ſame inſtant the Athenians, as if by concert, appeared upon the top of the hill that commanded the city. On the ſight of theſe ſuccours, the Mantineans were at laſt encouraged to mount the walls, and oppoſe the entrance of the Thebans. It is not without good reaſon therefore, that hiſtorians blame theſe accidents: and ſay of Epaminondas, that he performed every thing that was to be expected from a ſkilful General;

General; and, while he ſhewed himſelf to be ſuperior to his enemies, was vanquiſhed only by ill fortune.

The ſame reflections may be made with reſpect to the conduct of Annibal in the preſent inſtance. For when it is conſidered, that this General firſt attempted to raiſe the ſiege of Capua, by encamping near to the enemy, and attacking them in many little combats; that, when this deſign had failed, he then marched, with the ſame intention, into the very neighbourhood of Rome; that, when accident alone had prevented the ſucceſs of this bold project, and forced him to return back again with his army, he ſtill kept his attention fixed upon his firſt deſign, and ſtood ready to take advantage of any motion that ſhould be made by the army that was employed in the ſiege; and laſtly, when it is remembered, that he did not even in the end deſiſt from his undertaking, till he had diſperſed the Romans with great ſlaughter, and almoſt taken the city of Rhegium by ſurprize; who can behold ſuch actions, and not beſtow upon this great commander the ſtrongeſt teſtimony of admiration and applauſe?

With regard to the Romans, they muſt be allowed indeed to have deſerved upon this occaſion even a higher degree of praiſe than the Lacedæmonians in the inſtance that has been mentioned. For the Lacedæmonians, as ſoon as they knew that Sparta was attacked, marched away in haſte, and ſaved indeed their own city, but ſuffered Mantinea, as far as it depended upon themſelves alone, to be loſt. But the Romans preſerved their country; and yet drew not away their army from the walls of Capua: but remaining immoveable and fixed in their firſt pupoſe, continued to preſs the ſiege with the ſame confidence as before.

But let it not now be imagined, that my purpoſe in falling into this digreſſion was barely to extol the Carthaginians and the Romans. Their great actions have already been often celebrated in the courſe of this work. My deſign was rather, by diſplaying the conduct of the leaders in theſe two ſtates, to afford a leſſon to all thoſe who may hereafter be placed at the head of affairs in any country. That, when they call to their remembrance the fame of theſe commanders, and place their actions in full view before them, they may be led to emulate

emulate ſuch great examples: and be perſuaded, that many things which appear to be beyond meaſure daring and full of danger, are not leſs ſafe in the execution, than admirable in the attempt; and that the deſign itſelf, as well when fruſtrated as when attended with ſucceſs, will draw after it immortal honour, if it be conducted only with ability and ſkill.

EXTRACT the THIRD.

The ill policy of the Romans cenſured, in carrying into their own country the ornaments of the cities which they had conquered.

SUCH then was the reaſon that determined the Romans to remove into their own country the ornaments that have been mentioned, and not to leave any part behind. Whether this reſolution was right and agreeable to their intereſts, or the contrary, would afford room perhaps for much diſpute. It ſeems however, that the ſtrongeſt reaſons might be brought to ſhew, that they acted, and ſtill continue to act, very imprudently in this matter. If the cultivation indeed of arts like theſe had been the means of their firſt advancement to ſtrength and power, they might then with good reaſon have transferred into their own poſſeſſion ſuch ornaments as had been found effectual to promote the greatneſs of their country. But as in truth it was a kind of life that was deſtitute of all ſuperfluous wealth, and manners far removed from elegance and ſplendour,

dour, which enabled them to ſubdue continually thoſe very nations, which poſſeſſed the moſt, as well as the moſt beautiful, of theſe embelliſhments; how can it be doubted, but that they erred in judgment upon this occaſion? Nor are they to be blamed in this reſpect alone, that, when they were conquerors, they relinquiſhed their own manners, and adopted the ſpirit of the conquered in exchange. There is alſo a certain kind of envy, which never fails to accompany ſuch actions; and which of all things a powerful empire has the greateſt cauſe to dread. For when men behold a ſtate in poſſeſſion of the riches that belonged to others, inſtead of applauding the good fortune, they view it, on the contrary, with ſecret jealouſy; and are at the ſame time moved by ſentiments of compaſſion towards thoſe who have been thus deſpoiled. And when in the farther progreſs of ſucceſs, the whole wealth of every foreign ſtate is drawn together to one city, and the people themſelves are invited as it were to take a view of that magnificence which ſo lately was their own; the evil then becomes greater than before. For the ſpectators, not actuated, as in the former inſtance, by compaſſion for the ſufferings of their neighbours, are now exaſperated by a ſenſe of

their own loſſes: and begin to glow, not with envy alone, but with reſentment alſo againſt thoſe whom fortune has ſo favoured. For the remembrance of the calamities which men have felt will naturally excite their hatred againſt the authors of them. If the Romans indeed had only carried away the ſilver and the gold from the countries which they conquered, they would have deſerved no blame. For they could not in general have held the vanquiſhed in ſubjection, unleſs they had deprived them of that ſource of their ſtrength, and added it to their own. But with reſpect to the riches of a different kind, it would certainly have been far more prudent, to have ſuffered them to remain where they were found, together with the envy which they inſpire: and to have eſtabliſhed the glory of their own country, not by the vain ornaments of pictures and of ſtatues, but by a gravity of manners, and a maganimity of conduct. But theſe reflections are ſufficient. They may ſerve perhaps as inſtruction at leaſt to future conquerors; not to ſtrip the cities which they ſubdue; nor to think it poſſible, that the calamities of other nations can ever become the ornament of their own countries.

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EXTRACT the FOURTH.

A digreſſion concerning the proper manner of conducting any enterprize. What things are neceſſary to be known by the commander of an army. The application and uſe of Aſtronomy and Geometry. Examples of Generals who failed in their attempts, from being unacquainted with the principles of thoſe ſciences. A cenſure of ſome common errors, ariſing from the ſame defect.

CHAP. I.

IN the affairs of war, much conſideration is indeed required, to guard againſt the accidents that may ariſe in the courſe of ſuch an undertaking. And yet in every project there is good reaſon to expect ſucceſs, if the means of carrying it into execution be conducted only with ſound ſenſe and judgment.

If we examine then the accounts of former wars, it will be very obvious to perceive, that thoſe actions, which are accompliſhed openly and by force alone, are much leſs frequent, than thoſe that are con-

concerted with ſome ſtratagem, and upon ſome occaſion that is offered. From the ſame view likewiſe it will be no leſs evident, that, among theſe laſt, the number of thoſe that fail, is greater than of thoſe that are attended with ſucceſs. And that the want alſo of ſucceſs, upon ſuch occaſions, is almoſt always to be aſcribed to the ignorance or the negligence of the commanders, cannot reaſonably be doubted. I ſhall endeavour therefore to point out the proper method of conducting enterprizes of this ſort; not taking into the conſideration things that happen without foreſight or intention, which deſerve the name of chance or accident rather than of actions, and which are in their nature too unſettled to be fixed by any rule; but confining myſelf wholly to thoſe actions which are undertaken with ſome certain purpoſe and deſign.

Every action then, of the kind here mentioned, muſt have a determinate point of time; a certain portion of time; and a certain place. It requires alſo ſecrecy; certain perſons, through whom, and by whom, it muſt be accompliſhed: and laſtly, a certain manner of carrying it into execution. When a commander has formed his meaſures right with reſpect to all theſe circumſtances, it is manifeſt that his at-

attempt will be attended with ſucceſs. But, on the other hand, the neglect of any one of theſe will moſt aſſuredly defeat the whole deſign. For ſuch is the nature of all concerted enterprizes: a failure in any ſingle part, however inconſiderable, ſhall have force to overthrow them; while all the meaſures together ſcarcely are ſufficient to conduct an undertaking to its deſtined end. It is clearly therefore a matter of the laſt importance, not to leave any thing neglected upon ſuch occaſions.

Now, of all the precautions that have been mentioned, the firſt to which a commander ſhould attend, is that of obſerving ſecrecy. That neither the joy which ſprings from an unexpected proſpect of ſucceſs, nor yet the dread of a miſcarriage; that neither friendſhip nor affection may prevail upon him, to communicate his deſign to any perſons except thoſe alone without whoſe aſſiſtance it cannot be carried into execution: and not even to theſe, till the time in which their ſervices are ſeverally required obliges him to diſcloſe it. Nor is it neceſſary only that the tongue be ſilent; but much more, that the mind alſo make not any diſcovery. For it has often happened, that men, who have carefully reſtrained themſelves

ſelves from ſpeaking, have ſometimes by their countenance alone, and ſometimes by their actions, very clearly manifeſted their deſigns. A ſecond thing to be conſidered are the different routes, either by day or by night, and the manner of performing them, both upon land and ſea. The third, and indeed the greateſt object is, to know the differences of the times that depend upon the heavens; and to be able to accommodate them to the execution of any deſign. Nor is the manner of executing any enterprize to be regarded as a point of ſmall importance. For this alone has often made things practicable, which appeared to be impoſſible, and ordered others impracticable which were eaſy to be performed. In the laſt place, great attention ſhould be paid to ſignals and counterſignals; as well as to the choice of the perſons, through whoſe means, and with whoſe aſſiſtance the undertaking is to be accompliſhed.

The knowledge, that is requiſite in the things now mentioned, is to be acquired, partly by experience, partly by inquiry, and partly by the rules of ſcience. With reſpect to the ſeveral routes; the place that is the object of the march; the nature of that place; and the perſons fit

fit to be employed in the execution of the enterprize; it is beſt indeed, when a commander is himſelf acquainted with theſe things from his own proper knowledge. But if it be otherwiſe, his duty then is, to uſe the greateſt care in his inquiries: not truſting raſhly to any information that is offered; nor following any guides, without leaving behind him ſome pledges of their fidelity. In theſe things then, and in others ſimilar to theſe, a General may obtain ſufficient light, by conſulting that experience which is gained in armies; by employing his own induſtry; and by making the neceſſary inquiries. But there are others that demand ſkill and knowledge, and ſome acquaintance with the rules of theoretical ſcience, eſpecially with thoſe of Aſtronomy and Geometry. For, without having recourſe to the more difficult branches of theſe two ſciences, there are certain parts of them, which, though they require but little labour, are of the greateſt uſe upon ſuch occaſions, and ſerve principally to promote the ſucceſs of all ſuch enterprizes as have here been mentioned.

Among the things that are to be learned in this method, one of the moſt neceſſary is the inveſtigation of the theory of the days and nights. If indeed the days and the

the nights were at all times equal, there would be no need of ſtudy, in order to acquire a knowledge which would in that caſe be common and obvious to all. But ſince they are different, not only each from the other, but alſo from themſelves, it is plainly a matter of great importance, to know the laws by which they are ſeverally diminiſhed or increaſed. For, unleſs he be acquainted with theſe differences, how ſhall a commander be able to meaſure with exactneſs the time of a concerted march, either by night or by day? How can he be aſſured, without this knowledge, that he ſhall not either arrive too early, or too late? It happens alſo upon ſuch occaſions, and indeed upon ſuch alone, that the firſt of theſe miſtakes is more dangerous than the other. For he who arrives too late, is only forced to abandon his deſign. Perceiving his error, while he is yet at a diſtance, he may return back again with ſafety. But he who comes before the appointed time, being diſcovered by the enemy upon his approach, not only fails in the intended enterprize, but is in danger alſo of ſuffering an intire defeat. It is time indeed, which principally governs in all human actions; and moſt particularly in the affairs of war. A commander therefore ſhould be per-

fectly acquainted with the time of the ſummer and the winter ſolſtice; the equinoxes; and the different degrees of the diminution or increaſe of the nights and days, as they fall between the equinoctial points. For this is the only method that can enable him to adjuſt his motions to the courſe of time, either by land or ſea.

Nor is it leſs neceſſary that a commander ſhould alſo know diſtinctly the ſeveral portions of the day and of the night; in order to determine the proper hour of riſing, and of putting the troops in march. For without beginning well, it is not poſſible to obtain a happy end. Now the time of day may eaſily be known: by the ſhadow from the ſun; by the courſe which the ſun takes; and by the different degrees of his elevation above the earth. But it is not ſo eaſy to diſtinguiſh the time of night: unleſs to thoſe who are verſed in the doctrine of the ſphere; and are able to follow the courſe of the twelve ſigns, and to mark their diſpoſition in the heavens. With this knowledge, it is a matter of no difficulty. For, though the nights are unequal, yet, ſince in the courſe of every night ſix of the twelve ſigns are raiſed above the horizon, it neceſſarily follows, that at the ſame times of the night equal parts of the

twelve

twelve ſigns muſt always appear. When it is known then what part of the zodiac the ſun occupies in the day, nothing more is requiſite, than, at the time of his ſetting, to draw a line diametrically through the circle. When this is done, as much as the zodiac ſhall afterwards riſe above the horizon, ſo much alſo of the night will have paſſed. And if the number only and the magnitude of the ſigns be known, the different parts of the night will be alſo known.

When the nights are cloudy, recourſe muſt be had to the moon. For this planet is of ſuch a magnitude, that, in whatever part of the heavens, it may happen to be, the light of it may always be diſcerned. It is ſometimes from the time and place of its riſing, and ſometimes from thoſe of its ſetting, that the hours of the night are to be computed. But it will firſt be requiſite to know with exactneſs the different times of it's riſing upon each ſeveral day. Nor is this knowledge difficult to be obtained. For as the courſe of the moon is completed in a ſingle month, the right apprehenſion of its progreſs in that period will ſerve equally in all the reſt.

Upon theſe principles it may be obſerved, how well the Poet deſerves our

praiſe, when he repreſents Ulyſes, who poſſeſſed all the qualities of a great commander, forming conjectures from the appearances of the heavens, not only concerning the courſe of navigation, but with reſpect alſo to actions upon land. For even thoſe ſudden and unexpected events, by which men frequently are thrown into the greateſt difficuties, may by this method be apprehended with exactneſs before they happen. Such are violent rains and inundations; the fall of ſnows; a black and clouded air; and other ſimilar accidents. If we are therefore negligent with reſpect even to things of this kind, which are poſſible to be foreſeen; muſt we not fail, through our own fault alone, in almoſt every thing that we attempt? But indeed there is ſcarcely one, of all thoſe precautions which have been before recited, that can with ſafety be neglected; if we would avoid falling into thoſe abſurdities of conduct, into which many others are reported to have fallen. I ſhall here mention ſome of them as examples.

Aratus, the Achæan Prætor, having reſolved to attempt to take Cynætha by ſurprize, concerted the following plan with the citizens that were engaged in the deſign. That, on a certain day, having before ad-

vanced ſilently in the night, he ſhould take his poſt near to the river that ran down from the city, and for ſome time remain quiet with his army. That, about the middle of the day, the citizens, when all things were prepared, ſhould ſecretly ſend out one of their number, dreſſed in a mantle; who ſhould take his ſtand upon a certain tomb that was without the city. That the reſt ſhould then attack the guards of the gate; who, according to their cuſtom would be ſleeping at that hour: and that Aratus, in this very moment, ſhould riſe from his concealment, and advance with haſte towards the gate. The matter being thus regulated, Aratus came at the appointed time; and, having ſtationed his troops in ſecret along the river, waited for the ſignal. It happened that one of the inhabitants, who was the maſter of ſome of thoſe delicate ſheep that were uſually paſtured near to the city, having occaſion to give ſome ſudden orders that concerned them, came out at the gate, about an hour before the middle of the day, dreſſed in a mantle; and, ſtanding upon the very tomb that had been named, looked round the country in ſearch of his ſhepherd. Aratus, being perſuaded that this was the ſignal that had been concerted, advanced in haſte towards the gate. But the gate

was

was immediately ſhut by the guards; for things were not yet ready within the city. Thus this General not only failed in his attempt, but brought deſtruction alſo upon the citizens that were engaged in the deſign. For being now diſcovered, they all loſt their lives in torture. What now was the cauſe of this misfortune? It was only that Aratus, who was at this time extremely young, and not acquainted with the ſingular advantage of double and reſpondent ſignals, was ſatisfied with having concerted a ſingle ſignal. So ſlight is the difference, upon which the good or ill ſucceſs of any military enterprize depends.

In the ſame manner alſo Cleomenes, the king of Sparta, when he had reſolved to make an attempt of this kind upon Megalopolis, agreed with ſome of the garriſon, who were to be ſtationed upon that part of the wall that was called Colæum, that he would come with his forces in the night, about the time of the third watch. For this was the hour, in which theſe men were appointed to take the guard. But not having before conſidered, that at the time of the riſing of the Pleiades the nights were extremely ſhort, he did not begin his march from Lace-

dæmon till about the ſetting of the ſun. It was therefore full day before he arrived at the deſtined place. He had the raſhneſs however to attempt to ſtorm the city; but was repulſed with diſgrace and loſs, and was even in danger of ſuffering an intire defeat: whereas, on the other hand, if he had only been exact in the computation of his time, his friends might have ſecured his entrance into the city, and the deſign have been attended with ſucceſs.

Thus again king Philip, when he attempted to take Melite in the manner that has before been mentioned, was guilty of a double error. For not only the ladders which he carried were too ſhort; but he failed alſo with reſpect to the time. Inſtead of coming to the place in the middle of the night, as it had been concerted, when the people would have been all faſt in ſleep, he began his march from Lariſſa at an early hour; and, having entered the territory of the Melitæans, as it was neither ſafe for him to halt, leſt the enemy ſhould gain notice of his approach, nor poſſible to return back again without being perceived, he was compelled by neceſſity to advance, and arrived at the city before the inhabitants were yet gone

gone to reſt. But as he could not ſcale the walls, becauſe the ladders were not proportioned to the height; ſo neither was he able to enter through the gate, becauſe the time of the attack prevented his friends that were within the city from favouring his entrance. At laſt therefore, having only provoked the rage of the inhabitants, and loſt many of his men, he was forced to return back without accompliſhing his purpoſe; and inſtructed all mankind for the time to come, to be ſuſpicious of his deſigns, and to ſet themſelves on their guard againſt him.

Another example occurs in the example of Nicias the Athenian. This General, having found a fair occaſion for withdrawing his army from the ſiege of Syracuſe, made choice of the proper time of night, and had retreated to a ſafe diſtance undiſcovered by the enemy, when it happened that the moon was ſuddenly eclipſed. Being ſtruck by this event, and vainly imagining that it portended ſome misfortune, he immediately ſuſpended his march. The conſequence was, that when he deſigned to continue his retreat on the following night, the Syracuſans, having now gained notice of his motions, fell upon him as he marched, and rendered them-

ſelves maſters both of the army and of all the leaders. And yet, if he only had inquired of men that were acquainted with theſe matters, he might not only not have loſt his own proper time, but have rendered the accident itſelf ſubſervient to his purpoſe, on account of the ignorance of the enemy. For the ignorance of others is the ſureſt way for conducting ſkilful men to the accompliſhment of their deſigns. It is manifeſt then, that ſo much of Aſtronomy ſhould be acquired, as may be neceſſary upon ſuch occaſions.

With regard to the meaſure of ladders, the method of determining it is this. If the height of the walls be known, by the means of ſome communication with thoſe that are in the city, the proportion of the ladders is then moſt eaſy to be aſcertained. For if the wall, for example, contain ten certain parts of any meaſure in height, the height of the ladders muſt include at the leaſt twelve ſuch parts. The diſtance of the foot of the ladders from the walls ſhould be equal to one half of their height. For this is the moſt juſt proportion with reſpect to the men that are to mount upon them. If the diſtance be greater, the ladders will too eaſily be

broken

broken under the weight. If leſs, they will then be ſo erect, that the ſoldiers, as they aſcend, muſt be continually in danger of falling headlong down. If the walls are not to be approached, and the meaſure of them is unknown, the height of any body that ſtands perpendicularly upon a plane ſurface may be taken at a diſtance. The method of doing this is not only practicable, but eaſy, to thoſe who are acquainted with the mathematicks. And thus again it is evident, that, in order to obtain ſucceſs in military operations, the ſtudy of Geometry will be alſo requiſite: not indeed in its whole extent; but ſo far as it teaches to inveſtigate the theory of relations and proportions. For it is not only in meaſuring the height of walls, that this ſcience is ſo neceſſary; but in changing alſo the figure of a camp, as occaſions may require. By this method it is, that a General is enabled, ſometimes, taking every kind of figure, to keep ſtill the ſame proportion between the ſeveral parts, that are contained within the camp; and ſometimes retaining the ſame figure, to vary the proportion of the parts, according to the number of thoſe that enter, or that depart from the camp. But theſe matters

have already been treated by us at large, in our Diſcourſe on the Orders of Battle.

It will not, I think, be objected to me by any reaſonable man, that I require too much, in making Aſtronomy and Geometry a neceſſary part of ſtudy for the General of an army. To join indeed to any profeſſion thoſe foreign and ſuperfluous acquiſitions, which only ſerve to furniſh matter of oſtentation and idle talk, is a labour which I entirely diſapprove. But as much as I condemn ſuch unneceſſary diligence, ſo much on the other hand muſt I contend for the neceſſity of drawing even from a diſtant ſource ſome knowledge of thoſe things which are of conſtant and notorious uſe. For is it not abſurd, that perſons who profeſs the arts of dancing and of muſick, ſhould ſubmit to be inſtructed in the theory of meaſure and of harmony, and even to be trained in the gymnaſtick exerciſes; becauſe theſe are all conſidered as the neceſſary means of obtaining perfection in their reſpective arts; and that thoſe who aſpire to the command of armies, ſhould be diſpleaſed to find, that an acquaintance in ſome degree with other ſciences is neceſſary in their profeſſion? Shall the men that exerciſe illiberal arts

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exert greater pains, and ſhew a ſtronger emulation to excel, than thoſe who are ambitious to obtain diſtinction in the nobleſt and moſt ſplendid of all employments? There is no man of ſenſe that will avow ſuch ſentiments. But enough has been ſaid upon this ſubject.

CHAP. II.

THE greateſt part of men form their opinion of the ſize of a camp, or of a city, only from the circumference. When they are told therefore that Megalopolis contains in circumference fifty ſtadia, and Lacedæmon no more than forty-eight, and yet that this laſt city is twice as large as the former, they know not how to believe it. And if any one, deſigning to increaſe the ſurprize, ſhould affirm that it is poſſible that a city or a camp, which contains only forty ſtadia in circumference, may be twice as large as another that contains a hundred ſtadia, they are ſtruck with the greateſt aſtoniſhment. The cauſe of this ſurprize is, that men forget thoſe principles of Geometry which they learned in their youth. And I was the rather inclined to take ſome notice of theſe matters, becauſe not the vulgar

vulgar alone, but ſome even of thoſe who are employed in the adminiſtration of ſtates, or placed at the head of armies, are ſometimes aſtoniſhed, and not able to conceive, that Lacedæmon is a much greater city than Megalopolis, though it be leſs in its circumference; and again, in the ſame manner likewiſe are perſuaded, that, by only viewing the circumference of a camp, they can eaſily determine the number of the troops which it contains. There is alſo another error in judging of cities, not unlike to that which has been mentioned. Many men imagine, that an unequal and hilly ground will contain more houſes, than a ground that is flat and level. This however is not the truth. For the houſes, being raiſed in a perpendicular line, form right angles, not with the declivity of the ground, but with the flat ſurface which lies below, and upon which the hills themſelves alſo ſtand. This alſo may be learned from the very firſt elements of ſcience. Suppoſe a number of houſes to be ſo built upon the ſides of a hill, as to riſe to an equal height; it is manifeſt that the roofs of all of them together will form a ſurface exactly parallel and equal to the ſurface of the ground which lies

under the foundations of the houſes and and the hill. Let this then ſerve as a leſſon to thoſe perſons, who, though they are ſo ignorant as not to conceive how theſe things can be, are deſirous of commanding armies, and of preſiding in the government of ſtates.

EXTRACT the FIFTH.

Agrigentum in Sicily deſcribed.

AGRIGENTUM excells almoſt all other cities, not only in the advantages that have been mentioned, but in ſtrength likewiſe, and eſpecially in ornament and beauty. Situated at the diſtance of only eighteen ſtadia from the ſea, it poſſeſſes all the conveniencies which the ſea procures. The whole circuit of the city is rendered uncommonly ſtrong both by nature and art. For the walls are built upon a rock, which partly by nature, and partly from the labour of art, is very ſteep and broken. It is ſurrounded alſo by rivers on different ſides. On the ſide towards the ſouth, by a river of the ſame name as the city: and on the weſt and ſouth-weſt, by that which is called the Hypſas. The citadel, which ſtands upon a hill on the north-eaſt ſide, is ſecured all round the outſide by a deep and inacceſſible valley; and has one way only by which it may be entered from the city. On the ſummit of the hill is a temple dedicated to Minerva; and another to Jupiter Atabyrius, as at Rhodes. For as

as the Agrigentines were a colony from Rhodes, they gave to this deity, not improperly, the ſame appellation by which he was diſtinguiſhed in the iſland from which they came. The city alſo itſelf, which is indeed in all reſpects magnificent, is adorned with porticoes and with temples. Among theſe, the temple of Jupiter Olympius, though not finiſhed indeed with ſo great ſplendour, is equal in ſize and in deſign to any of the temples of Greece.

EXTRACT the SIXTH.

The discourse of Chlæneas, embassadour from the Ætolians to the Lacedæmonians; in which he inveighs against the conduct of the kings of Macedon. He is answered by Lyciscus, embassadour from the Acarnanians: who defends the Macedonians, and warns the assembly of the fatal consequences of bringing the Romans into Greece.

CHAP. I.

* * * "NOW, that the kings of Macedon have from the first been enemies to the liberties of Greece, there is no man, O Lacedæmonians, that will have the boldness to deny. Let me enter however into the proof of this fact. Among the various colonies of Greeks, that migrated from Athens and from Chalcis, that of Olynthus was the first, both in consideration and in power. Philip, having subdued this city, ordered the inhabitants to be sold; and, by the terror of that example, not only obtained possession of all the other cities of Thrace, but

but forced Theſſaly alſo to receive his yoke. Some time afterwards, when he had defeated the Athenians in battle, he diſplayed indeed great generoſity after his victory; not from any deſire of ſhewing kindneſs to the vanquiſhed; for that was far from his intentions, but that others might be induced by ſuch an inſtance of his clemency to ſubmit themſelves voluntarily to his commands. At that time however, the power of your Republick was ſo great, that it ſeemed probable that at ſome convenient ſeaſon you would not fail to place yourſelves at the head of all the ſtates of Greece. He ſeized every occaſion therefore of declaring war againſt you. He invaded your country with his armies: he waſted your lands, and deſtroyed your houſes: and at laſt, having torn both cities and whole provinces from your dominion, he beſtowed one part of the ſpoil upon the Argians; gave another to the Tegeans and the Megalopolitans; and another to the Meſſenians; and ſhewed a willingneſs to gratify all mankind, if he could only do it with your loſs. From him Alexander received the ſovereignty. This prince again, being perſuaded, that, as long as Thebes remained, ſome little ray of hope would be ſtill left to Greece, deſtroyed that city in the manner which is

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known to all. There is no need that I ſhould enter into a particular detail of the conduct which his ſucceſſors have held with reſpect to Greece. For no man is ſo little verſed in the tranſactions of his country, as not to have heard, that when Antipater had gained a complete victory in the Lamian war, he treated the Athenians, as well as the reſt of the Greeks, with the greateſt inſult and indignity. For to ſuch exceſs did he carry his oppreſſion and injuſtice, that he appointed perſons to hunt out the exiles; and to deſtroy in every city all thoſe that had oppoſed his party, or were upon any account obnoxious to the houſe of Macedon. And thus many of thoſe unhappy men, taken away by violence from the temples, and torn even from the altars, loſt their lives in torture: while others were compelled to fly, and found no ſafety for themſelves in any part of Greece. Ætolia alone afforded to ſome of them a place of refuge. The actions of Caſſander and Demetrius, and thoſe of Antigonus Gonatas, are ſtill recent in the memory of all. Under theſe princes garriſons were eſtabliſhed, and tyrants ſupported in every place. Not a ſingle city was exempted from the name of ſervitude. But let me now paſs on to that laſt

laſt action of Antigonus: which, while it is viewed without ſuſpicion, may lead ſome of you perhaps to think, that you owe an obligation to the Macedonians. Was it then to ſave the Achæan ſtates, that this prince took arms againſt you in the Social War? Or was it to free the Lacedæmonians from the tyranny of Cleomenes? By no means ſurely: it would be too great ſimplicity to ſuppoſe it. But he foreſaw, that, if you ever ſhould obtain the ſupreme command in Peloponneſus, his own kingdom would be expoſed to danger. He had remarked alſo the great talents of Cleomenes; as well as the ſucceſs with which fortune ſeemed to favour your deſigns. It was fear therefore on the one hand, and jealouſy on the other, that urged him to enter Peloponneſus with an army: not to ſuccour the inhabitants of that country; but to deſtroy your expectations, and to humble your growing power. If the Macedonians therefore, when they were maſters of your city, did not ſuffer it to be pillaged; yet you ought not ſo much to love them on account of that kindneſs, as you ought to hate, and to conſider them as your enemies, becauſe they have been upon many occaſions the only obſtacle that prevented you from obtaining the ſove-

reignty of Greece. With reſpect to the profligacy of the preſent Philip, this alſo is too notorious to need any long diſcuſſion. The ravages which he committed in the temple of Thermum are a ſufficient proof of his impiety towards the Gods: and his perfidious treatment of the Meſſenians his allies, an example no leſs evident of the cruelty of his diſpoſition with reſpect to men. Now the Ætolians alone, of all the Greeks, had the courage openly to defy Antipater; and afford a refuge to thoſe who had been rendered miſerable by his injuſtice. The Ætolians alone oppoſed the invaſion of Brennus and the barbarous Gauls. And laſtly, they alone, of all whom you invited, were willing to aſſiſt you with their arms, in recovering again that ſupreme dominion which your anceſtors had held over the reſt of Greece. But enough has been ſaid upon this ſubject. With regard to the preſent deliberation, your votes indeed and your decrees muſt import a declaration of war. And yet it is by no means probable, that a war will be the conſequence. For it is not to be ſuppoſed, that the Achæans, weakened as they are by former loſſes, will attempt to invade your territory: but rather, that they will eſteem it as a favour from the Gods, if, when they find them-

themſelves ſurrounded on every ſide by the Eleans and Meſſenians our allies, as well as by our armies, they may be able to preſerve their own. I am perſuaded likewiſe that the ardour of Philip will be at laſt abated; when the Ætolians ſhall attack him upon land, and the Romans and king Attalus upon the ſea. It is eaſy indeed to conjecture what will happen, from that which has already been experienced. For if this prince, when the Ætolians only were his enemies, was never able to ſubdue them; how is it to be imagined that he can maintain a war, in which ſo many different powers are combined againſt him?

Thus then have I endeavoured to ſhew, that, even if you had not been bound by any treaty and the matter had been ſtill intire, you ought rather to join your arms with the Ætolians, than with the Macedonians. But ſince in fact you already are engaged, and have determined on the part that you would take, what room is there left for any more debate? If indeed the treaty which now ſubſiſts between you and us had been earlier than the kindneſs that was ſhewn towards you by Antigonus; there might then perhaps have been ſome pretence to doubt, whether, in favour of more recent benefits,

you ought not to overlook in ſome degree your former obligations. But if, after you had received this ſo much boaſted liberty and ſafety, theſe benefits with which you are continually reproached, you aſſembled your council to deliberate, whether you ſhould enter into an alliance with the Ætolians or the Macedonians; if, after frequent conſultation, you gave the preference to the former; if you confirmed your alliance with them by exchanging mutual pledges of fidelity; and even aſſiſted them with your forces in the late war againſt the Macedonians; what reaſonable doubt can now remain? By theſe tranſactions, your obligations to Antigonus and to Philip all were cancelled. It ſhould therefore now be ſhewn, that, ſince that period, you either have received ſome injury from the Ætolians, or ſome new favour from the Macedonians. But ſince neither of theſe can be pretended, what folly is it to ſuppoſe, that, in violation of oaths and treaties, the very ſtrongeſt bands that unite mankind, you will now become confederates with a people, whoſe alliance you before rejected with juſtice, even when you might have embraced it without reproach."

Here Chlæneas ended his harangue, which ſeemed not eaſy to be refuted.

Lyciſcus,

Lyciſcus, the ambaſſadour of the Acarnanians, then came forwards in the aſſembly. For ſome time he pauſed; obſerving that the people were diſcourſing together on what they had heard. But as ſoon as they were ſilent, he began in the following manner.

CHAP. II.

"I AM ſent to you, Lacedæmonians, by the ſtates of Acarnania, on the part of that Republick. But as we have been almoſt always joined together with the Macedonians in the ſame common hopes, we conſider this embaſſy alſo as common both to them and to ourſelves. For as, in the time of war, the ſuperior ſtrength and greatneſs of the Macedonian power has made our ſtate to be dependent on the proweſs of their arms; ſo, in the buſineſs of negotiation likewiſe, the intereſts of the Acarnanians are by conſequence included in the Macedonian rights. You will not therefore think it ſtrange, if a great part of my diſcourſe ſhould be employed on Philip and the Macedonians.

Chlæneas then, in the concluſion of his harangue, very ſhortly ſtated the nature of

your preſent obligations. If, ſaid he, ſince the time when you entered into treaty with the Ætolians, you had either ſuffered any injury or inſult from that people, or received any new kindneſs from the Macedonians, this matter would then perhaps have remained intire for your deliberation. But as nothing of that kind has happened, it is the very height of folly in us to believe, that, by alledging only thoſe old benefits which you had before experienced from Antigonus, we can prevail upon you to violate oaths and treaties. For my part indeed, I am ready to confeſs, that, if nothing new had happened, and if the affairs of Greece had remained ſtill in the condition in which they ſtood when you concluded your alliance with the Ætolians, there would be great weakneſs in the attempt; and all that I am prepared to ſay would be impertinent and vain. But if things are now in a different ſtate, as I ſhall ſhew in the progreſs of this diſcourſe, you will then, I doubt not be convinced, that I am able to point out to you your true intereſt, and that Chlæneas is unacquainted with it. For the ſole deſign and purpoſe of this embaſſy, is to demonſtrate to you, if it be poſſible, from a view of the dangers with which Greece is threatened, that the part moſt

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ſuitable and advantageous, the part moſt honourable and moſt worthy for you to take, is to join yourſelves now with us in the ſame common hopes: or, if that cannot be otained, at leaſt to remain quiet during theſe diſputes. But ſince thoſe who oppoſe us have dared to load the houſe of Macedon with various accuſations from the earlieſt time; I muſt alſo firſt look backwards, and endeavour to remove the falſe perſuaſion of thoſe perſons, who may have yielded an implicit credit to all that they have heard.

It was aſſerted then by Chlæneas, that Philip the ſon of Amyntas, having rendered himſelf maſter of Olynthus, took occaſion from that ſucceſs to reduce all Theſſaly beneath his yoke. But I on the contrary affirm, that not the people of Theſſaly alone, but all the reſt of the Greeks were indebted to Philip for their ſafety. For when Onomarchus and Philomelus had taken Delphi, and ſeized with ſacrilegious violence all the treaſures of the God; who does not know, that their power appeared ſo formidable, that not a ſingle ſtate had the courage to ſtand before them: and that it was even feared, that this impious outrage would be ſoon followed alſo by the conqueſt of all Greece? At this time it was, that Phi-

lip offered himſelf uncalled; deſtroyed the tyrants; ſecured the temple againſt future inſults; and preſerved the Grecian liberty. That this is the truth, the fact that followed will ſerve as a teſtimony to all poſterity. For the Greeks, not regarding him as the oppreſſor of Theſſaly, as Chlæneas had the confidence to affirm, but as the benefactor of all Greece, conferred an honour upon him which had no example, and with one voice declared him General of their armies both by land and ſea. But Philip alſo invaded the Lacedæmonian territory with an army. Yet you all know, that it was not with any purpoſe of his own that he took this meaſure. But having been invited, and often called upon by name, by his allies and friends in Peloponneſus, he at laſt conſented to it with reluctance. And what was his conduct, Chlæneas, after he arrived? Inſtead of complying with the deſires, inſtead of gratifying the reſentments of the neighbouring ſtates, by waſting the lands, and humbling the power of Sparta, he forced his allies, as well as his enemies, to embrace ſuch meaſures as the common intereſt required, and to ſubmit their ſeveral pretenſions to a fair diſcuſſion. Nor did he even aſſume to himſelf the right of judging in their diſputes

putes: but referred them to all the deciſion of the general ſtates of Greece. How proper a ſubject is this for cenſure. Thus again, you have loaded Alexander with reproaches, becauſe he inflicted that upniſhment upon the Thebans, which their ill conduct ſeemed to have deſerved: but have paſſed over in ſilence, in what manner he revenged the injuries with which the Perſians had inſulted Greece: and that he delivered you all from the greateſt evils, by conquering thoſe barbarians, and by taking from them the riches which they had employed to corrupt the Greeks, and to ſet one ſtate in war againſt another; ſometimes the Athenians againſt the anceſtors of theſe very Lacedæmonians, and ſometimes again, the Thebans; and in a word, that he reduced all Aſia beneath the Grecian yoke? And how is it that you have the confidence to mention likewiſe the ſucceeding princes; who, as conjunctures varied, have been the authors indeed of evil as well as of good to different people. But, whatever reſentment may be allowed upon this account to others, it never can be born that you, the Ætolians, ſhould of all men be ſuffered to complain: you, by whom ſo many have been injured, and who never have been the occaſion of good to any. For

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who were thoſe, that invited Antigonus the ſon of Demetrius to aſſiſt them in diſſolving the confederacy of the Achæan ſtates? Who entered into treaty with Alexander of Epirus, to ſhare with him the cities of Acarnania, and to ſell the inhabitants as ſlaves? Was it not you? Who ever placed at the head of their armies ſuch Generals as your nation has employed? Men, who dared to plunder even thoſe ſacred temples, which have always been eſteemed to be moſt ſecure from violence. Such was Timæus, who pillaged the temple of Neptune at Tænarum, and that of Diana at Luſſi. Such were Pharycus and Policritus; the firſt of whom ſpoiled the temple of Juno at Argos, and the other that of Neptune in Mantinea. Such alſo were Lattabus and Nicoſtratus; who, with a perfidy equal to that of Gauls or Scythians, attacked the Bœotians in the midſt of peace, when they were met together in their general aſſembly. Have the ſucceſſors of Alexander ever committed outrages like theſe? Being conſcious therefore that ſuch actions can neither be defended nor excuſed, you now pretend to boaſt, that you withſtood the irruption of the Gauls at Delphi, and were the means of preſerving Greece. But if the Greeks owe

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any thing to the Ætolians on account of that ſingle ſervice, how greatly muſt they be indebted to the Macedonians, who employ continually their whole life and ſtrength, in ſecuring them againſt the efforts of barbarous nations? For who does not know, that Greece would be expoſed to perpetual danger, if the zeal of the Macedonian kings, and the bulwark of their empire, were not our protection. Let me mention only one ſignal inſtance When the Gauls, after they had defeated Ptolemy ſurnamed Ceraunus, had no longer any cauſe to dread the Macedonians, they deſpiſed all other powers, and immediately led their army, with Brennus at their head, into the very midſt of Greece. The ſame misfortune muſt frequently have happened, if the Macedonians had not in all times been the barrier of this country. Much more might be urged concerning the tranſactions of thoſe ancient times: but this that I have ſaid may be ſufficient. You object impiety to the ſecond Philip, becauſe he deſtroyed a ſingle temple: but make no mention of the ſacrilegious violence, which yourſelves had exerciſed againſt the holy ſhrines in Dium and Dodona, and againſt the edifices of the gods. And yet this ſhould have been firſt recounted. But you, reciting only your

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own ſufferings, and exaggerating them far beyond the bounds of truth, paſs over in ſilence thoſe much greater evils which you had before inflicted upon others; as well knowing, that, in the judgement of mankind, all ſubſequent injuries are with reaſon aſcribed to thoſe who ſet the firſt example of outrage and injuſtice. With reſpect to the conduct of Antigonus, I ſhall ſo far only mention it, that I may not appear to think too lightly of what was then tranſacted, or to ſet too ſmall a value upon ſo great a ſervice. A greater indeed is ſcarcely to be found in hiſtory. It was in a word an action that can never be ſurpaſſed. For conſider it, Lacedæmonians, as it happened. Antigonus was engaged in war againſt you. He defeated your army in a ſet battle. Your city and all your territory were wholly in his power. It might then have been expected, that he would have uſed all the rights of conqueſt. But ſo far was he from employing againſt you any act of hardſhip or oppreſſion, that on the contrary, beſide other benefits, he drove out your tyrant, and reſtored again thoſe laws and that form of government, which your anceſtors had eſtabliſhed. In return for this great kindneſs, yourſelves alſo publickly proclaimed him your benefactor and your

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preſerver, in the preſence of all the ſtates of Greece. What then, O Lacedæmonians, ſhould have been your conduct after ſuch an action? Suffer me, I intreat you, to ſpeak my ſentiments with freedom: not for the ſake of loading you with any unſeaſonable reproach; but becauſe the preſent conjuncture obliges me to declare what the common intereſt requires. What is it then that I muſt ſay? That, even in the former war, the Macedonians, and not the Ætolians, were the people with whom you ſhould have joined your arms: and that now again, when you are invited, your alliance ſhould be made with Philip, and not with the Ætolians. But this, it will be ſaid, would be a violation of the faith of treaties. Which then is the greateſt crime? To pay no regard to a convention which you concluded privately with the Ætolians; or to tranſgreſs a treaty that was ratified in the preſence of all the Greeks; was inſcribed upon a column; and conſecrated with religious rites? And how is it that you are more afraid of ſlighting a people from whom you have received no benefit; than of being wanting in reſpect to Philip and the Macedonians, to whoſe favour you are indebted even for the power of holding this aſſembly? Can you think it

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neceſſary that you ſhould ſatisfy your engagements with your friends; and not rather that you ſhould diſcharge your obligations to thoſe who have preſerved you? To obſerve a written treaty is certainly an action not ſo pious, as it is impious to to take arms againſt thoſe who have ſaved you from deſtruction. Yet this is what the Ætolians now ſollicit you to do. But I ſhall add no more upon this head. What I have already urged may be thought perhaps, by thoſe who judge according to their prejudices, to be too diſtant from the preſent ſubject. I return therefore to the principles that were firſt aſſumed; and to that which themſelves acknowledge to be the chief point in this debate. That, if the affairs of Greece remain ſtill in the ſame condition in which they ſtood when you concluded your alliance with the Ætolians, you ought to conſider yourſelves as bound by thoſe engagements. But if on the contrary the ſtate of things be intirely changed, you may then with juſtice deliberate freely on the part which you are now preſſed to take. I aſk you then, Cleonicus and Chlæneas; who were then your allies, when you prevailed on the Lacedæmonians to act in conjunction with you? Were they not all Greeks? And with whom are you at this time

joined? And into what confederacy do you now invite this people? Is it not into a confederacy with barbarians? Is the condition then of your affairs the ſame as before? Is it not intirely the reverſe? At that time, you contended only for the honour of obtaining the ſupreme command in Greece, againſt others of the ſame race and country; the Achæans, and the Macedonians, with Philip at their head. But the end and tendency of the preſent war is to bring the Greeks themſelves into ſubjection to a foreign enemy. To an enemy, whom in appearance indeed you have invited only to oppoſe the deſigns of Philip; but whom in fact you have armed, without perceiving it, both againſt yourſelves, and againſt all the inhabitants of Greece. For as it is often ſeen in the time of war, that thoſe who, with a view to their preſent ſafety, admit too ſtrong a garriſon within their walls, at the ſame time that they ſecure themſelves againſt their enemies, become ſubject to the power of their friends; juſt ſo will it happen, from the conduct which the Ætolians now purſue. For, while their deſign is only to weaken Philip, and to humble the power of the Macedonians, they obſerve not that the cloud, which they are drawing hither from the Weſt, though

though at firſt perhaps it may only darken Macedon, will in its progreſs ſhed the heavieſt evils upon all the Greeks. It is the duty therefore of them all, to foreſee in time the approaching ſtorm: and upon none is this duty more incumbent, than upon you, O Lacedæmonians. For what, do you ſuppoſe, were the ſentiments of your anceſtors, when they thruſt into a well, and threw earth upon the head of the meſſenger that was ſent to them by Xerxes to demand earth and water; and then bade him tell his maſter, that the Lacedæmonians had given him earth and water agreeably to his demand? What again was their intention, when Leonidas and all his army expoſed themſelves by their own free choice to certain death? Was it not to declare, that the Lacedæmonians would ſtand the foremoſt, in maintaining not only their own liberty, but that alſo of all the Greeks? And ſhall now the deſcendants of men like theſe conclude a treaty with a barbarous nation; and join them in making war againſt the Epirots, the Acæans, the Acarnanians, the Bœotians, the Theſſalians; in a word, againſt almoſt every people of Greece, except the Ætolians? Let the Ætolians themſelves commit ſuch baſeneſs; for they are accuſtomed to think

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no action diſhonourable, that can ſatisfy their deſire of gain. But theſe are not the manners of the Lacedæmonians. And what may it not be expected that the Ætolians will attempt, when joined in an alliance with the Romans: they, who, with the aſſiſtance of the Illyrians only, made an attack upon Pylus from the ſea, in contempt of treaties; and, by land, laid ſiege to Clitor, and carried the inhabitants of Cynætha into ſlavery? Can it be doubted, that, as they before formed the project of ſharing with Antigonus the cities of Acarnania and Achaia, they have now concluded a like agreement with the Romans with reſpect to the whole of Greece? Can any one be warned of ſuch deſigns, and not dread the arrival of the Romans? And muſt we not deteſt that ſenſeleſs profligacy, which has led the Ætolians into this alliance? They have already taken Naxus and Oeniade from the Acarnanians. Not long before, they attacked Anticyra in conjunction with the Romans. And when the city was ſubdued, the women and the children were carried away captives by the Romans, and reſerved for all that wretchedneſs, which thoſe who fall into the power of a foreign enemy are condemned to ſuffer; while the Ætolians divided the

houſes among themſelves by lot. Is this then an alliance worthy to be approved? Or can the Lacedæmonians, above all others, determine to embrace it? Thoſe Lacedæmonians, who, when the Perſians invaded Greece, reſolved by a publick decree, that, as ſoon as they ſhould have conquered the barbarians, they would devote a tenth part of the Thebans victims to the Gods, becauſe this people alone, though compelled by neceſſity to remain quiet, had taken no part in the war. Conſider therefore, I intreat you, what your own honour, and your own dignity require. Let the remembrance of your anceſtors, your apprehenſion of the power of the Romans, your jealouſy of the pernicious conduct of the Ætolians, and, above the reſt, your ſenſe of the great kindneſs that was ſhewn towards you by Antigonus, prevail with you ſtill to be the friends of virtuous actions. In a word, reject all alliance with the Ætolians, and join yourſelves to the Achæans and the Macedonians. Or, if thoſe who poſſeſs the greateſt power among you ſhould obſtruct that meaſure, reſolve to remain quiet in this conjuncture, and make not yourſelves confederates in the unjuſt deſigns of the Ætolians."

EXTRACT the SEVENTH.

The ſiege of Echinus by Philip.

PHILIP, having reſolved to make his approaches againſt Echinus in the part of the two towers, ordered a tortoiſe and a battering-ram to be raiſed before each of them, and a gallery to be conducted from one ram to the other, oppoſite to the ſpace that was between the towers, and parallel to the wall. The work, being completed according to this deſign, was in its form and aſpect not unlike to the city. For as the buildings upon the tortoiſes, from the ſtructure of the hurdles of which they were compoſed, had the figure and appearance of towers; ſo the gallery that was between, being formed into battlements at the top, bore no leſs reſemblance to a wall. In the loweſt part of theſe towers were placed ſome pioneers, who filled up the inequalities of the ground with earth, that the rollers might move freely. Here alſo the motions of the rams were regulated. Upon the ſecond ſtage, together with ſome catapults, there were veſſels filled with water; and other preparations

for ſecuring the building againſt fire. Upon the third, which was equal in height to the towers of the city, ſtood a body of ſoldiers, ready to engage with thoſe that ſhould attempt to obſtruct the motions of the rams. From the gallery that was between the towers two trenches were opened, and carried forwards to the wall of the city; and in theſe there were three batteries of baliſtæ; one of which threw ſtones of the weight of a talent, and the other two, ſtones of thirty pounds. From the camp to the towers on either ſide was a covered paſſage; that the ſoldiers might paſs from the army to the works, or return back again from the works to the camp, without being expoſed to the darts of the beſieged. Theſe works were all completed in very few days; becauſe the country afforded all things that were neceſſary for the purpoſe in the greateſt plenty. For Echinus is ſituated upon the Malian gulph, oppoſite to Thronium, and looks towards the ſouth. The ſoil alſo around it is extremely fertile. Philip therefore was readily ſupplied with all things that were requiſite for ſuch an undertaking. And when he had completed his works in the manner that has been now deſcribed, he began without delay to attack the city.

EXTRACT the EIGHTH.

The ſources and courſe of the Euphrates.

THE river Euphrates has its ſources in Armenia; and, flowing from thence through Syria and the neighbouring country, paſſes on to Babylon. It is thought that it diſcharges itſelf at laſt into the Red-ſea. But this is not the truth. For it ſpends itſelf in channels which are cut through the country, and is exhauſted before it can reach the ſea. This river is different in two reſpects from almoſt all other rivers. The ſtreams of other rivers are uſually increaſed, in proportion as they flow through a larger tract of country. Their waters alſo are fulleſt in the winter, and loweſt in the height of ſummer. But the Euphrates on the contrary is fulleſt at the time of the riſing of the dog-ſtar; is no where ſo large as in Syria; and in its farther progreſs is continually diminiſhed. The cauſe of this difference is, that the increaſe of its waters is not made by the winter rains, but by the melting of the ſnows in ſummer. And the ſtream as it advances, is diminiſhed,

by being turned aſide, and divided into other ſtreams, for the purpoſe of watering the country. From hence alſo it happens, that the tranſportation of armies down the Euphrates is in thoſe parts extremely tedious; the veſſels being ſo deeply loaded, and the river ſo low, that the force of the ſtream affords but little aſſiſtance in the navigation.

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GENERAL HISTORY

OF

POLYBIUS.

BOOK the TENTH.

EXTRACT the FIRST.

The advantages of Tarentum with reſpect to commerce.

ALONG that whole ſide of Italy, which looks towards the ſea of Sicily and the coaſts of Greece, though the extent of it, from the ſtraits of Rhegium to Tarentum, be more than two thouſand ſtadia, there is not to be found a ſingle harbour, except that of the laſt mentioned city. But the country itſelf is inhabited by a very numerous people; compoſed partly of barbarians, and partly of ſome of the moſt conſiderable colonies

from Greece. Among the former are the Brutians, the Lucanians, a part of the Samnites, the Calabrians, and many other nations. The Grecian cities are Rhegium, Caulonia, Locri, Croton, Metapontum, and Thurium. The merchants therefore that come from Greece, to trade with any of the people who are ſituated along this coaſt, are obliged to bring their veſſels into the harbour of Tarentum, and to make all their exchange and traffick in that city. It may be judged what great advantages muſt ariſe from ſuch a ſituation, if we conſider only the flouriſhing condition of the inhabitants of Croton. For this people, with the convenience only of ſome places which afford an anchorage in the ſummer, and which cannot be compared in any reſpect with the harbour of Tarentum, though they are viſited but by a very ſmall number of ſhips, have drawn to themſelves great wealth. The advantages alſo of its ſituation, with reſpect to the ports of the Adriatic ſea, are ſtill very conſiderable; though not ſo great as in former times. For before Brunduſium was built, all the veſſels that came from the oppoſite coaſt, which lies between Sipontum and the Iapygian promontory, towards this part of Italy, directed their courſe always to Tarentum

tum, and uſed that city as the market for vending all their merchandize. Fabius therefore, conſidering this paſſage as an object of great importance, neglected every other care, and employed all his thoughts to guard it.

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EXTRACT the SECOND.

The Character of Publius Scipio illuſtrated by ſome of the earlieſt Actions of his life. His expedition into Spain. He renders himſelf maſter of New Carthage. Inſtances of his humanity, moderation, and continence.

CHAP. I.

AS I am now going to relate the things that were performed by Publius Scipio in Spain, and to give alſo a ſhort and general account of all the other actions of his life, it will firſt, I think, be neceſſary to lead the reader into ſome acquaintance with the character and the natural diſpoſition of this commander. For as he has ſurpaſſed almoſt all that lived before him in the celebrity of his name, there are ſcarcely any that have not a deſire to know, what manner of man he was; and by what abilities, natural or acquired, he accompliſhed ſo many, and ſuch great exploits. But they are forced either to remain in ignorance, or

or to form at leaſt a very falſe opinion concerning him, becauſe the writers of his life have themſelves wandered widely from the truth. That this cenſure is not ill grounded, will be manifeſt to every one, who is able to conſider with a juſt attention the account which I ſhall give even of the greateſt and the moſt aſtoniſhing of all his actions.

Theſe writers then have all of them concurred in repreſenting Scipio to us, as one of thoſe favourites of fortune, who by a kind of ſpontaneous hazard, and in ſeeming oppoſition to the rules of reaſon, conduct all their undertakings to the deſired end. They think, that men of this ſort have ſomething in them more admirable and more divine, than thoſe who follow the guidance of reaſon in every action. They conſider not, that one of the things here mentioned is barely to be fortunate; and that the other is worthy of praiſe; that the firſt is common even to the moſt vulgar of mankind; while the latter is the portion of thoſe alone who excell in ſenſe and underſtanding: and that theſe laſt are to be regarded as approaching neareſt to divine, and as the higheſt in favour of the Gods.

To me it ſeems, that there is a great reſemblance, both in character and in conduct

conduct, between Scipio and Lycurgus, the legiſlator of the Lacedæmonians. For it muſt not be imagined, either that Lycurgus, by ſuperſtitiouſly conſulting upon upon all occaſions the Pythian prieſteſs, was taught to frame the Spartan government; or that Scipio was directed by dreams and omens to thoſe great actions, which ſo much enlarged the empire of his country. But becauſe they both were ſenſible, that the greateſt part of men are not eaſily engaged in new and unuſual deſigns, and fear to expoſe themſelves to manifeſt danger, unleſs they have ſome reaſon to expect that they ſhall be aſſiſted by the Gods; the firſt, by joining the authority of the Prieſteſs to all that he propoſed, rendered his own deſigns more worthy of credit, and more eaſy to be received; and the other, by cheriſhing an opinion in the multitude, that he was ſupported in all his undertakings by a ſupernatural aid, inſpired thoſe that were under his command with greater confidence, and made them more eager to engage even in the moſt difficult attempts.

That this great commander was conducted in every action by ſound ſenſe and prudence, and that his undertakings always were attended with ſucceſs, becauſe in reaſon they deſerved it, will ſufficiently

ently appear from the facts that will be hereafter mentioned. The generoſity and magnanimity, that were ſo conſpicuous in his character, are indeed acknowledged by all. But the readineſs of his conception, the ſobriety of his judgement, and the extreme attention with which his underſtanding was directed to the object which it had in view, have remained ſtill unknown; or been known to thoſe alone, who lived in friendſhip with him, and had the opportunity of beholding him in the neareſt light. Among thoſe was Caius Lælius: who was a witneſs to all his words and actions from his childhood to his death. And he it was, who firſt raiſed in me that opinion of this General which I now have mentioned. For all that he related to me concerning him was extremely probable, and perfectly conſiſtent with the actions which he performed.

The firſt thing, as he informed me, which diſtinguiſhed Scipio, was his behaviour at the time of the engagement between Annibal and his father with the cavalry near the river Po. He was then but ſeventeen years old: and, becauſe this was his firſt campaign, he was attended by a troop of ſelect horſemen as a guard. In the battle, perceiving that his father

father with only two or three of the cavalry was incloſed by a large body of the enemy, and was already dangerouſly wounded, he at firſt exhorted his little troop to go to his aſſiſtance. And when theſe for ſome time heſitated, becauſe the numbers that had ſurrounded the Conſul were ſo great, himſelf with the moſt deſperate fury drove his horſe into the middle of the combatants. His attendants alſo being then forced to join him in the charge, the whole body of the enemy was parted by the ſhock: and the Conſul, being thus unexpectedly reſcued from deſtruction, was the firſt to proclaim aloud, that he owed his preſervation to his ſon. As by this action he acquired the reputation of a man whoſe courage was not to be doubted; ſo, in the ſubſequent parts of his life, whenever his country repoſed all her hopes upon him, he was ready to throw himſelf without reſerve into every kind of danger. This ſurely is not the conduct of a man who truſts himſelf to fortune; but of a commander who is guided by ſound ſenſe and prudence.

Some time after this action, his elder brother Lucius was a candidate for the Ædileſhip; which is one of the moſt honourable dignities among the Romans. The

The cuſtom was, to elect two Patricians into this office: and at this time there were many candidates. At firſt Scipio had not the confidence to offer himſelf a candidate for this magiſtracy in conjunction with his brother. But as the time of the election came near, perceiving that the people were not diſpoſed to favour the intereſts of his brother, but that himſelf ſtood very high in their eſteem, he judged that the only way of obtaining the Ædileſhip for his brother would be that both of them ſhould ſue for it together. He employed therefore the following method. As his father was at this time gone to take the command in Spain, the conſent of his mother alone was neceſſary to be gained. Obſerving then, that ſhe was buſied every day in viſiting the temples, and in offering ſacrifices to the gods in favour of his brother; and that her mind was filled with anxious expectation concerning the event; he told her, that he had dreamed the ſame dream twice. That it had ſeemed to him; that he was thoſen Ædile with his brother: and that, as they returned home from the Forum together, ſhe had met them at the door, and had embraced and kiſſed them. The female heart was touched in a moment by this

ſtory. Oh, ſhe excaimed, that I might but ſee that day. Do you conſent then, mother, continued he, that we make the trial? And when ſhe replied, that ſhe conſented; not ſuſpecting, as he was then extremely young, that he would have the boldneſs to attempt it; but believing only that he ſpoke in jeſt; he ordered a white gown to be prepared, ſuch as the candidates for offices are accuſtomed to wear. His mother reflected no more on what had paſſed. But Scipio in the morning while ſhe was aſleep, for the firſt time put on the gown, and went into the Forum. The people, ſtruck with the unexpected ſight, and who before had entertained ſtrong prejudices in his favour, received him with acclamations and applauſe. He advanced to the place in which the candidates were ranged; and, ſtanding on the ſide of his brother, obtained not only his own election, but that of his brother alſo in conſideration of himſelf. They then returned home together Ædiles. The news being carried to the mother, ſhe ran full of joy, and meeting them at the door, kiſſed both her ſons with tranſport.

From this accident, an opinion prevailed among all who heard the ſtory of theſe dreams, that Scipio, not only when he was aſleep, but in his waking moments

ments alſo, and in the time of day, held familiar converſe with the gods. It was no dream however, that gave him any aſſiſtance in this buſineſs. But being by nature generous, magnificent, and courteous in his addreſs, he had before conciliated the favour of the multitude. Add to this, that he had alſo the ſkill to chooſe his proper time, both with the people and his mother. By theſe means it was, that he not only obtained his purpoſe; but was judged to have acted under the impulſe of a divine admonition. For it is uſual with men, who, through the fault of their own nature, and from a want either of activity or of ſkill, are unable to view diſtinctly the times, the cauſes, and the courſe of actions, to aſcribe thoſe events to the gods and fortune, which are accompliſhed only by the ready and dexterous management of ſound ſenſe and reaſon. I thought it neceſſary to make theſe reflections, that my readers might not be ſo far miſled by the opinion which is falſly propagated concerning Scipio, as to overlook what was brighteſt and moſt admirable in his character; I mean, his dexterity, and his unwearied application to affairs. In how high a degree he poſſeſſed theſe qualities, will be more clearly ſeen from the tranſactions of the Hiſtory, to which I now return.

CHAP. II.

SCIPIO, having aſſembed the troops together, exhorted them not to be diſheartened by the loſs which they had ſuſtained. "That their defeat was by no means to be aſcribed to the ſuperior courage of the Carthaginians; but was occaſioned only by the treachery of the Spaniards, and the imprudent diviſion, which the Generals, repoſing too great a confidence in the alliance of that people, had made of their forces. That the Carthaginians themſelves were now in the ſame condition with reſpect to both theſe circumſtances. For, beſides that they were divided into ſeparate camps, they had alſo alienated by injurious treatment the affections of their allies, and had rendered them their enemies. That from hence it had happened, that one part of the Spaniards had already ſent deputies to the Romans; and that the reſt, as ſoon as the Romans ſhould have paſſed the river, would haſten with alacrity to join them; not ſo much indeed from any motive of affection, as from a deſire to revenge the inſults which they had ſuffered from the Carthaginians. That there was

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ſtill another circumſtance, even of greater moment. That the diſſenſion which prevailed among their leaders, would prevent the enemy from uniting their whole ſtrength in an engagement: and, if they ſhould venture on a battle with divided forces, that they would then moſt eaſily be defeated. That, with all theſe advantages in proſpect, they ſhould now therefore paſs the river with the greateſt confidence; and leave to himſelf, and to the reſt of the commanders, the whole care of what was afterwards to be done."

After this diſcourſe, he left Marcus, who was joined with him in the command, with a body of three thouſand foot and five hundred horſe, to protect the allies that were on this ſide of the Iberus; and then paſſed the river with the reſt of the forces, having concealed from every perſon his true intention. For he had determined not to do any of thoſe things which he had ſuggeſted to the army. His real deſign was ſuddenly to inveſt New Carthage.

And here we may firſt remark a moſt ſignal proof of that peculiar diſpoſition which I have aſcribed to Scipio. For firſt, though he was now no more than twenty-ſeven years old, he took upon himſelf the conduct of a war, which,

from the ill ſucceſs that had attended it, all other perſons had concluded to be deſperate. In the next place, when he had engaged himſelf in this deſign, inſtead of purſuing the moſt obvious and common meaſures, he formed a plan of action, which was alike impenetrable to his own army, and unſuſpected by the enemy. And with reſpect to both theſe points, he was determined by the moſt ſolid reaſons. While he was ſtill at Rome, he informed himſelf of the true ſtate of things, by a moſt careful and exact inquiry. And being aſſured, that the treachery only of the Spaniards, and the diviſion of the Roman armies, had occaſioned the misfortune of his father, he neither feared the Carthaginians, not yielded to that deſpondency with which others were poſſeſſed. When he was afterwards alſo told, that the allies on this ſide of the Iberus remained ſtill conſtant in the Roman friendſhip; that the Carthaginian Generals were broken by diſſenſions; and that they treated the people who had ſubmitted to them with great ſeverity; he ſet out upon the expedition with full confidence of ſucceſs: not building his expectations upon fortune, but upon the views which reaſon had ſuggeſted to him. As ſoon as he arrived in Spain, renewing his

his inquiries in every part with the greateſt diligence he was informed, that the Carthaginian army was divided into three ſeparate bodies. That Mago, at the head of one, was poſted beyond the pillars of Hercules, in the territory of the Conians; that the ſecond, under the command of Aſdrubal the ſon of Geſco, was incamped in Luſitania near the mouth of the river: that the other Aſdrubal, with the third, was laying ſiege to a town in the Carpetanian diſtrict: and that each of theſe different bodies was diſtant full ten days march from the city of New Carthage. He conſidered therefore with himſelf, that, as it would be much too dangerous both on account of the late defeats, and becauſe the enemy alſo were far ſuperior to him in their numbers, to venture on a ſet engagement againſt their united forces; ſo, on the other hand, if he ſhould attack either of theſe ſeparate bodies, there was reaſon to fear, that, while the body attacked might retire and decline the fight, the reſt alſo would be able to advance: and that, being thus incloſed on every ſide, he ſhould fall into the ſame calamity which had been ſo fatal to his father and his uncle. Upon theſe conſiderations, he rejected the deſign of an engagement, and turned all his

thoughts towards New Carthage: a place, which, as he very well knew, brought many advantages to the enemy, as well as great detriment to the Romans, in the progreſs of the war.

For, while he remained in winter quarters, having endeavoured to obtain from the priſoners a minute and particular knowledge of every thing that related to this city, he found, that it was almoſt the only place upon the coaſt of Spain, that afforded a harbour capable of receiving a fleet and naval forces: that it was ſo ſituated, that the Carthaginians might paſs over to it from Afric with the greateſt eaſe; that large ſums of money alſo, and all the baggage of the army were at this time in it; together with all the hoſtages, which the Carthaginians had taken from the cities of Spain. He learned likewiſe, what was ſtill of greater importance, that the garriſon conſiſted only of a thouſand ſoldiers, appointed to defend the citadel. For it never had been conceived, that, while the Carthaginians were maſters of almoſt the whole of Spain, any attempt would be made to lay ſiege to this city. That the multitude of the other inhabitants indeed was very great: but that they were all artificers, labourers, or ſeamen; deſtitute of all experience in the

affairs

affairs of war; and who would rather facilitate, than obſtruct, his attempt againſt the city, if he ſhould appear unexpectedly before it. He knew the manner likewiſe in which the city was ſituated: the fortications by which it was defended: and the nature of the lake that ſurrounded it. For ſome fiſhermen, who frequented the place, had informed him, that the lake in general was marſhy; and that it was alſo fordable, as often as the tide retired; which uſually happened every day near the time of evening. From all theſe circumſtances he concluded, that ſucceſs in this attempt would not only bring a heavy loſs upon the enemy, but tend greatly to advance his own affairs: and that, if he ſhould fail, he might at leaſt be able, as he was maſter of the ſea, to withdraw the troops in ſafety; taking care only to ſecure his camp againſt any inſult. And this it would be eaſy to accompliſh, becauſe the forces of the enemy were at ſo great a diſtance. Laying aſide therefore all other thoughts, he employed himſelf, while he was in winter quarters, in making preparations for the ſiege. And though he had formed ſo great a deſign, and was only of the age that has been mentioned, he concealed his intention from every perſon, except from Caius

Lælius, till the time came in which he judged it neceſſary to diſcloſe it.

Now it is generally acknowledged by Hiſtorians, that theſe were the reaſons which determined the conduct of Scipio upon this occaſion. And yet when they had gone thus far, they in the end, I know not how, aſcribe the ſucceſs that followed, not to the prudence of the commander, but to the interpoſition of the gods and fortune. But this opinion, as it is deſtitute of all ſupport from probability, or from the teſtimony of thoſe who lived at the time, is refuted alſo by the letters which Scipio himſelf wrote to Philip; in which he expreſsly declares, that in every thing that concerned his expedition into Spain, and more particularly in his reſolution to attack New Carthage, he was determined wholly by thoſe conſiderations which have been here recited. Let us now attend to the ſiege.

CHAP. III.

SCIPIO then, having given ſecret orders to Caius Lælius, who alone, as we have ſaid, was acquainted with his deſign, to ſail to New Carthage with the fleet,

fleet, began his march with the land forces, and advanced with the greateſt haſte. His army conſiſted of twenty-five thouſand foot, and of two thouſand and five hundred horſe. After ſeven days march, he arrived and incamped on the ſide of the city that looked towards the north. The hinder part of the camp he fortified with a ditch and a double intrenchment, which was drawn from one ſea to the other. The ſide that was towards the city he left without any fortification; becauſe the nature of the place alone ſufficiently ſecured it againſt all inſult. But before we enter into a particular deſcription of the ſiege, it will be proper to give the reader ſome conception of the manner in which the city was ſituated, and the country that was round it.

New Carthage then is ſituate near the middle of the coaſt of Spain, upon a gulph that looks towards the ſouth-weſt, and which contains in length about twenty ſtadia, and about ten ſtadia in breadth at the firſt entrance. The whole of this gulph is a perfect harbour. For an iſland lying at the mouth of it, and which leaves on either ſide a very narrow paſſage, receives all the waves of the ſea: ſo that the gulph remains intirely calm; except only that its waters are

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ſometimes agitated by the ſouth-weſt winds blowing through thoſe paſſages. All the other winds are intercepted by the land, which incloſes it on every ſide. In the inmoſt part of the gulph ſtands a mountain in form of a peninſula, upon which the city is built. It is ſurrounded by the ſea, upon the eaſt and ſouth; and, on the weſt, by a lake, which is extended alſo ſo far towards the north, that the reſt of the ſpace, which lies between the lake and the ſea, and which joins the city to the continent, contains only two ſtadia in breadth. The middle part of the city is flat; and has a level approach to it from the ſea, on the ſide towards the ſouth. The other parts are ſurrounded by hills; two of which are very high and rough; and the other three, though much leſs lofty, are full of cavities, and difficult of approach. Of the former two, the largeſt is that which ſtands on the ſide of the eaſt. It extends itſelf into the ſea; and has a temple conſecrated to Æſculapius upon the top. The other is in like manner ſituated, oppoſite to the former upon the weſt. Upon this laſt is a magnificent and royal palace, which was built by Aſdrubal, when he deſigned, as it is ſaid, to declare himſelf ſovereign of the country. The other

three hills, which are of ſmaller ſize, incloſe the city on the ſide towards the north. The firſt of theſe, which ſtands neareſt to the eaſt, has the appellation of Vulcan. The ſecond, that of Aletes; who is ſaid to have obtained divine honours, from having firſt diſcovered the ſilver mines. The third is called the hill of Saturn. For the conveniency of thoſe who uſe the ſea, a communication is made by art between the lake and the ſea. And acroſs the narrow channel, which joins the two together, there is alſo a bridge; which ſerves for the paſſage of carriages and beaſts of burthen, as they come loaded with neceſſaries from the country into the city. By this ſituation of the places, the front of the Roman camp was ſecure without any fortification; being covered by the lake and the ſea. Even in the part that was oppoſite to the narrow neck that ran between the lake and the ſea, and which joined the city to the continent, Scipio had neglected to throw up any intrenchment; either becauſe, by thus leaving the very middle of his camp open, he deſigned to intimidate the enemy; or that, when he ſhould be ready to attack the city, he might advance, and return back again to his camp, without any im-

impediment. This city formerly contained not more than twenty ſtadia in circumference. Many writers indeed affirm it to have been forty. But in this they are miſtaken. For my own part, I can ſpeak of this matter with aſſurance. For I take not my account from what I have heard; but have myſelf ſeen and examined the place. At this time the circumference is leſs.

The fleet then being arrived at a proper time, Scipio aſſembled the troops together, and explained to them the reaſons that had determined him to engage in the preſent undertaking, and which were no other than thoſe that have now been mentioned. He ſhewed them, that the enterprize itſelf was practicable. And having enumerated all the advantages which would ariſe to themſelves from this conqueſt, together with the great loſs which the enemy would ſuſtain, he promiſed crowns of gold to thoſe who ſhould firſt mount upon the walls, and the other cuſtomary rewards to all who ſhould perform any ſignal ſervice in the attack. In the end he told them, that the deſign had firſt been ſuggeſted to him by Neptune: who ſtood near him as he ſlept; and promiſed that he would ſo viſibly aſſiſt him in the very time of the action,

that

that the whole army ſhould acknowledge the efficacy of his preſence. The juſtneſs of the reaſons that appeared in this diſcourſe, the promiſe of the golden crowns, and, above all the reſt, the expected aſſiſtance of the god, raiſed in all the ſoldiers the higheſt ardour and alacrity.

On the following day, having ſtored the fleet with miſſile weapons of every kind, he ordered Lælius, who commanded it, to preſs the city on the ſide of the ſea. By land, he ſelected two thouſand of the ſtrongeſt ſoldiers, together with the men who carried the ladders, and advanced to the aſſault about the third hour of the day. Mago, who commanded in the city, divided the garriſon of a thouſand men, and, leaving one half in the citadel, drew up the reſt in order of battle upon the hill that ſtood towards the eaſt. He ſtationed alſo two thouſand of the citizens, to whom he had given the arms that were in the city, near the gate that led to the narrow neck which joined the city to the continent, and which was oppoſite to the Roman camp. The reſt of the inhabitants were ordered to aſſiſt with their utmoſt ſtrength, in every part in which the walls ſhould be attacked.

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As ſoon as the Roman trumpets had given the ſignal for the aſſault, Mago ordered the two thouſand citizens to advance through the gate; being perſuaded that he ſhould ſtrike a terror into the enemy, and force them to deſiſt from their deſign. They advance accordingly, and vigorouſly charge the Romans, who were drawn up in battle between their camp and the iſthmus. At firſt the engagement was extremely fierce; and vehement cries were made on either ſide, as the numbers increaſed that came both from the city and from the camp. But the aſſiſtance that was ſent to either ſide was very unequal: the Carthaginian ſuccours coming only through a ſingle gate, and having the length of two ſtadia alſo to paſs; while the Romans on the contrary were near to the place and poured in their troops from every ſide. For Scipio had deſignedly ranged his forces in battle near to the camp, that he might draw the enemy to a greater diſtance from the city: as well knowing, that if this body, which was the very ſtrength of the inhabitants, ſhould be once defeated, the whole city would be thrown into ſo great confuſion, that none would afterwards dare to appear without the walls. As the combatants however were all choſen

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men, the victory remained for ſome time doubtful. But the Carthaginians, unable to ſuſtain the weight of the Romans, who came continually from the camp, were at laſt forced to fly. Many of them fell in the engagement, and in their flight. But the greateſt part were cruſhed, as they entered together in crouds through the gate. The inhabitants, on the ſight of this defeat, were ſo ſtruck with conſternation, that they immediately abandoned the walls: and the Romans, who indeed had almoſt entered the city with thoſe that fled, fixed their ladders in full ſecurity.

In this action Scipio himſelf was preſent; but uſed all the caution that was poſſible, with reſpect to his perſon. For he was attended by three ſoldiers carrying bucklers; who, when any thing was thrown from the walls, joined their bucklers together, and covered him from the danger. Under this protection, moving from ſide to ſide, or placing himſelf upon ſome eminence, he greatly promoted the ſucceſs of the action. For, as by this method he ſaw every thing that paſſed, ſo, being ſeen alſo by all the army, he inſpired the combatants with courage. From hence alſo it happened, that nothing that was neceſſary was neglected

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in the courſe of the engagement: and that whatever the occaſion ſuggeſted to him was immediately carried into execution.

The Romans, who began now to mount the ladders with the greateſt confidence, found much leſs danger in the reſiſtance of the enemy, than from the height of the walls. The difficulties indeed which this alone occaſioned were ſo great, that the beſieged began to reſume their courage. For ſome of the ladders, being of ſo large a ſize as to admit many to aſcend together, were broken by the weight. Upon others, the firſt who mounted loſt their ſight upon ſo great a height; and, as ſoon as they were oppoſed by the leaſt aſſiſtance, threw themſelves headlong down. When any beams alſo, or other things of the ſame kind, were thrown from the battlements, whole bodies of men were torn away together, and carried to the ground. Theſe difficulties however, though ſo many and ſo great, were none of them ſufficient to reſtrain the ardour and the impetuoſity of the Romans. No ſooner were the firſt thrown down, than thoſe who followed immediately aſcended into the vacant place. But as the day began now to decline, and the ſol-

diers were almoſt exhauſted by fatigue, the General ordered the trumpets to ſound the ſignal of retreat.

The beſieged, perſuading themſelves that they had repelled the danger, began to exult with joy. But Scipio, expecting now the time when the ſea would retire, ſtationed five hundred men, together with ladders, upon the border of the lake. At the ſame time he ſelected alſo a body of freſh troops; and having exhorted them to perform their duty, he ſent them again towards the gate upon the iſthmus, and gave them a greater number of ladders than before, that the whole length of the walls might be attacked. When the ſignal then was made, and the troops began to aſcend the ladders in every part, the inhabitants within were thrown into the greateſt confuſion and diſorder. At the very time when they conceived that they had nothing left to dread, behold a new danger juſt beginning from a new aſſault. Their darts alſo began to fail: and the numbers of men which they had already loſt had ſunk their courage. Their embarraſſment therefore was very great. They defended themſelves however againſt the aſſailants with their utmoſt ſtrength.

While this conteſt was at the height, the tide began to retire, and left only a very ſhallow water upon the upper ſide of the lake: at the ſame time running through the mouth of it, into the adjoining ſea, with ſuch rapidity and force, that thoſe who were unacquainted with the nature of the thing, regarded it as a kind of miracle. Scipio, who had ſome guides alſo ready, exhorted the troops that were ſelected for this ſervice, to enter the lake, and to fear nothing. For this, among his other talents, was that in which this General principally excelled: the art of inſpiring his troops with courage, and of making them feel all the paſſions which his diſcourſe endeavoured to infuſe. They immediately obeyed his orders; and puſhed their way with eagerneſs through the lake: the whole army being perſuaded, that what they had beheld was undoubtedly the work of ſome divinity. It was now that they remembered what Scipio had ſaid to them in his harangue, concerning the interpoſition of Neptune in their favour. Animated therefore by this perſuaſion, one part of them formed the tortoiſe; and, advancing with impetuoſity to the gate, began to break it with bars and hatchets; while the reſt, as they approached the walls, finding the battlements

ments deſerted, not only fixed their ladders in full ſecurity, but gained alſo the top of the wall without any reſiſtance. For as the beſieged, not having any ſuſpicion that the city ever could be approached on the ſide of the lake, were wholly employed in other parts, and eſpecially near the gate that led to the iſthmus; ſo the cries alſo, and the confuſion, that aroſe from the diſordered multitude, prevented them from hearing or diſcerning any thing that was proper to be done. The Romans ran from ſide to ſide upon the walls, in order to attract the enemy: a kind of ſervice, which the manner in which they are armed enables them to perform with ſingular dexterity. And when they arrived at the gate, they deſcended; and breaking the bars, gave entrance to thoſe that were without. The body, that had attempted to ſcale the walls on the ſide towards the iſthmus, had now alſo gained the battlements. Thus the whole walls were at laſt in the poſſeſſion of the Romans. The hill likewiſe, that ſtood on the eaſtern ſide of the city, was ſeized by a part of thoſe who entered through the gate; and who attacked and routed the Carthaginians that were left to guard it.

As ſoon as a ſufficient number of the troops had entered, Scipio ſent away the greateſt part to deſtroy the inhabitants; commanding them to kill all that they ſhould meet, without ſparing any; and not attempt to pillage, till they ſhould receive the ſignal. Such is the cuſtom among the Romans, when they have taken a city by ſtorm. And their deſign, as I ſuppoſe, is to ſtrike the greater terror. It is common therefore to ſee, not men alone lying ſlaughtered; but dogs alſo cut in two, and other animals divided limb from limb. Upon the preſent occaſion eſpecially, there was much of this kind of carnage, becauſe the numbers that were in the place were great. The General himſelf then marched with a thouſand men to attack the citadel. At his firſt approach, Mago ſeemed determined to make ſome reſiſtance. But when he had conſidered, that the city was intirely in the power of the Romans, he ſent and obtained a promiſe of ſafety for himſelf, and delivered up the citadel. The ſignal being then made, the ſlaughter ceaſed, and the pillage was begun. When night came on, thoſe who had received ſuch orders remained in the camp. The General, with his thouſand men, was lodged in the citadel. The reſt of the ſoldiers, having been

been called out of the houſes by the Tribunes, were ordered to bring the booty, all of them in their ſeveral cohorts, into the Forum, and to guard it during the night. The light-armed forces were drawn from the camp, and were poſted upon the hill that was on the eaſtern ſide. In this manner the Romans became maſters of the city of New Carthage in Spain.

CHAP. IV.

ON the following day, the baggage of the Carthaginian garriſon, and all that had been taken both from the citizens and the artificers, being collected together in the Forum, was diſtributed by the Tribunes among the reſpective legions, according to the uſual cuſtom of the Romans. The method which this people obſerve, when they have taken a city, is this. They every day ſelect, for the purpoſe of pillage, a certain number of men, or a certain number of cohorts, according to the ſize of the city; taking care always, that not more than half of the forces be employed in this work. The reſt all remain in their ſeveral poſts; either within, or without the city, as occaſion

caſion requires. As their armies uſually are compoſed of two Roman legions with an equal number of allies, and ſometimes, though but rarely, of four legions; the men, who are employed in pillaging, bring all the booty, each of them to his reſpective legion. A ſale is then made of all that has been taken; and the money divided by the Tribunes into equal ſhares which are allotted to all alike: not only to thoſe who were ſtationed under arms in the ſeveral poſts; but to thoſe that were left in the camp; to the ſick likewiſe; and even to thoſe that had been ſent away from the camp upon any diſtant ſervice. And that no part of the plunder may be concealed, the ſoldiers, before they begin to march, and at the time of their firſt incampment, are obliged to ſwear, that whatever they ſhall take from the enemy they will bring faithfully to the camp: as we have already more particularly mentioned, in our diſcourſe on the Roman government. Now by this precaution, of employing one half of the army only in the pillage, while the reſt remain under arms in the ſeveral poſts, the Romans are ſecured from any danger that might happen to them from the greedineſs of the ſoldiers. For as the hope of having a ſhare in the booty

booty is never loſt to any of the troops; but remains as certain to thoſe who are fixed in the ſeveral poſts, as to thoſe who are employed in pillaging; every man remains quiet in his ſtation: whereas, among other nations, a contrary method is frequently attended with very fatal conſequences. So powerful is the deſire of gain, that in general it is this alone which encourages men to ſuffer hardſhips, or to throw themſelves into dangers. When occaſions therefore of this kind ariſe, it is not to be ſuppoſed, that thoſe who are left in the camp, or ſtationed in any poſt, will contentedly forego the opportunity that is offered; if every man, as the cuſtom is in almoſt all other armies, be allowed to retain the booty which he takes. For though a prince perhaps, or a General, may at ſuch times give the ſtricteſt orders for bringing all the ſpoil together into a common heap; yet, whatever the ſoldiers are able to conceal, they are accuſtomed to conſider as their own. And while they all purſue this object with an ardour which it is not poſſible to reſtrain, the ſafety of the whole is often brought into the greateſt danger. Very frequently it has been ſeen, that commanders, when they have ſucceeded in their firſt deſign, and have either taken

a city, or forced their way into the camp of the enemy, have, from this ſingle cauſe alone, not only loſt all the fruits of their victory, but even ſuffered an intire defeat. There is nothing therefore that more deſerves the foreſight and attention of the leader of an army, than to make ſuch proviſion, that all the troops may be aſſured of obtaining an equal ſhare of the plunder upon theſe occaſions.

While the Tribunes were employed in making a diſtribution of the ſpoil, the General, having ordered all the priſoners, who were not much fewer than ten thouſand men, to be brought before him, divided them into two ſeparate bodies. In the firſt were the free citizens, together with their wives and children: and the artificers of the city in the other. Having exhorted the former to embrace the friendſhip of the Romans, and to bear in remembrance the favour which they now received, he diſmiſſed them to their ſeveral habitations. A deliverance ſo unexpected melted them into tears of joy. They proſtrated themſelves before him, and retired. He then told the artificers, that for the preſent they were the publick ſlaves of the Roman people: but that, if they would ſhew an affection towards this people, and ſerve them with alacrity

crity in their reſpective trades, they might be aſſured of obtaining their freedom, as ſoon as the war with Carthage ſhould be brought to a happy end. He then ordered them to be enrolled by the Quæſtor; and having divided them into bands of thirty men, appointed a Roman to take the charge of every band. The whole number amounted to about two thouſand men. From the reſt of the priſoners he ſelected thoſe that were in the vigour of their age, and of the ſtrongeſt bodies, and joining them to his naval forces, ſo that the whole now conſiſted of a half part more than double the former number, he not only furniſhed the ſhips that had been taken from the enemy, but allotted to every veſſel in the fleet almoſt twice as many ſeamen as they had before. For the veſſels that were taken were eighteen in number; and his own fleet conſiſted of thirty-five. To theſe men likewiſe, upon condition that they would only diſcharge their duty with diligence and zeal, he gave the ſame aſſurance of their freedom, as ſoon as the Carthaginians ſhould be conquered. In this manner, by his indulgent treatment, he entirely gained the confidence of the citizens, and ſecured their affection both to himſelf and to the common cauſe.

The

The artificers, encouraged by the hopes of freedom, applied themſelves to their work with the greateſt chearfulneſs. And the fleet, by the prudent diſpoſition which he made, was increaſed in the proportion that has been mentioned.

When this buſineſs was finiſhed, he ſeparated Mago, and the other Carthaginians that were of rank, from the reſt. For among thoſe that were taken, there were two that were of the council of the Ancients, and fifteen of the Senate. All theſe he committed to the care of Lælius; and ordered them to be treated with particular attention. He then commanded all the hoſtages, who were in number more than three hundred, to be brought before him. And calling the children to him one by one, he careſſed and ſoothed them; telling them, that in a ſhort time they ſhould ſee their parents. The reſt he ordered to write to their ſeveral cities, that they were ſafe and well; and that they ſhould ſoon be permitted to return to their reſpective habitations, if their friends would only conſent to embrace the alliance of the Romans. With theſe words, having before ſelected from the ſpoil what was moſt proper for his deſign, he preſented all of them with ſuch ornaments as were ſuitable to their ſex

and

and age. To the girls he gave bracelets and little pictures; and ſwords and poniards to the young men and boys.

At this time, one of the female captives, the wife of Mandonius, who was the brother of Andobalis king of the Ilergetes, fell at his feet, and intreated him with tears to give ſuch orders concerning the women that were priſoners, that they might obtain more decent treatment than they had experienced from the Carthaginians. Scipio was moved at this ſight: for the woman was advanced in years, and had ſomething venerable in her appearance. He aſked her therefore, whether they were in want of any neceſſaries. And when ſhe made no anſwer, he ordered thoſe that were appointed to take care of the women to be called; and was told by them, that the Carthaginians had always furniſhed them with neceſſaries in the greateſt plenty. But as ſhe ſtill embraced his knees, and continued to repeat the ſame requeſt, Scipio, being more perplexed, and ſuſpecting that the men had told him an untruth, and had undoubtedly been negligent in their charge, bade her and the reſt of the women take courage; and aſſured them, that he would appoint other perſons, who ſhould take care that they ſhould be in want

want of nothing. You underſtand not our requeſt, replied the woman after a little ſilence, if you think that we are thus importunate with you for the ſake of meat and drink. In a moment Scipio underſtood her meaning: and, when he ſaw before him the daughters of Andobalis, and of many other princes, all in the flower of their age, he was unable to refrain from tears. The whole diſtreſs of their condition was diſcloſed to him by a ſingle word. He ſignified therefore to the woman, that he now knew perfectly what ſhe intended: and taking her by the hand, he again bade her to take courage, and all the reſt that were with her: aſſuring them, that he would be no leſs careful of them, than if they were his own ſiſters or his daughters; and that he would give them in charge to perſons of approved fidelity, whoſe behaviour ſhould agree with this aſſurance.

After this, he delivered to the Quæſtors all the publick money that had been taken from the Carthaginians. The amount of it was more than ſix hundred talents. He had brought alſo with him from Rome four hundred: ſo that, with both ſums together, he had now more a thouſand talents, to defray the expences of the war.

About

About the ſame time alſo it was, that ſome young ſoldiers, having found a virgin of a moſt uncommon bloom and beauty, and knowing that Scipio was inclined to the love of women, brought and placed her before him, and intreated him to receive her as a preſent. Scipio was ſtruck with the ſight; and, having expreſſed his admiration of her beauty, "If I were a private man, ſaid he, you could not have offered to me a more acceptable preſent; but, in the ſtation in which I now am placed, it is quite otherwiſe." Intimating, as I ſuppoſe, by this diſcourſe, that, in the hours of leiſure and repoſe, young men may ſometimes agreeably amuſe themſelves with theſe enjoyments; but that, in ſeaſons of buſineſs, the activity both of the mind and body is too much obſtructed by ſuch indulgence. He therefore thanked the ſoldiers; and having called the father of the virgin, he delivered her into his hands, and exhorted him to marry her to any one of her own citizens whom he ſhould chooſe. By this inſtance of his continence and moderation, the character of Scipio was raiſed high in the opinion of all who were under his command.

When he had thus regulated all things, and committed the reſt of the priſoners to the

the care of the Tribunes, he ſent Lælius, with the Carthaginians, and ſome others of the moſt eminent rank that were taken, in a Quinquereme to Rome, to carry the news of this ſucceſs. For he very well knew, that as the affairs of Spain had been conſidered as almoſt deſperate, an account of this important conqueſt could not fail to infuſe new courage into the people, and engage them to apply themſelves with much greater earneſtneſs to the buſineſs of the war. With reſpect to himſelf, remaining for ſome time in New Carthage, he exerciſed continually the naval forces; and inſtructed the Tribunes alſo to exerciſe the land army in the following manner.

On the firſt day, the legions were commanded to run the ſpace of thirty ſtadia with their arms. On the ſecond, to ſcour and brighten their arms, and to examine in open view their whole armour. The third day was allotted to relaxation and repoſe. On the fourth, they fought together with wooden ſwords caſed with leather, and guarded with a button at the end; and threw javelins, which were covered alſo with a button. On the fifth day, they returned again to the ſame courſe of running with which they had begun,

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He employed alſo a principal part of his attention upon the artificers; that the arms might be finiſhed in the completeſt manner, both for the exerciſes in the field, and for real ſervice. With this view, he not only appointed ſkilful men to regulate the workmen as we have already mentioned; but himſelf went every day among them, and ſaw that they were ſupplied with neceſſaries. And thus, while the legions were exerciſing themſelves continually before the walls, and the naval forces upon the ſea contending together in rowing and in mock engagements; while the workmen in the city were ſharpening weapons, or labouring in braſs and wood; and, in a word, while all without exception were employed in preparing arms; whoever had beheld the ſight, might have obſerved in the words of Xenophon, that this city was in truth the very workingſhop of war. When all things ſeemed at laſt to be in the condition which he deſired, and the troops were perfect in their exerciſe; having ſecured the city alſo by placing guards, and making the fortifications that were neceſſary, he put both the army and the fleet in motion, and began his march towards Taraco, carrying the hoſtages alſo with him.

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The motions which Scipio judged to be moſt uſeful for the cavalry upon all occaſions, and in which he commanded them to be exerciſed, were theſe. To turn every man ſingly his horſe to the left, and again to the right, and then to make him fall back. With reſpect to whole troops, they were alſo taught to turn to one ſide at once, and to recover again their firſt poſition: to turn their backs to the enemy in two motions, and to face about again in three: to make little bodies of ten or of twenty men, go off with ſpeed from the wings, or ſometimes from the centre; and return again to their place in the main body without breaking their ranks: to extend themſelves upon the wings, in order to prevent the camp from being attacked, or to cover the rear of the army. The breaking of the whole body into looſe and ſeparate bands, was a thing which he thought deſerved but little attention; becauſe it was nothing more than the order into which troops would naturally fall upon a march. In the laſt place, they were inſtructed ſo to advance againſt the enemy, or to retire again, in all the different movements, that, even when running with full ſpeed, they might keep their ranks intire, and preſerve the ſame

diſtance

diſtance between the troops. For his opinion was, that nothing was more dangerous or fatal, than for a body of cavalry to charge with diſordered ranks.

When he had communicated theſe inſtructions to the officers and ſoldiers, he afterwards went round to the ſeveral cities, and examined, in the firſt place, whether the men comprehended his plan of diſcipline, and ſecondly, whether thoſe who commanded in the cities were clear and perfect in their manner of teaching it. For he judged that the ſucceſs of this new method would principally depend upon the ſkill of the particular commanders. As ſoon as every thing was perfected, he drew out all the cavalry from the cities to one place; and himſelf directed them in all the movements, and made them perform the whole exerciſe in his preſence. Nor did he, upon this occaſion, take his ſtation at the head of all the troops, as the Generals of this age are accuſtomed to do; imagining that the foremoſt place is the proper place for a commander. But in truth they both ſhew a want of judgement, and bring much diſadvantage upon the ſervice itſelf, by chooſing a poſt, in which, while they are ſeen by every one, they can themſelves ſee nothing. For the buſineſs in queſ-

tion, at ſuch a time, is not to diſplay the power and dignity of the commander, but to ſhew ability and ſkill; to attend to the ſoldiers in all their movements; and, for this purpoſe, to be ſometimes at the head, ſometimes again in the rear of all, and ſometimes in the centre. It was thus that Scipio acted. He rode from rank to rank, and ſaw all the troops himſelf. He inſtructed thoſe that were leſs ready; and corrected in the beginning whatever was amiſs. But as ſo great attention had been uſed before in exerciſing each particular body, the miſtakes that now appeared were very few and inconſiderable. For this indeed, as Demetrius Phalereus has very juſtly obſerved, is the only method that can render a body of troops perfect in their diſcipline. As a building, ſays this writer, will be firm and ſolid, if every ſcantling, and every joint, and each ſingle apartment, has been diſpoſed and finiſhed with the neceſſary care; ſo an army likewiſe will have its proper ſtrength, when every troop, and every ſoldier, have firſt been ſeparately trained, and rendered perfect in their duty.

EXTRACT the THIRD.

An obſervation on the policy of the Romans with reſpect to Greece.

THE preſent ſtate of things very much reſembled, it was ſaid, the diſpoſition of an army drawn up in battle. Upon ſuch occaſions, the light-armed and moſt active of the troops are placed always in front, and are the firſt attacked: but the event of the battle is decided by the phalanx of heavy forces that ſtand behind them. In the ſame manner the Ætolians, and the people of Peloponneſus their allies, are now firſt expoſed to danger; while the Romans, like the phalanx, keep themſelves in reſerve. If the firſt ſhould be defeated, the latter will withdraw themſelves in ſafety from the fray. But if they ſhould be victorious, which the gods avert, the Romans will then be able to ſubdue, not only the Ætolians, but all the reſt alſo of the people of Greece.

EXTRACT the FOURTH.

A deſcription of Ecbatana, the capital city of Media. The expedition of Antiochus againſt Arſaces.

MEDIA is the moſt powerful of all the kingdoms of Aſia; whether we conſider the extent of the country, or the numbers and goodneſs of the men, and alſo of the horſes, which are there produced. For theſe animals are found in it in ſo great plenty, that almoſt all the reſt of Aſia is ſupplied with them from this province. It is here alſo that the royal horſes are always fed, on account of the excellence of the paſture. The whole borders of the province are covered with Grecian cities; which were built as a check upon the neighbouring barbarians, after the country had been ſubdued by Alexander. Ecbatana only is not one of theſe. This city ſtands on the north ſide of Media, and commands all that part of Aſia which lies along the Mœotis and the Euxine ſea. It was, even from the moſt ancient times, the ſeat of the royal reſidence: and ſeems, in ſplendour and

and magnificence, very greatly to have exceeded all other cities. It is built on the declivity of the mountain Orontes; and not incloſed with any walls. But there is a citadel in it, the fortifications of which are of moſt wonderful ſtrength: and below the citadel ſtands the palace of the Perſian kings. With reſpect to other particulars, I am in doubt whether I ſhould ſpeak, or be intirely ſilent. To thoſe who love exaggeration, and to ſtrike their readers with ſomething wonderful in their deſcriptions, this city would afford ample matter for ſuch digreſſion. But others, who go not without great diffidence into things that exceed the common apprehenſion, will, for this very reaſon, be the more perplexed. Thus much however I ſhall ſay. The palace contained ſeven ſtadia in circumference. And the magnificence of the ſtructure in every part was ſuch as muſt have raiſed a very high opinion of the wealth and power of thoſe who built it. For though the wood was all of cedar, or of cypreſs, no part of it was left naked: but the beams, the roofs, and the pillars that ſupported the porticoes and periſtyles, were all covered, ſome with plates of ſilver, and ſome of gold. The tiles likewiſe were all of ſilver. The greateſt part of theſe riches was carried

away by the Macedonians who attended Alexander: and the reſt was pillaged in the reigns of Antigonus and Seleucus. At this time however, when Antiochus arrived, there were ſtill remaining in the temple of Æna ſome pillars caſed with gold, and a large quantity of ſilver tiles laid together in a heap. There were alſo ſome few wedges of gold, and a much greater number of ſilver. Theſe were now coined into money with the royal ſtamp; and amounted to the ſum of almoſt four thouſand talents.

Arſaces had expected, that Antiochus would advance as far as to this city; but was perſuaded, that he never would attempt to lead ſo great an army through the deſert that was beyond it: eſpecially becauſe he could not fail of being in great want of water. For, in theſe parts, no water is ever ſeen above the ſurface of the ground. But, through the whole of the deſert, there are many ſubterraneous wells and ſtreams, which are known only to thoſe who are acquainted with the country. The account which the inhabitants give of theſe is true. That the Perſians, when they were maſters of this part of Aſia, gave to thoſe who brought a ſtream of water into places in which there was none before, the free inheritance of the ground

ground for five generations; and that the natives, encouraged by this advantage, ſpared no labour or expence, to bring the water, which falls from mount Caucaſus in many large ſtreams, through ſubterraneous channels to a very great diſtance; ſo that, in the preſent times, thoſe who uſe the waters know not the beginning, nor the courſe, of the channels through which they flow. When Arſaces ſaw however, that the king had determined to paſs through the deſert, he ordered the wells to be broken and filled up. But Antiochus, being informed of this deſign, ſent away Nicomedes with a thouſand horſe; who, finding on his arrival that Arſaces had retreated, and that a ſmall body of cavalry only was employed in ſtopping the mouths of the ſtreams, forced them to fly upon his firſt approach, and returned back again to Antiochus.

The king, having paſſed the deſert, arrived at Hecatompylus; a city ſituated in the middle of the Parthian territory, and which takes its name from the great number of roads which lead from it into all the neighbouring parts. In this place he allowed the army ſome time to reſt And when he had conſidered with himſelf, that, if Arſaces had been inclined to venture on a battle, he never would have

left his country, or have looked for any ground more proper for his own army than that which lay round Hecatompylus; and that it was evident from his retreat that he had no ſuch deſign; he reſolved to advance into Hyrcania. Arriving at Tagæ, and being informed by the inhabitants, that the whole way leading to the ſummit of the mountain Labutas, which overlooked Hyrcania, was extremely difficult, and that great numbers of barbarians alſo had already poſſeſſed themſelves of all the paſſes; he divided his light-armed forces into many little bodies, and ſent them away under different leaders, aſſigning to each the route which they ſhould take. The pioneers of the army were ſeparated alſo into little bands; and were ordered to attend the light-armed troops, and, in every part, as they arrived, to make the aſcent practicable for the heavy forces, and the beaſts that were loaded with the baggage. When he had made this diſpoſition, he gave to Diogenes the van of the army; which was compoſed of archers and ſlingers, and thoſe mountaineers, who are very ſkilful in throwing darts or ſtones; and who, not keeping any rank, but engaging man with man, as time and place may require, perform the greateſt ſervice in ſuch difficult paſſes.

Next

Next to theſe marched a body of two thouſand Cretans, armed with bucklers, and led by Polyxenidas of Rhodes. And in the rear of all were the heavy forces, under the command of Nicomedes of Cos, and Nicolaus an Ætolian.

As the army advanced, the way was found to be much more rough and difficult, than it had been before conceived. For as the whole length of the aſcent was not leſs than three hundred ſtadia; ſo the greateſt part of the way alſo was through a deep and hollow road, formed by the winter torrents, and filled with trees and fragments of rocks which had fallen from the mountains that hung over it. The barbarians likewiſe not only had increaſed theſe difficulties, by laying trees together in heaps, and ſtones of the largeſt ſize; but had ſpread themſelves upon all the eminences that were moſt proper for their purpoſe, along the whole border of the road. And indeed if they had not wholly been miſtaken in their judgement, the king muſt have been forced to deſiſt from his deſign. For having perſuaded themſelves, that the whole army muſt neceſſarily paſs along this road, they had taken the meaſures that were moſt agreeable to this perſuaſion, and ſecured the poſts that were moſt proper for defending the paſſage.

ſage. But they never had conſidered, that, though the baggage and the heavy forces muſt paſs indeed along this way, becauſe it was not poſſible for them to aſcend the neighbouring mountains, yet the light-armed troops might advance along the very ſummit of the rocks. No ſooner therefore was the firſt of their poſts attacked, than the whole face of things was intirely changed. For Diogenes, perceiving in the very firſt conflict what was neceſſary to be done, led his troops out of the hollow way, and having gained the heights that were above the enemy, galled them with darts and ſtones. The ſtones eſpecially, that were diſcharged by the ſlingers from a conſiderable diſtance, ſpread among them ſo great diſſorder, that they were forced to abandon their poſt. The pioneers then cleared the ground in full ſecurity; and as the number of them was great, this taſk was ſoon accompliſhed. And thus, as the archers and ſlingers, with the reſt of the light-armed troops, ſtill continued to advance; ſometimes ſpreading themſelves along the ſides of the rocks, and ſometimes uniting in a body, and ſeizing all the advantageous poſts; while the Cretans, as a reſerve, marched ſlowly and in good order through the hollow road;

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the barbarians, unable to ſuſtain theſe different attacks, abandoned their ſeveral ſtations, and retreated together to the top of the mountain. In this manner Antiochus at laſt conducted his army through the paſſes, though very ſlowly, and with great difficulty: for he had ſcarcely gained upon the eighth day the ſummit of the mountain. As the enemy had aſſembled all their forces together in this place, and were perſuaded that they ſhould ſtill compel him to deſiſt from his deſign, a new and fierce battle enſued. But the barbarians were defeated in the following manner. They had formed themſelves into a cloſe body, and maintained the fight with courage againſt the heavy forces that attacked them in front; when they perceived that the light-armed troops, having made a circuit in the night, had poſſeſſed themſelves of the eminences in their rear. At this ſight they were ſtruck with terror, and began to fly with great precipitation. The king would not ſuffer them to be purſued, but ordered the trumpets to ſound a retreat; that he might deſcend with all his army, in good order, into Hyrcania. Having regulated his march as he deſired, he arrived at Tambracus; a city not incloſed with walls; but of great extent, and in which there was alſo

a royal

a royal palace. In this place he incamped: and being informed that the greateſt part of the routed army, together with many of the neighbouring people, had retired to Syrinx; which was at no great diſtance from Tambracus, and on account both of its ſtrength and ſituation, was conſidered as the capital of all Hyrcania; he reſolved to make himſelf maſter of that city. Advancing therefore with his army, he extended his forces round it, and began the ſiege. The chief part of his labour was employed in preparing tortoiſes, for the purpoſe of filling up the intrenchments. For the city was ſurrounded by three ditches; each of which contained not leſs than thirty cubits in breadth, and fifteen in depth. Upon the top of each was a double paliſade: and beyond them a ſtrong wall. It was here that continual combats paſſed without any intermiſſion: ſo that neither the beſiegers nor the beſieged were able to remove the wounded and the dead. For they not only fought above the ground; but often met together in the mines which they had digged below. By the activity however of the king, as well as from the number of the troops employed, the ditches were in a ſhort time filled, and the wall fell in the part that was undermined.

mined. The barbarians, unable any longer to make reſiſtance, killed all the Greeks that were in the place; and, having pillaged the city of all the goods that were of greateſt value, endeavoured to eſcape by night. But Antiochus, being informed of their retreat, ordered Hyperbaſis to purſue them with the mercenaries. The barbarians, upon the firſt approach of theſe troops, threw away their baggage, and fled back into the city. And when they found that the heavy-armed forces had alſo entered the city through the breach, they deſpaired of any farther means of ſafety, and ſurrendered themſelves to the king.

EX-

EXTRACT the FIFTH.

The Conſuls Marcellus and Criſpinus are loſt through their own imprudence. Reflections of the Hiſtorian upon this event.

THE Conſuls, Claudius Marcellus and Criſpinus, being deſirous to take a perfect view of thoſe parts of the hill that looked toward the camp of the enemy, ordered the reſt of the army to remain within the intrenchment, and, attended only by two troops of horſe, ſome light-armed, and about thirty lictors, advanced to examine the ground. It happened, that ſome of the Numidians, who were accuſtomed to wait in ambuſcade, and to attack by ſurprize thoſe who came out to ſkirmiſh, or upon any occaſion advanced from the Roman camp, had at this very time concealed themſelves, lying cloſe under the foot of the hill. As ſoon then as their ſcout gave notice by a ſignal, that ſome of the enemy were above them, they roſe from their place, and, winding along the ſides of the hill, intercepted the Conſuls, and cut off their return to the camp. The Conſul

Conſul Claudius, and ſome others, were killed in the firſt onſet: and the reſt, being wounded, directed their flight by different ways among the precipices. The ſon of Claudius, who was alſo wounded, very unexpectedly eſcaped, and with great difficulty. The Romans from their camp ſaw diſtinctly every thing that paſſed, but were not able to ſend any aſſiſtance. For while they cried aloud, and were ſtruck with conſternation at what had happened; while ſome bridled their horſes, and others prepared their arms, the action was intirely finiſhed. Thus was Marcellus loſt through his own ſimplicity, and by not attending to the proper duty of a General.

I have often been forced, in the courſe of this Hiſtory, to make ſome reflection upon faults like theſe. For, among all into which the leaders of armies are betrayed, there is none more frequent: nor any on the other hand that affords a clearer proof of ignorance. What good indeed can be expected from a man, who knows not that the commander of an army ſhould keep himſelf, as much as it is poſſible, out of little combats, which decide nothing with reſpect to the whole: and that, if ever any occaſion ſhould oblige him to take a part in ſuch engagements,

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he ought to ſee many fall, before the danger be ſuffered to approach himſelf? Let the baſe Carian riſk his life, as the proverb expreſſes it, and not the General. To ſay afterwards, I did not think it; and, who could have expected ſuch an accident; is in my judgement the ſtrongeſt proof that a General can give of his want of capacity and ſenſe. I cannot therefore but conſider Annibal, who was indeed in many other reſpects an excellent commander, as moſt particularly admirable upon this account; that in all the long time which he paſſed in a hoſtile country, amidſt much variety of fortune, and in the courſe of ſo many and ſo great battles, though upon many occaſions he ſurpriſed the enemy, he never was himſelf ſurpriſed. So great was the prudence with which he provided always for the ſafety of his own perſon. And ſurely nothing is more commendable than ſuch precaution. For though an army may have ſuffered an intire defeat, yet, if the General be unhurt and ſafe, many favourable occaſions may ariſe, for repairing the loſs that has been ſuſtained. But when he, who is as the pilot in a veſſel, falls; the army, though ſuperior perhaps in the action to the enemy, cannot draw any advantage even from victory; becauſe the hopes

hopes of every man are all centered in the leader. Let this then ſerve as a caution to thoſe commanders, who through oſtentation, youthful folly, a want of experience, or a contempt of the enemy, are apt to fall into ſuch abſurdity of conduct. For to one or other of theſe cauſes misfortunes like that which has now been mentioned muſt always be aſcribed.

EXTRACT the SIXTH.

The conduct of Scipio in Spain. He is joined by Mandonius and Andobalis: defeats Asdrubal in battle; and forces him to leave the country. He rejects the title of king, which was offered to him by the Spaniards.

CHAP. I.

WHILE Scipio remained in winter quarters at Taraco, as we before have mentioned, he endeavoured to secure the confidence and friendship of the Spaniards, by delivering to them the several hostages which had fallen into his power. An accident happened, which greatly assisted him in this design. Edeco, a powerful prince in the country, no sooner heard that the Romans were become masters of New Carthage, and that his wife and children were in their hands, than he considered with himself, that it was highly probable that the Spaniards would in no long

long time revolt, and join the conquerours. He reſolved therefore to ſet the firſt example of this change: being perſuaded, that by ſuch a meaſure he not only ſhould recover again his wife and children, but appear alſo to have embraced the friendſhip of the Romans, not through neceſſity, but by choice. Nor was he indeed diſappointed in his hopes. As ſoon as the armies were fixed in winter quarters, he came to Taraco, with ſome of the neareſt of his friends: and being admitted into the preſence of Scipio, "he thanked the gods, he ſaid, who had permitted him to be the firſt in coming to him, of all the princes of the country. That others indeed extended their hands towards the Romans; but ſtill turned their eyes towards the Carthaginians, and held a correſpondence with them. But that he, on the contrary, was ready to ſurrender without reſerve, not only himſelf, but his kindred alſo and friends, to the Romans. That, if Scipio would conſider him as an ally and friend, he might draw from ſuch compliance many great advantages, both now and in future times. That, with reſpect to the preſent, the reſt of the Spaniards, as ſoon as they ſhould find that he was treated as a friend, and had obtained what he deſired, would

haſten to follow his example; with the hopes of recovering again their families, and of being received into the ſame alliance. And that hereafter likewiſe, poſſeſſed as they would be with a ſenſe of ſo great an honour as well as kindneſs, they would be ready to aſſiſt him without reſerve in all the operations of the war. He intreated him therefore to reſtore to him his wife and children; to conſider him as his friend; and to ſuffer him to return with that denomination to his own country; till ſome occaſion ſhould ariſe, in which he might ſhew in the moſt effectual manner the ſincerity of his own attachment, as well as that of his friends, both to Scipio himſelf, and to all the intereſts of the Romans."

Here he ended his diſcourſe. Scipio, who long before had viewed the thing in this very light, and had reaſoned upon it with himſelf in the ſame manner as Edeco had done, immediately reſtored his wife and children, and gave him an aſſurance of his friendſhip. And when, in the courſe of many converſations which they afterwards held together, he had inſinuated himſelf by various methods into the heart of the Spaniard, and had raiſed alſo in all his friends great expectations of future honour and advantage, he

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ſent them back to their own country. The report of this tranſaction being ſoon noiſed abroad, all the Spaniards that lived on that ſide of the Iberus, and who before were enemies of the Romans, immediately with one conſent embraced their party. When the ſucceſs of this meaſure had ſo fully anſwered all his expectations, Scipio, having now no enemy upon the ſea, diſbanded his naval forces; and, ſelecting the ableſt of the men, diſtributed them among the companies, and increaſed his land army.

CHAP. II.

MANDONIUS and Andobalis were two of the moſt powerful among the princes in Spain; and had always been conſidered as the firmeſt friends of the Carthaginians. But they long had harboured a ſecret diſſatisfaction in their minds, becauſe Aſdrubal, on pretence that he ſuſpected their fidelity, had demanded their wives and children as hoſtages, together with a large ſum in money, as we have already related. Conceiving therefore the preſent opportunity to be moſt favourable for carrying into execution the deſign which they had from that time meditated, they withdrew their troops from the Carthaginian camp by

night, and retired to ſome fortified poſts in which they were ſecure from being attacked. This revolt was followed alſo by that of many others of the Spaniards: who for a long time had ſupported with great pain the haughtineſs of the Carthaginians; and were ready to ſeize the firſt occaſion that was offered to declare their real inclinations.

Examples of the ſame kind have been indeed extremely frequent. It is a great thing undoubtedly to obtain ſucceſs in action, and to defeat an enemy in the field. But, as we have often taken occaſion to obſerve, it requires much greater ſkill and caution, to make a good uſe of victory. There are many who know how to conquer: and but few, in the compariſon, who uſe their conqueſt with advantage. The Carthaginians were among the firſt of theſe. As ſoon as they had defeated the Roman army, and killed the two Conſuls, Publius and Cnæus, being perſuaded that they ſhould now hold without diſpute the ſovereignty of Spain, they treated all the people of the country with the greateſt haughtineſs. Inſtead therefore of allies and friends, they made all who had ſubmitted to their power their enemies. And how indeed could it be otherwiſe? They conceived, that one way

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was the beſt for gaining empire, and another for maintaining it. They ought however to have learned, that men moſt eaſily preſerve their power, by perſiſting in the ſame courſe of conduct by which it was at firſt obtained. Now nothing is more evident, or more confirmed by a great variety of examples, than that the ſureſt way of drawing any people to ſubmiſſion, is to flatter them with kindneſs, and to allure them by the proſpect of advantage. But if men, when they have gained the end which they deſired, reverſe this treatment, and load thoſe that have ſubmitted to them with rigour and ſeverity, the inclinations of the ſubjects, as the Carthaginians now experienced, will not fail to correſpond with the change of conduct in the governours.

In this dangerous condition of affairs, the mind of Aſdrubal was filled with many apprehenſions, and diſtracted by various thoughts. He was grieved at the revolt of Andobalis. The diſcontents of his own officers, and their oppoſition to his will, added much to his anxiety. He dreaded alſo the arrival of Scipio with his army. And as he judged that this would very ſhortly happen; perceiving likewiſe, that the Spaniards had deſerted him, and were haſtening with one conſent to join

the Romans; he at laſt reſolved, that he would diſpoſe all things in the beſt order that was poſſible, and try the fortune of a battle. That, if happily he ſhould be victorious in the action, he might afterwards deliberate upon future meaſures in full ſecurity. If, on the other hand, he ſhould be conquered; he would then retreat with the remains of his army into Gaul; and, being joined by as many of the barbarians as he ſhould be able to draw together in that country, would from thence paſs into Italy, to aſſiſt Annibal his brother, and to partake with him in the ſame common hopes.

While Aſdrubal was forming this deſign, Scipio, having been joined again by Lælius, who brought to him the orders of the ſenate, drew all the troops from their winter quarters, and began his march. In every place through which he paſſed, the Spaniards were prepared to meet him, and joined themſelves to the army with alacrity and joy. Among the reſt, Andobalis, who had long before ſent meſſages to Scipio, no ſooner was informed of his approach, than he went out of his camp to meet him, attended by his friends. And when he had joined him, he began with giving an account of his late connection with the Carthaginians: diſplaying,

ing, on the one hand, the advantages which they had drawn from his alliance, and the fidelity with which he had always ſerved them; and, on the other, the many injuries and inſults, with which his ſervices had been requited. He intreated Scipio therefore to be himſelf the judge of what he had heard. That, if he ſhould be found to have falſely accuſed the Carthaginians, it might with good reaſon be ſuppoſed, that he would not long maintain his faith in this new alliance. But if, on the contrary, he had only ſeparated himſelf from his former friends, becauſe a long courſe of injurious treatment had compelled him to abandon them; there was good ground to hope, that, having now embraced the party of the Romans, he would adhere to it with a firm affection. He ſaid many other things upon this ſubject. And when he had ended, Scipio replied: "That he doubted not of the truth of what he had heard. That he could well judge what muſt have been the inſolence of the Carthaginians towards him; not only from the manner in which they had treated all the people of Spain; but more particularly from the inſults, to which the wives and daughters of Andobalis and the other princes had been expoſed. That himſelf, on the contrary,

when theſe women had fallen into his power, not as hoſtages, but as priſoners and ſlaves, had obſerved towards them ſuch ſtrict fidelity, that even they who were their parents ſcarcely could have equalled him in diſcharging that duty." Andobalis declared aloud, that he ſpoke the truth; and, proſtrating himſelf before him, ſaluted him with the appellation of King. The reſt that were preſent all applauded the word. But Scipio, inclining himſelf towards them, only exhorted them to take courage, and to be aſſured, that they ſhould receive every mark of kindneſs from the Romans. He then delivered to them their wives and daughters: and on the next day concluded a treaty with them in which the chief condition was, that they ſhould be ſubject to the command of the Roman leaders, and obey the orders which they ſhould give. The Spaniards, after this tranſaction, returned back again to their own camp; and, taking with them all their forces, came and incamped together with the Romans, and began their march with them towards Aſdrubal.

The Carthaginian General was at this time incamped in the neighbourhood of Bætula, a city ſituated in the Caſtalonian diſtrict, at no great diſtance from the

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ſilver mines. But when he heard that the Romans were advancing towards him, he went into another camp, which was ſecured behind by a river. In his front he had a plain, which was bordered at the extremity by a riſing ground; of a height ſufficient to cover the camp; and of ſufficient length alſo for drawing up the army in battle. In this place he remained; taking care only to place continually an advanced guard of troops upon the riſing ground. As ſoon as Scipio arrived, he was impatient to engage: but the great advantages of the ground in which Aſdrubal was incamped filled him with perplexity. When he had waited however two whole days, and began to fear, that, if Mago and Aſdrubal the ſon of Geſco ſhould advance alſo with their armies, he ſhould then be incloſed on every ſide, he reſolved to make ſome attempt at leaſt to draw the enemy to a battle. Having ordered therefore the reſt of the army to remain in the intrenchments, and to hold themſelves in readineſs to engage, he ſent away a part of the light-armed troops, together with the extraordinaries of the infantry, to attack thoſe bodies of the enemy that were poſted upon the riſing ground. This order was executed with vigour. The Carthaginian

thaginian General remained for ſome time quiet, and expected the event. But, when he ſaw that his men were cloſely preſſed by the Romans, and that they ſuffered greatly in the action, he drew out his army, and, truſting to the advantage of his ſituation, began to range them in order of battle upon the riſing ground. Scipio then ſent away all the light-armed forces, to aſſiſt thoſe that were firſt engaged: and, at the ſame time, dividing the reſt of his army into two equal bodies, he gave one of them to Lælius, and ordered him to make a circuit round the riſing ground, and fall upon the right of the enemy, while himſelf with the other wheeled round on the oppoſite ſide, and attacked their left. While this was done, Aſdrubal was but juſt beginning to draw out his troops from the intrenchments. For to this moment he had remained quiet; not expecting that the Romans would riſk a battle againſt him in ſo ſtrong a poſt. And now, when the thing had happened, it was too late to draw up his army in proper order. The Romans therefore falling thus upon the wings before they had taken their reſpective poſts, not only gained the top of the riſing ground without reſiſtance, but continuing alſo to advance,

vance, while the enemy was ſtill in motion to be formed, killed thoſe who preſented their flank to them as they marched, and forced the reſt, who had juſt formed themſelves in front, to fly. When Aſdrubal perceived, that his troops were repulſed in every part, perſiſting in the plan which he at firſt had formed, he reſolved not to continue the battle to the laſt extremity. Taking with him therefore the money and the elephants, and collecting together as many as he was able of thoſe thoſe that fled, he retreated towards the Tagus, with deſign to paſs over the Pyrenæan mountains into Gaul.

Scipio, not judging it proper to purſue the enemy, leſt the other Generals ſhould in the mean time advance towards him, gave permiſſion to the ſoldiers to pillage the camp. On the following day, he aſſembled together all the priſoners, and gave the neceſſary orders concerning them. Their numbers were ten thouſand of the foot, and more than two thouſand horſe. The Spaniards through all the country, who had taken arms in favour of the Carthaginians, came and ſubmitted themſelves to the Romans at diſcretion. In the converſations which they held with Scipio upon this occaſion, they all ſaluted him by the name of King. This appellation had firſt been

been given to him by Edeco, who had alſo proſtrated himſelf before him. Andobalis uſed afterwards the ſame expreſſion. The word at that time paſſed without any obſervation. But after the preſent victory, when Scipio found that all the Spaniards addreſſed him by that title, he thought it a matter that deſerved his moſt ſerious reflection. Having aſſembled them therefore all together, he told them; "that he ſhould always deſire to be, and to be eſteemed by all, a man of a mind truly royal: but that he neither would be a king, nor would be ſo called by any one; and that, for the time to come, they ſhould addreſs him by no other appellation than that of General."

The greatneſs of ſoul, that was diſplayed by Scipio upon this occaſion, may very juſtly be thought to deſerve applauſe. Though at this time he was extremely young, and fortune had ſo favoured him in his career, that a whole ſubject people made a voluntary offer to him of the royal title, he remained conſtant to himſelf, and was not to be tempted by ſo flattering a ſhew of honour. But this ſame greatneſs will appear in a degree much more exalted, if we turn our view upon the later period of his life.

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For when, after his exploits in Spain, he had ſubdued the Carthaginians, and brought the faireſt and the largeſt provinces of Afric, from the Philænean altars even to the pillars of Hercules, into ſubjection to his country; when he had conquered Aſia and the Aſſyrian kings; and forced the nobleſt and the moſt conſiderable parts of the whole known world to ſubmit to the Roman ſway; how many occaſions aroſe, of eſtabliſhing himſelf in royalty, in almoſt any part of the earth that he ſhould chooſe? A ſituation like this might have inſpired not only a human mind, but even divinity itſelf, if I may be allowed to ſay it, with ambitious pride. But ſo elevated, ſo ſuperior was the ſoul of Scipio to that of other men, that, though ſovereignty is regarded as the greateſt bleſſing which the Gods can give, and though it was thrown ſo often in his way by fortune, he rejected it with diſdain; and preferred his own duty, and the intereſts of his country, to all the dazzling ſplendour and imagined happineſs of power. But let us return from this digreſſion.

Scipio, having ſeparated the Spaniards from the reſt of the priſoners, diſmiſſed them without ranſom to their ſeveral countries. He permitted Andobalis to

chooſe for himſelf three hundred of the horſes, and diſtributed the reſt among thoſe who had none. He then took poſſeſſion of the Carthaginian camp, becauſe it was ſituated with ſo great advantage; and remained there with the army, expecting the other Generals of the Carthaginians. He ſent ſome troops alſo towards the Pyrenæan mountains, to obſerve the motions of Aſdrubal. When the ſummer was ended, he again decamped; and returned back to Taraco, to take his winter quarters in that city.

EXTRACT the SEVENTH.

The preparations of Philip for maintaining the war againſt the Ætolians, ſupported by Attalus and the Romans. A digreſſion on Signals by lighted torches.

CHAP. I.

THE Ætolians, having now conceived the greateſt expectations from the arrival of Attalus and the Romans, ſtruck a terrour into all the Greeks, and were ready to attack them by land, while Publius Sulpitius and Attalus preſſed them on the ſide of the ſea. The Achæans therefore ſent an embaſſy to Philip, to implore aſſiſtance. For, beſides the danger which threatened them from the Ætolians, Machanidas alſo had drawn together an army upon the borders of the Argian territory. The Bœotians, apprehenſive that the fleet would make a deſcent upon their coaſts, demanded likewiſe from Philip a leader and a body of troops. The Eubœans preſſed him with the greateſt earneſtneſs to take ſome meaſures

for their defence. The Acarnanians urged the ſame requeſt. An embaſſy came alſo from Epirus. At the ſame time a report was ſpread, that Scerdilaidas and and Pleuratus were drawing together their forces: and that the Thracians, who were contiguous to Macedon, and eſpecially the Mædians, had reſolved to invade that kingdom, as ſoon as Philip ſhould be removed to any diſtance from it. The Ætolians likewiſe had already ſecured Thermopylæ, by ditches and intrenchments, and ſtrong bodies of troops: and were perſuaded, that they had ſhut the entrance againſt Philip; and that it would not be poſſible for him to advance to the aſſiſtance of his allies that were within thoſe paſſes.

Conjunctures like theſe, in which the leaders of armies are obliged to exert all their ſtrength, and to bring into trial their whole ability both of mind and body, are thoſe which moſt particularly deſerve the attention of the reader. For as, in the diverſions of the field, the force and vigour of the hunted beaſts are never ſo conſpicuouſly diſplayed, as when they are preſſed on every ſide by danger; juſt ſo it happened with reſpect to theſe commanders; and in this light it was that Philip now appeared. As ſoon therefore as he

had dismissed the embassadours, with assurance that he would assist them with his utmost power, he applied his whole attention to the war: turning himself on every side; and considering with the greatest care, to what part first he should direct his aim. Being informed that Attalus had passed over with his army to the island Peparethus, and was master of the open country, he sent a garrison to secure the city. He ordered Polyphantas to march with a body of troops, to cover Phocis and Bœotia. To Chalcis, and the other cities of Eubœa, he sent Menippus with a thousand heavy-armed soldiers, and five hundred Agrianians. At the same time he began his own march towards Scotussa; having ordered the Macedonian troops to be assembled in that place. But when he heard that Attalus had sailed away to Nicæa; and that the Ætolian chiefs were assembled together at Heraclea, in order to deliberate concerning the operations of the war; he again left Scotussa, and marched with the greatest haste, that he might either prevent or disperse their meeting. But the assembly had separated before he was able to arrive. He therefore wasted the country; and when he had destroyed, or taken away, all the

corn, that was found among the people who lived round the Ænian bay, he returned back to Scotuſſa, and, leaving there the body of his army, went himſelf to Demetrias with the light-armed forces and the royal troop, and attended to the deſigns of the enemy. And that the earlieſt knowledge might be obtained of all their motions, he ſent orders to Peparethus, to the people of Phocis, and thoſe of Eubœa, that they ſhould inform him of every thing that ſhould happen, by ſignals of lighted torches raiſed upon Tiſæum; a mountain of Theſſaly, which ſtood commodious for conveying this kind of notice from all the parts now mentioned. But as this manner of making ſignals is of the greateſt ſervice in war; and no perfect method has hitherto appeared of carrying it into practice; it will not be unuſeful, if we here pauſe a while, and beſtow upon it ſuch conſideration as the importance of the ſubject well deſerves.

CHAP. II.

IT is a thing well known, that opportunity, which has ſo great a ſhare in the accompliſhment of all deſigns, has the greateſt in thoſe that belong to war. Now, of all the inventions which have been

been contrived for ſecuring opportunity, the moſt effectual is that of making ſignals by the means of lighted torches. By this method, things which have been juſt tranſacted, and others at the very time in which they happen, may be communicated to thoſe who are concerned to know them; though they are diſtant perhaps three or four days journey, and ſometimes even many days from the place; and the requiſite aſſiſtance be received, when it ſeems ſcarcely poſſible to expect it. In former times, the manner of conveying this notice was too ſimple; and the invention, upon that account, loſt much of its advantage. For the method was, to ſettle by concert ſome fixed and determinate ſignals. But as the things which happen are infinite, the greater part were incapable of being ſignified by ſuch a method. Thus, for example, that an army is arrived at Oreum, Peparethus, or at Chalcis, may be expreſſed by ſignals before concerted. But accidents of a different kind, ſuch as the revolt of the citizens, the diſcovery of treaſon, maſſacres committed in the city, and other events like theſe; accidents, which, though they are very frequent, cannot before be taken into account; and which, becauſe they happen unexpectedly,

require a ſpeedier conſultation and more quick relief; theſe accidents never could be ſignified by ſignals of torches before concerted. For it is not poſſible that ſignals ſhould be concerted, to give notice of events which cannot be foreſeen.

Æneas, who compoſed a work on the Art of War, perceiving the defects of this method, added indeed ſome little improvement to this invention; but was very far from carrying it to that degree of perfection which the thing requires. The reader may judge of it from the account that follows.

Let thoſe, ſays he, who intend to convey and to receive intelligence of what has happened by the means of lighted torches, take two earthen veſſels, of a depth and breadth exactly equal. The depth of three cubits may commonly be ſufficient, and the breadth of one. Let them then take two corks, a little leſs in ſize than the mouths of the veſſels, and in the middle of them fix two ſticks; which muſt be divided, on the outſide into equal portions, very diſtinctly marked, and containing three fingers breadth in each. Upon each of the portions inſcribe one or other of thoſe events which uſually happen in the time of war. On one, for example; "A body of cavalry is come into

into the country." On the next; "A body of heavy infantry." Upon a third; "Light-armed forces." On another; "A body of cavalry and infantry." Then again; "A fleet of ships." Afterwards; "Corn." And in the same manner upon the rest till all the portions are severally filled with those events, which are capable of being foreseen, and which the state and condition of the war may render probable. Particular care is to be taken, that the tapholes in both the vessels be exactly equal; that the water may be discharged alike from both. Let the vessels be then filled with water, and the corks with the sticks be placed upon the water; and then let the tapholes be opened. When this is done, it is clear, that, if all things are exactly equal in both vessels, the corks, together with the sticks that are upon them, will sink alike in both, as the water is discharged. When the experiment therefore has first been made, and the sticks are found to descend in equal time, let the vessels be carried to the respective places, in which the signals are to be given and received. And when any one of those events, which are inscribed upon the sticks, has happened, let those on one side raise a lighted torch, and hold it erect, till another

torch be ſhewn on the other ſide, Then let the firſt be dropped; and the tap-holes of the veſſels on both ſides be opened. And when, by the ſinking of the cork, that portion of the ſtick, which is inſcribed with the event intended to be communicated, becomes level with the mouth of the veſſel, let thoſe on one ſide again raiſe a lighted torch, and thoſe on the other ſtop the taphole of their veſſel, and examine the inſcription that is alſo level with the mouth. For the writing in this part will be the ſame in one veſſel as in the other; if all things have been performed in exact and equal time.

But this method, though preferable indeed to that of making concerted ſignals with the help of torches, is far from being attended with ſufficient certainty. For it is evident, that all things cannot be foreſeen: and, if they could, that it would be impoſſible to inſcribe them all upon a ſtick. When an event therefore happens, of which there was no ſuſpicion, no notice can ever be given of it in this method. Add to this, that the inſcriptions alſo upon the ſticks are themſelves too indeterminate. They neither ſhew the numbers of the infantry or cavalry; nor into what part of the country they are come; nor the number of the ſhips arrived;

rived; nor the quantity of the corn. For as theſe are circumſtances, which cannot poſſibly be known before they happen, it is by conſequence impoſſible to aſcertain or mark them. And yet this is the moſt important part of the whole. For, unleſs we know the numbers of the enemy, and the place into which they are come, how ſhall it be determined what aſſiſtance is neceſſary to be ſent? Unleſs we are informed, how many ſhips the fleet contains, and what quantity of corn the allies have furniſhed, how can we frame a judgment with regard to the event, or how in a word be able to take any meaſures?

The laſt method, which I ſhall mention, was invented either by Cleoxenus or Democlitus, but perfected by myſelf. This method is preciſe, and capable of ſignifying every thing that happens with the greateſt accuracy. A very exact attention however is required in uſing it. It is this which follows.

Take the alphabet, and divide it into five parts, with five letters in each. In the laſt part indeed, one letter will be wanting; but this is of no importance. Then let thoſe, who are to give and to receive the ſignals, write upon five tablets the five portions of the letters in their proper

proper order; and concert together the following plan. That he, on one ſide, who is to make the ſignal, ſhall firſt raiſe two lighted torches, and hold them erect, till they are anſwered by torches from the other ſide. This only ſerves to ſhew, that they are on both ſides ready and prepared. That afterwards, he again who gives the ſignal, ſhall raiſe firſt ſome torches upon the left hand, in order to make known to thoſe on the other ſide, which of the tablets is to be inſpected. If the firſt, for example; a ſingle torch: if the ſecond, two: and ſo of the reſt. That then he ſhall raiſe other torches alſo upon the right; to mark in the ſame manner, to thoſe who receive the ſignal, which of the letters upon the tablet is to be obſerved and written. When they have thus regulated their plan, and taken their reſpective poſts, it will be neceſſary firſt to have a dioptrical inſtrument, framed, with two holes or tubes; one for diſcerning the right, and the other the left hand of the perſon who is to raiſe the torches on the oppoſite ſide. The tablets muſt be placed erect, and in their proper order, near the inſtrument. And, upon the right and left there ſhould be alſo a ſolid fence, of about ten feet in length, and of the height of a man: that the torches,

torches, being raiſed along the top of theſe ramparts, way give a more certain light; and, when they are dropped again, that they may alſo be concealed behind them. When all things then are thus prepared, if it be intended, for example, to convey this notice; "that ſome of the ſoldiers, about a hundred in number, are gone over to the enemy;" it will be neceſſary in the firſt place to chooſe words for this purpoſe which contain the feweſt letters. Thus, if it be ſaid; "Cretans a hundred have deſerted;" the ſame thing is expreſſed in leſs than half of the letters which compoſe the former ſentence. Theſe words then, being firſt written down, are communicated by the means of torches in the following manner. The firſt letter is Cappa; which ſtands in the ſecond diviſion of the alphabet, and upon the ſecond tablet. The perſon therefore, who makes the ſignal, firſt holds up two torches upon the left; to ſignify that it is the ſecond tablet, which is to be inſpected: and afterwards five upon the right; to ſhew that Cappa is the letter, which he who receives the ſignal muſt obſerve and write. For Cappa ſtands the fifth in the ſecond diviſion of the letters. Then again, he holds up four torches upon the left; becauſe Ro is found in

the

the fourth diviſion: and two upon the right, to denote that it ſtands the ſecond in that diviſion. From hence, the perſon who receives the ſignal writes Ro upon his tables: and, in the ſame manner all the reſt of the letters. By this method, an account of every thing that happens may be conveyed with the moſt perfect acuracy. It is true indeed, that, becauſe every letter requires a double ſignal, a great number of torches muſt be employed. If the neceſſary pains however be uſed, the thing will be found to be very practicable. In both theſe methods, it is principally requiſite, that the perſons employed ſhould firſt be exerciſed by practice: that, when a real occaſion happens, the ſignals may be made and anſwered without any miſtake.

With reſpect to the ſeeming difficulty of the method, it would be eaſy to ſhew by many inſtances, that there is a very great difference in the ſame things, when they are firſt propoſed, and when they are afterwards rendered familiar to us by habit: and that many things, which appear in the beginning to be not only difficult but abſolutely impracticable, in the courſe of time, and by continued uſe, are accompliſhed with the greateſt eaſe. Among numberleſs examples, the art of

reading

reading may be mentioned, as one of the cleareſt and the moſt convincing proofs of the truth of this remark. Take a man, who has never learned to read, but is otherwiſe a man of ſenſe. Set a child before him, who has learned: and order him to read a paſſage in a book. It is certain that this man will ſcarcely be able to perſuade himſelf, that the child, as he reads, muſt conſider diſtinctly, firſt the form of all the letters; in the next place their power; and thirdly, their connection one with another. For each of theſe things requires a certain portion of time. When he hears him therefore read four or five lines together without any heſitation, and in a breath, he will find it very difficult to believe, that the child never ſaw the book before. But if to the reading ſome geſture alſo ſhould be added; if the child ſhould attend to all the ſtops; and obſerve all the breathings rough and ſmooth; it will be abſolutely impoſſible to convince the man, that this is true. From hence therefore we may learn, never to be deterred from any uſeful purſuit by the ſeeming difficulties that attend it; but to endeavour rather to ſurmount thoſe difficulties by practice and by habit. It is habit, which gives to men the nobleſt acquiſitions: even thoſe which are upon

many

many occaſions the principal means of their ſafety. With reſpect to myſelf, what induced me to enter into a diſcuſſion of this kind, was the remark that was made in a former part of this work: that, in the preſent age, the ſciences are advanced to ſo great perfection, that almoſt every thing is capable of being taught by method. Such digreſſions therefore deſerve to be conſidered as ſome of the moſt uſeful parts of a hiſtory that is well compoſed.

EXTRACT the EIGHTH.

The manner in which the Aſpaſians paſs the Oxus.

THE wandering tribes that are called Aſpaſians live between the Oxus and the Tanais. The firſt of theſe rivers diſcharges itſelf into the Hyrcanian ſea, and the other into the Mœotis. Both of them are ſo large as to be navigable. It is difficult therefore to conceive, in what manner this barbarous people paſs the Oxus without the help of veſſels, and come into Hyrcania with their horſes *.

* There is much Geographical error in this account. For Hyrcania itſelf is ſituated between the Tanais and the Oxus. It might be imagined, that what the author calls the Oxus ſhould mean the Araxes; which enters the Hyrcanian ſea on the weſtern ſide, as the Oxus does on the eaſt. And theſe two rivers are often miſtaken one for the other by the ancients. But on the other hand, what he afterwards ſays, that this river riſes in mount Caucaſus and runs through Bactriana, agrees with the Oxus, but not with the Araxes. The truth is, the ancients, even after the expedition of Alexander, had a very imperfect knowledge of theſe parts of the globe. As this is almoſt the ſingle miſtake of this kind that I have obſerved in Polybius, I was willing to remark it. In general, he is more exact and accurate, in the names of places and deſcriptions of countries, than even the profeſſed writers of geography.

Two different accounts are given of this fact: one of which is probable; and the other, though very extraordinary, not impoſſible. The Oxus takes its ſources from mount Caucaſus; and being increaſed by the addition of many large ſtreams as it flows through Bactriana, rolls its waters over the plain with a full and impetuous courſe. From thence it paſſes through a deſert to the top of a craggy precipice; whoſe height, together with the ſtrength and the rapidity of the waters, throws the ſtream forward with ſuch violence, that it falls upon the ground below at the diſtance of more than a ſtadium from the rock. By this way, it is ſaid the Aſpaſians enter Hyrcania; paſſing cloſe along the rock, and under the fall of the river. But there is another account, which appears to be much more probable. This account affirms; that at the bottom of the rock there are ſome large cavities in the ground; that the river, forcing its way downward through theſe cavities, runs to a moderate diſtance under ground, and afterwards appears again; and that the barbarians, being well acquainted with the part that is left dry, paſs over it with their horſes into Hyrcania.

EXTRACT the NINTH.

Antiochus gains the victory in an engagement againſt Euthydemus who had revolted.

WHEN Antiochus was informed, that Euthydemus had incamped with his whole army near Taguria, and that he had ſtationed a body of ten thouſand cavalry upon the banks of the river Arius, to defend the paſſage; he immediately raiſed the ſiege, and reſolved to paſs the river, and to advance towards the enemy. Being diſtant three days journey from the place, during the two firſt days he moved with a moderate pace. But on the evening of the third, having ordered the reſt of the army to decamp and follow him at break of day, he took the cavalry and the light-armed troops, together with ten thouſand of the Peltaſtæ, and continued his march all night with the greateſt haſte. For he had heard, that the cavalry of the enemy, which guarded the paſſage of the river by day, retired, as ſoon as night came on, to a certain city, which was full twenty ſtadia

diſtant from the river. As the country was a level plain, commodious for the march of cavalry, he arrived at the expected time, and paſſed the river with the greateſt part of his forces before the day approached. But the Bactrian cavalry, being now informed by their ſcouts of what had happened, ran towards the river, and were ready to attack the troops as they marched. The king, judging it to be neceſſary that he ſhould receive their firſt charge, exhorted the two thouſand horſemen, that always fought near his perſon, to perform their duty; and having ordered the reſt to range themſelves in troops and cohorts, and to take their accuſtomed poſts, led on his body of cavalry and engaged with the foremoſt of the enemy. In this action he diſtinguiſhed himſelf above all that were with him. Many fell on both ſides: but the firſt ſquadron of the enemy was at laſt broken by the king. When the ſecond, and afterwards the third ſquadron advanced to the charge, the troops of Antiochus were in their turn preſſed, and began to fall into diſorder. But Panætolus, bringing up the reſt of the cavalry; who were now almoſt all completely formed, reſcued the king from the danger; and forced the Bactrians, whoſe ranks

ranks were already broken, to fly in great diſorder. Nor did they ſtop their flight, till they had reached the camp of Euthydemus: being ſtill cloſely purſued by Panætolus, and having loſt the greateſt part of their men. The royal cavalry, when they had killed great numbers, and taken many alſo alive, at laſt deſiſted from the purſuit, and incamped upon the banks of the river. Antiochus had a horſe killed under him in the battle; and was himſelf wounded in the mouth, and loſt ſome of his teeth. Nor was there indeed any action of his life, in which he gained ſo high a reputation for courage, as in this engagement. Euthydemus, diſheartened by this defeat, retreated to Zariaſpa, a city of Bractriana, with all his army.

End of the THIRD VOLUME.

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